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ABSTRACT 
 
Essays on Modeling the Economic Impacts of a Foreign Animal Disease on the United 
States Agricultural Sector. (December 2009) 
Amy DeAnn Hagerman, B.S., Oklahoma State University; 
M.S., Texas A&M University 
Chair of Advisory Committee: Dr. Bruce A. McCarl 
 
Foreign animal disease can cause serious damage to the United States (US) agricultural 
sector and foot-and-mouth disease (FMD), in particular, poses a serious threat. FMD 
causes death and reduced fecundity in infected animals, as well as significant economic 
consequences. FMD damages can likely be reduced through implementing pre-planned 
response strategies. Empirical studies have evaluated the economic consequences of 
alternative strategies, but typically employ simplified models. This dissertation seeks to 
improve US preparedness for avoiding and/or responding to an animal disease outbreak 
by addressing three issues related to strategy assessment in the context of FMD: 
integrated multi region economic and epidemic evaluation, inclusion of risk, and 
information uncertainty. 
An integrated economic/epidemic evaluation is done to examine the impact of various 
control strategies. This is done by combining a stochastic, spatial FMD simulation model 
with a national level, regionally disaggregated agricultural sector mathematical 
programming economic model.  In the analysis, strategies are examined in the context of 
California's dairy industry. Alternative vaccination, disease detection and movement 
restriction strategies are considered as are trade restrictions. The results reported include 
epidemic impacts, national economic impacts, prices, regional producer impacts, and 
disease control costs under the alternative strategies. Results suggest that, including trade 
restrictions, the median national loss from the disease outbreak is as much as $17 billion 
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when feed can enter the movement restriction zone. Early detection reduces the median 
loss and the standard deviation of losses. Vaccination does not reduce the median 
disease loss, but does have a smaller standard deviation of loss which would indicate it is 
a risk reducing strategy.  
Risk in foreign animal disease outbreaks is present from several sources; however, 
studies comparing alternative control strategies assume risk neutrality. In reality, there 
will be a desire to minimize the national loss as well as minimize the chance of an 
extreme outcome from the disease (i.e. risk aversion). We perform analysis on FMD 
control strategies using breakeven risk aversion coefficients in the context of an outbreak 
in the Texas High Plains. Results suggest that vaccination while not reducing average 
losses is a risk reducing strategy.  
Another issue related to risk and uncertainty is the response of consumers and domestic 
markets to the presence of FMD. Using a highly publicized possible FMD outbreak in 
Kansas that did not turn out to be true, we examine the role of information uncertainty in 
futures market response. Results suggest that livestock futures markets respond to 
adverse information even when that information is untrue. Furthermore, the existence of 
herding behavior and potential for momentum trading exaggerate the impact of 
information uncertainty related to animal disease.  
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1. INTRODUCTION 
Historically the vast majority of recommendations regarding the management of animal 
disease have been based primarily on analyses with epidemic simulation models that 
minimize the time to control disease outbreaks. After the 2001 United Kingdom (UK) 
FMD outbreak, such modeling was termed “armchair epidemiology” and was strongly 
criticized (Kitching, Thrusfield and Taylor). This criticism stemmed from a post 
outbreak appraisal of the policy recommendations made and implemented during the 
outbreak (contiguous herd slaughter plus slaughter of infected and dangerous contact 
herds) that judged those approaches to have caused excessive, unnecessary long term 
damage to the livestock industry. Cited evidence includes findings that the UK exhibited 
a declining trend in animal agriculture following the outbreak (Bai et al.) with some 
producers choosing to scale down or discontinue operations (Bennet et al.).  Similarly, 
the extensive vaccination and slaughter from the policy implemented during the 
Netherlands’ 2001 FMD outbreak resulted in ex post criticism by livestock industry 
participants who felt the amount of slaughter was not justified (Pluimers et al.).  
The cost of animal disease impacts is generally broader than would arise under a simple 
accounting of the number of dead animals or an examination of just the length of the 
outbreak. Such costs include the cost of lost animals and the direct costs of disease 
management along with the national welfare losses, short and long term trade losses, 
environmental consequences, consumer demand shifts and local impacts. Epidemic 
model driven strategy selection based on quickly eradicating the disease may not 
minimize total economic impact in either the short or long run. Neither can economics 
be the sole criteria; rather an integrated economic/epidemic model is likely to better 
support the implementation and evaluation of disease control strategies.  
_______________________ 
This dissertation follows the style of the Journal of Agricultural and Applied Economics. 
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Ideally, a disease control evaluation system would be dynamic and spatial in nature 
(Rich and Winter-Nelson) taking into account both the time it takes to control the 
disease and the full economic implications of the control strategies chosen. Control 
strategy efficacy can be measured in terms of the lost animals, disease management, 
national welfare costs, short and long term trade losses, environmental consequences, 
consumer demand shifts and local impacts. The evaluations should consider not only 
average affects but also the distribution of effects. The economic portion of the analysis 
can capture some or all of these loss categories and integrate them into a set of measures 
to quantify the distribution of outcomes from an animal disease outbreak in a particular 
region. The reason economic models have not been more extensively used in the past is 
the difficulty in developing a model that can quantify those impacts that extend beyond 
the primary livestock markets and the more firm level and epidemic orientation of many 
of the studies (Rich and Winter-Nelson). 
1.1. Dissertation Objectives and Procedures 
The ultimate objective of this work is to improve the preparedness of the US for 
avoiding and/or dealing with animal disease outbreaks. This will be done in the case of 
FMD a disease that has not been found in the U.S. since 1929, but could occur as 
exhibited by recent outbreaks in other parts of the world plus increased transmission 
likelihood as influenced by increased international commerce and tourism along with 
terrorism possibilities. More operationally this work:  
• Assesses the economic and epidemic consequences of select FMD related 
strategies and in the process  
o develops a deterministic, integrated economic/epidemic model approach that 
can be used in this and future assessments because it captures economic 
impacts more fully across the US agricultural sector by including the inter-
relationships among markets   
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o extends the framework into a risk setting to improve understanding of how 
risk and uncertainty impact FMD response policies and livestock markets.  
• Examines the way that information release can influence livestock markets.  
This provides a contribution to the economic/epidemic literature by assessing impacts in 
vertically and horizontally linked markets considering effects on consumers and 
producers, in both domestic and international markets. It also provides an approach to 
examining the role of risk and uncertainty in formulating policy for control strategy 
selection ex ante using the breakeven risk aversion coefficient concept. Finally a 
contribution is made by exploring the role of information uncertainty factors into futures 
market response.  
In order to meet the objective, this dissertation will:  
• conceptualize a linked economic/epidemic model plus develop an overall 
analysis framework that evaluates vulnerability and response strategies in terms 
of welfare, market and risk consequences.  
• implement that framework in the context of the concentrated beef feeding region 
located in the High Plain of Texas and in the large dairy production region 
located in the Central Valley of California.   
• evaluate ex post disease management strategies regarding vaccination, 
surveillance and detection, and quarantine zones in both a risk averse and a risk 
neutral setting 
• examine the market consequences of information uncertainty about disease in the 
U.S. within the context of an FMD scare in Holton, Kansas in 2002.  
1.2. Plan of Dissertation   
This dissertation consists of five essays in addition to introductory and conclusions 
sections: 
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• Section 2 contains the first essay that sets the stage for the dissertation by 
providing an overview of FMD as an economic damage causing disease, the 
threat to US livestock industries and what the likely response strategy in the US 
will be.  
• Section 3 contains essay 2, which develops and explains the modeling done in 
the study by first reviewing the literature on integrated epidemic-economic 
modeling in general and the economic justification for various model choices, 
then explains the modeling methodology used in the assessments in essays 3 and 
4, and covers the methodology for linking the epidemic and economic models. 
The code related to the model conceptualized in this essay is provided in the 
appendix.  
• Section 4 contains the third essay that presents an application of the model 
framework discussed in essay 2 and the appendix, using the economic/epidemic 
analysis of control to examine several standard disease mitigation strategies like 
detection, slaughter, vaccination and movement restrictions. Impacts will be 
estimated at the local affected region level and at the national aggregate level. 
Specifically we use a framework integrating the Davis Animal Disease 
Simulation (DADS) Model for the epidemic modeling and the Forestry and 
Agricultural Sector Optimization Model (FASOM) for the economic modeling. 
These models are used to examine the impacts of an FMD outbreak in the dairy 
producing areas of California, and discuss briefly the value of using a national 
level sectoral model over input-output or cost benefit analysis.  
• Section 5 contains the fourth essay that risk attitude on the part of policy makers 
would influence control strategy selection in the context of an FMD outbreak in 
the Texas High Plains. In particular alternative intensities of control strategies 
(i.e. enhanced versus regular surveillance of suspect premises during the 
outbreak) are examined. This marks one of the first study to provide economic 
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rankings of strategies that include risk attitude, which would be expected to be a 
key component when faced with a large scale animal disease outbreak.  
• Section 6 contains the fifth and last essay that explores another facet of the 
challenges the country would face in the event of an FMD outbreak. In particular, 
that essay examines market distortions under information uncertainty looking at 
whether herding behavior and momentum trading may cause mispricing when 
information about disease testing is uncertain. Specifically investigating whether 
mispricing occurred as a result of the March 12, 2002 FMD test scare and the 
duration of the distortion.  
• Section 7 contains a general summary and conclusions.  
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2. ESSAY 1: OVERVIEW OF FMD ISSUE AND ECONOMICS 
The FMD virus is considered to be one of the greatest foreign animal disease threats US 
livestock producers face (USDA-APHIS, 2007b).  FMD in animals is highly contagious, 
hardy in various climates and can be carried on almost any surface (Musser). Currently 
the US is FMD free, but the threat of this disease has made it a top priority in the 
nation’s bio-security plan1. 
Although FMD can cause animal deaths, the danger from FMD is not due to the 
mortality rate the disease imposes but rather from the economic consequences. Most 
adult animals survive infection and the young animal death rate is approximately 50% 
(USDA-APHIS, 2007b). Adults often recover in 2-3 weeks. Death rates are higher in 
very young animals, animals with compromised immune systems, and newborns. Its 
primary natural threat is in reduced meat and milk productivity (James and Rushton). 
However, FMD results in almost a 100% morbidity rate (Musser). Its contagiousness 
and hardiness have led to a policy of strict trade regulations against a country where the 
disease is present. Thus, FMD has been labeled an “economic disease” because the 
motivation for its eradication comes from trade and economic reasons rather than the 
threat posed to livestock or human beings (Anthony; James and Rushton).  
This essay sets the stage for the FMD analysis showing the danger presented by FMD 
through both its impact in other parts of the world and the potential damage it could 
cause in the US. First, an illustration of FMD's threat as an economic disease using the 
2001 UK FMD outbreak as an example is presented. Then an overview of the disease 
                                                 
1 Bio-security is “the series of management steps taken to prevent the introduction of 
infectious agents into a herd or flock” (Hutchinson et al., pg. 1). Often the process of 
bio-containment is included in this term. Bio-containment is the set of management 
practices used to prevent the spread of infectious disease once it has entered the herd. 
When an infectious agent is purposefully spread to cause damage to a group or country, 
it is termed bio or agro-terrorism. 
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itself, its historical presence in the US, and its potential threat to US agriculture today 
will be discussed. Finally the control strategies prescribed under current US policy will 
be described as well as alternative strategies that could be used in the event of an 
outbreak.  
2.1. FMD as an Economic Disease: The 2001 UK Outbreak  
To illustrate the economic dangers of an FMD outbreak, we consider the 2001 FMD 
disease outbreak in the United Kingdom, which resulted in the destruction of over 6 
million animals. Only 20% of slaughter was due to slaughter of animals with the actual 
infection. Welfare slaughter (animals killed because of feed or space limits) accounted 
for about 35% (2 million animals) of the total, and the rest (45%) were slaughtered for 
dangerous contact or other disease control purposes (Anderson, 2002; NAO). In 
addition, a little over 500,000 young sheep were slaughtered under the Light Lamb 
Scheme (Thompson et al.). The Light Lamb Scheme slaughtered very young animals 
soon after birth as a disease preventative. Figure 1 provides a breakdown of the number 
of animals destroyed to control the disease.   
The event was also costly.  Total direct costs to the public sector as estimated by the 
U.K. Cabinet Office were £3 billion (British pounds) or almost $5 billion (US dollars 
using 2009 exchange rate). Compensation paid out to farmers and ranchers for their lost 
livestock totaled £1.4 billion ($2.3 billion) and payments to contractors providing goods 
and services used in eradication of the disease totaled £1.3 billion ($2.14 billion). At the 
height of the outbreak in mid-April 10,000 personnel including veterinarians, soldiers 
and support staff were employed in the effort and 100,000 animals were being 
slaughtered per day (Anderson, 2002).  
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 Figure 1. Slaughter of Animals in the 2001 UK FMD Outbreak by Purpose and Species 
(Anderson, 2002)2 
 
 
                                                 
2 Tables and figures are original unless a source is cited directly in the title.  
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The losses were found to extend well beyond the animals slaughtered and direct costs. 
During the outbreak, which lasted from February 20 to September 30, borders remained 
closed to exports of live animals and animal products. Such trade barriers would be 
expected to cause significant losses to society, harm commercial trade, and hamper 
competition (Evans) both in the short and long run. In the time frame from 2000 to 2003, 
cattle and sheep exports from the UK were reduced by 72%, meat and processed meat 
exports were reduced by 45%. If the 1999 BSE trade losses still in place as of 2001 are 
also taken into account, the trade loss was estimated to increase to 92% from a “no ban” 
baseline (Phillipidis and Hubbard). It is estimated that trade markets in the UK will not 
recover until 2020 at least (Philippidis and Hubbard), perhaps longer after the 2007 
outbreak.  
In terms of secondary losses, the government estimates £4.5 to £5.4 billion ($7.4 to $8.9 
billion) were lost in tourism. Visitors were deterred by the blanket closures of footpaths 
and the media images of pyres used in mass carcass incineration (NAO).  Figure 2 
illustrates the tourism losses during the outbreak period.  From 2000 to 2001, March 
shows an increase but this may be because the height of the outbreak occurred in April. 
Tourism turned out to be the largest loss category of the entire disease outbreak (NAO).  
The UK was not the only country that experienced an FMD outbreak in 2001, but may 
be the best documented. The world community saw many previously FMD-free 
countries become contaminated in 2001. Figure 3 shows a map of the countries (darker 
areas) that reported a 2001 FMD outbreak to the World Organization for Animal Health 
(OIE), FAO or the World Reference Laboratory.  
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Figure 2. Change in Tourism in the UK from 2000 to 2001 (NAO) 
 
 
Figure 3. FMD Events Reported in 2001 (WAHID) 
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Clearly there is valid concern over the consequences of FMD coming to the United 
States.  In particular, given the current state of preparedness for such an event—or lack 
thereof—concerns have been raised over the country’s ability to quickly and effectively 
control an FMD outbreak. In the UK example, a post-event analysis revealed the 
country's lack of preparation led to both higher monetary costs and larger animal losses 
than anticipated (Anderson, 2002). With pre-planning for such a disaster, the 
infrastructure would support a more rapid, effective response.  The U.K. FMD outbreak 
in 2007 was less severe because there was a plan in place and consequently response was 
swift with the outbreak was rapidly controlled; however, severe and long lasting damage 
has been done to the country’s animal agriculture sector (Anderson, 2008).   
2.2. Background on FMD 
Any even-toed, split-foot ungulate is susceptible to FMD—including cattle, sheep, 
swine, bison, goats, deer and elk.  There are 7 serotypes of FMD and more than 60 sub-
serotypes (USDA-APHIS, 2007a). Once an animal is infected, the virus can be spread 
through any secretion, excretion, or tissue including the animal's breath, milk, semen, 
saliva, urine, feces and blood. Animals shed the disease for days or weeks after initial 
infection. It is transmitted primarily via inhalation or the ingestion of materials 
containing the virus. It can also be spread via contaminated organic and inorganic 
materials such as trucks, cloths, hay or people (Ekboir). Finally, under certain 
conditions, the disease can be spread through wind. Wildlife can also contribute to 
disease spread.  
The primary mode of FMD entry into a disease free country is through the import and 
subsequent use in feeding of materials contaminated with the virus or the import of live 
animals (Musser). Swine can excrete large amounts of the virus but are not highly 
susceptible. In the U.S., swine operations are largely centralized, making containment 
and tracing easier. Sheep, goats and exotics make up only a small portion of the overall 
livestock sector, so their primary threat is as carriers of the disease. Cattle populations 
are largely de-centralized and highly susceptible to the disease. Animal movements are 
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large and complex making tracing difficult.  Also wild deer, feral hogs and other 
susceptible wildlife populations are particularly effective as carriers since FMD could go 
undetected for long periods of time and these animals range over large areas, often 
grazing with susceptible domesticated herds. In 2001 FMD outbreaks in Africa, the 
African Buffalo played a pivotal role in the spread of the disease (Bengis, Kock and 
Fischer).   
FMD has an incubation period of 1 to 8 days (3 days on average), after which clinical 
signs of the disease will present themselves. Signs include blisters on the mouth and feet, 
lameness, and excess salivation (USDA-APHIS, 2007a). These signs can be quite subtle. 
In the 1997 Taiwanese outbreak, FMD was found only in hogs, whereas the 2000 
Taiwanese outbreak included cattle and goats (Musser). The goats did not have lesions 
in the mouth but the cattle did (Musser). In the 2001 U.K. outbreak, sheep showed very 
few signs of the disease but were the primary method of transmission and the largest 
category of slaughter (Anderson, 2002). In addition, the blisters, lameness and excess 
salivation could indicate a more benign problem; for example, burrs or mold in feed 
could cause similar symptoms (Cattle Buyers Weekly, 2002a). Only lab tests can 
identify the true cause. Even if farmers see clinical signs of the virus, it is possible they 
will not run the appropriate tests in a timely manner, either because they do not 
recognize the danger or because they do not wish to be the epicenter of an FMD 
outbreak.  
In summary, FMD can spread over large distances fairly quickly.  It takes only a small 
amount exposure for infection to occur, and the incubation period is relatively short. 
Detection is difficult, and the infected animal can become contagious before visible 
signs of infection (Ekboir). For these reasons, FMD is very dangerous and costly.  
2.2.1. Disease Spread 
A vulnerable animal could go through six possible states: susceptible, latently infected, 
sub-clinically infectious, clinically infectious, immune (either naturally or through 
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vaccination) or dead.  An animal does not have to move through all states, but every 
animal begins in the susceptible state. Most epidemic models are built based on 
simulating the movement of animals through states and for this reason are called “state 
transition models”.  Figure 4 provides a flow of the disease states (adapted from Bates, 
Thurmond and Carpenter).  
 
 
Figure 4. Illustration Depicting the Model States and Pathways for Progression of FMD 
(Bates, Thurmond and Carpenter)  
 
Once a single animal has the virus, the movement through states begins. There may be a 
short period in which the animal is infected but not excreting the disease (latently 
infected) after which the infected animal will start excreting the virus but not showing 
signs of the disease (sub-clinically infectious). These two stages are sometimes simply 
called the sub-clinically infectious or latent period. During this time anything that comes 
in contact with the infected animal can become a carrier, including trucks, feed, clothes, 
non-susceptible species, and other fomites. The latent stage is estimated to last an 
average of 3.7 days; during this stage no virus is detectable (Thurmod and Perez). How 
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an animal moves through the states is largely dependent on the control strategies put in 
place. For example, a susceptible animal that is vaccinated is still partially susceptible, 
but will have some immunity. Under current policies, which will be discussed later, that 
animal is then moved directly to slaughter and thus the probability of spread from that 
animal is eliminated upon proper carcass disposal. Live animal exports cannot take place 
from an FMD infected country (James and Rushton).  
Only very rarely have humans contracted a mild form of FMD, so it is not considered a 
zoonotic disease. Symptoms in humans are mild headache, fever and small sores on the 
hands/feet accompanied by a tingling sensation. Blisters heal within a few days, and full 
recovery occurs within a week. Only serotypes O and A have been shown to infect 
humans. Forty reported cases have been recorded since 1921, these were all in Europe, 
Africa and South America (Bickett-Weddle et al.).  
Meat from animals that have been slaughtered as a result of the FMD outbreak is still of 
human consumption grade. However, livestock products and humans exposed to the 
virus can still carry it for a period of time and cause contamination to other areas. In 
humans the virus can live in the nose and lungs for up to 48 hours and consequently 
spread it to any susceptible animal they come in contact with during that period 
(Musser). Bone and lymph nodes products are particularly adept at carrying the disease 
(Paarlberg and Lee). For this reason livestock product import bans are a standard 
response from trading partners when a previously FMD-free country becomes infected.  
A country that has allowed FMD to become endemic would need to produce 
processed/cooked meat products in order to still participate in international trade. Other 
impacts from FMD that are captured using economic estimation would be the impact of 
FMD on trade of other products from the infected region (e.g. fruit and vegetable exports 
from an area under movement restrictions), local veterinary service interruptions, market 
losses from slaughter ready animals being held past their prime, and restrictions of 
movements of people (James and Rushton).  
15 
 
2.3. FMD in the United States 
FMD has been recorded in the US eight times since 1870. The most devastating outbreak 
was in 1914 where it spread across 22 states, leading to the destruction of 172,000 cattle, 
sheep, swine and goats. Cattle populations are considered to be at particular risk due to 
the comparative ease with which they can be infected by the airborne virus and their 
ability to excrete the virus up to four days before detection (Ekboir); however, severe 
damage could be done in multiple livestock industries.  
2.3.1. Threat to the US 
Although FMD has not been seen in the United States since 1929, it has occurred in 52 
other countries since March 2000 (Musser) increasing the risk of infection today. US 
livestock production shares characteristics with other developed countries that make it 
particularly vulnerable to a foreign animal disease attack (Jin, Elbakidze and McCarl).  
First, it is highly concentrated both in terms of firm numbers and geographic spread. 
Meatpacking is a segment of the supply chain that poses a risk as a supply bottleneck. In 
the US, four firms accounted for 67% of meat packing in 2005 (GIPSA). In Figure 5 
each dot shows the location of a meat packing plant for either Cargill, Tyson, Smithfield, 
National or Swift.  
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Figure 5. Major Meat Packing Plant Locations in the US and Canada (Peel) 
 
Geographically, large scale animal feeding is concentrated in particular regions due to 
land and feed availability. The area enclosed by the box shown in Figure 6 represents 
80% of the fed beef production in the US (Wilson). Iowa alone accounted for 28% of 
pork production in 2008 (USDA-NASS, 2009). Furthermore, the pork and poultry 
industries are centralized into a few firms operating many contract concentrated feeding 
operations.   
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Figure 6. The Concentrated Beef Feeding Region of the United States (Wilson)  
 
Second, the US is a large scale producer and consumer of meat and meat products. 
Consequently, livestock are routinely moved over long distances, changing hands 
several times throughout the supply chain (Jin, Elbakidze and McCarl). One study 
contends that, from farm to table, meat travels on average 994 miles (Cupp et al.).  In 
simulations of FMD, current patterns of animal movement could spread the disease to 25 
states in five days (Chalk).  
Other characteristics that make the US livestock sector vulnerable to FMD are: 
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•  the high levels of livestock and personnel movements to and from other 
countries and South American countries in particular;  
• limited experience of farmers and veterinarians in identifying the disease;  
• limited adherance to biosecurity protocols in areas of high animal movements 
like salebarns; and  
• lack of incentives for farmers to report signs of the disease.  
The remainder of this section will provide a brief overview of US livestock production, 
broken down by susceptible livestock type. This gives the reader an understanding of the 
scope and scale of livestock production as well as provides a context for results 
presented in later sections.  
2.3.2. Beef Cattle 
The US is the largest producer of beef in the world (USDA-ERS, 2009a) with 11.9 
billion metric tons of production, about 22% of world production (USDA-FAS). In 2008, 
the US produced a retail equivalent of $76 billion in value for 26.56 billion pounds of 
beef, or a cattle and calf production value of $34.9 billion (USDA-ERS, 2009a).  
The US is also the top consumer of beef in the world (USDA-FAS) consuming 27.3 
billion pounds in 2008 (USDA-ERS, 2009a). As a consequence, the US is a net importer 
of beef. Imported beef is typically lower value, grass fed beef destined for processing 
and ground beef, whereas exported beef is typically of the higher value, grain finished 
cuts (USDA-ERS, 2009a). In 2008, a little over 7% of the total US beef production was 
exported (USDA-ERS, 2009a) so most beef is processed or consumed domestically.  US 
beef imports primarily come from countries that have a comparative advantage in 
producing beef inexpensively. As shown in Figure 7, Australia is the main source of US 
beef imports followed by Canada (USDA-ERS, 2008).  
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Figure 7. US Beef Imports 2001-2007 (USDA-ERS, 2008) 
 
At this juncture, the impacts three US cases of BSE have had on beef trade is warranted. 
In December, 2003 a Washington state dairy cow was identified as having been infected 
with BSE prompting a total ban on US exports to major beef trading partners. Two other 
confirmed cases of BSE were identified in Texas (2004) and in Alabama (2006), slowing 
the ability of those markets to recover. Of the four major US trading partners prior to 
2003-Japan, Canada, Mexico and South Korea-trade with Mexico and Canada has 
largely resumed, but Japan and South Korea continue to be restricted with both having 
limits on animal age at the time of slaughter to protect against BSE (Mathews, 
Vandeveer and Gustafson) although these limitations began to ease as of 2008 
(Bloomberg News). Figure 8 illustrates US beef exports to these major trading partners 
from 2001 to 2007.  
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Figure 8. US Beef Exports 2001-2007 (USDA-ERS, 2008) 
 
There is also trade in live cattle, primarily with Canada and Mexico due to geographic 
proximity and similar production practices. As the largest live cattle trading partner, 
65% of live cattle imports come from Canada compared to only 33% of beef imports 
(USDA-ERS, 2009a).  
2.3.3. Dairy  
The 2008 US Dairy cow inventory was 9.3 million head, producing almost 190 billion 
pounds of milk (USDA-NASS, 2008). The dairy industry is highly de-centralized, 
primarily made up of family-owned farms, but products are generally marketed through 
producer cooperative associations. The trend on these farms is to use improved genetics 
for more milk production per cow and an increased number of cows per farm. This has 
led to an increasing trend in milk production that more than offsets the declining trend in 
the number of operations and total number of milk cows in the US (USDA-ERS, 2009c). 
The largest dairy producing states are California, Wisconsin, New York, Idaho, and 
Pennsylvania (USDA-NASS, 2008). 
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US International exports of dairy products have historically been small, particularly 
when compared to other products like beef and pork. Trade is primarily based on butter, 
cheese and dried milk. The years 2007-2008 saw an increase in dairy exports that could 
mean an increased importance of trade for the dairy industry in the future (USDA-ERS, 
2009c). Export categories include American cheese, other cheeses, condensed milk, 
evaporated milk, and non-fat dry milk. Imports have mostly been limited to cheese, but 
the levels of imports are somewhat large. Total dairy product imports for the US were 
5.3 billion pounds in 2004 (USDA-ERS, 2009c). The US is a net importer of cheese, 
with the exception of American cheese, which is a net export.  
2.3.4. Swine 
As of 2008, the US was second only to China in pork production with 67.4 million head 
(USDA-FAS), and is the leading pork exporter in the world. The value of pork exports 
alone in 2008 was $4.675 billion (Meyer). The US has been a net exporter of pork and 
pork products since 1995 with net exports increasing eleven fold in the eight years since 
2000 (USDA-ERS, 2009b). This is primarily the result of advances in the efficiency of 
pork production through drastic structural changes away from small, independent 
producers to large commercial operations organized through contracting and vertical 
coordination. This structure reduces production risk (e.g. lower death rate in sows and 
offspring) and allows for optimal year round production regardless of weather 
conditions.  Technological advances are not limited to the way the hogs are raised; other 
advances have been made in genetics, feeding and management techniques to obtain 
more pork per sow as shown in Figure 9 (USDA-ERS, 2009b).  
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Figure 9. US Commercial Pork Production and Breeding Herd Beginning Stocks 1990-
2007 (USDA-ERS, 2009b) 
 
The primary export markets for pork are Japan (28%) followed by Mexico, Hong Kong, 
Russia and Canada. The US primarily exports fresh chilled pork (e.g. loin), which is a 
higher value product. Mexico's US pork demand has fluctuated over time and Canada's 
has dropped with expanding Canadian pork production (USDA-ERS, 2009b). Canada 
and Denmark are the primary sources of US pork imports. Although imports represent a 
small share of total pork usage in the US, these two countries have represented about 
80% of imports since 1985 (USDA-ERS, 2009b). This is primarily represented by 
imports of low-cost cuts like ribs.  
Live hogs, like live cattle, have been traded with Canada and Mexico. The largest 
portion of US live hog imports occurs with Canada, but US live hog exports have 
primarily gone to Mexico (USDA-ERS, 2009b).   
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2.3.5. Sheep and Small Ruminants 
The final major category of susceptible animals, which includes sheep and goats, has 
been losing prevalence in the US livestock sector since the 1940s. In 2007, only 6.2 
million head of sheep were on inventory. There are two major types of sheep operations: 
large rangeland flocks and small farm flocks. Sheep and goats have historically been a 
source of meat and wool, but as the industry transitions there is an increasing niche 
market for cheeses, yogurts, organic and specialty wool, and sheep for youth stock 
shows (National Academy of Sciences). The US is not a major player in the world sheep, 
lamb and mutton markets. Imports of lamb and mutton primarily come from the major 
world players in the industry, Australia and New Zealand, where exports of lamb go to 
Bermuda and Mexico and mutton goes to Mexico and Canada (USDA-ERS, 2009d).  
2.3.6. Summary 
Whether accidental or intentional, a FMD outbreak would make a significant impact on 
the U.S. economy. Domestic losses from FMD can run into the billions in the short term, 
but international trade restrictions put in place as a consequence of an FMD incident 
could have longer lasting impacts, particularly for pork producers who have a significant 
presence in the world market. The introduction of animal disease can lead to stiff trade 
barriers by non-infected countries.  
Further, if importing countries find another stable source of goods, they are likely to 
maintain this new relationship even after the original trading partner is disease free. One 
example of this is Japanese pork imports. Prior to 1982, Denmark was the leading 
exporter of pork products to Japan. However, following the outbreak of FMD in 
Denmark, Taiwan became Japan’s leading supplier until 1997 when they experienced a 
devastating FMD outbreak. Since that time, the US has become the leading exporter of 
pork to Japan (Casagrande). Given prior history, there seems little doubt that should the 
US contract FMD, current trading partners will seek another disease-free source of 
product with little hesitation.  
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2.4. Strategies for Eradicating FMD 
The current US policy for FMD is enforced by the Animal and Plant Health Inspection 
Service (APHIS). This policy is outlined in a fact sheet that was published by APHIS in 
April 2007. After a suspected infected animal is identified, then tests are taken with 
animals in the same herd or on the same premises put under quarantine.  Upon 
confirmation of an FMD outbreak by an APHIS diagnostician, which usually takes only 
24 hours after samples are taken, APHIS and state agencies will immediately take steps 
to secure the area surrounding the infected premises including setting up an initial 
quarantine zone, tracing the movements of infected animals and alerting officials in 
neighboring states, countries and the OIE.  At this point prescribed response policies 
would be put in place. Namely, all animals on the premises or in dangerous contact 
would be slaughtered as discussed below; however, this slaughter could be combined 
with other policies. After the outbreak is eradicated, or at least regionalized, the goal of 
APHIS would then be to help producers recover from the outbreak (USDA-APHIS, 
2007c).  
2.4.1. Detection 
Many strategies have been suggested for eradicating FMD should it occur in the US; 
however, there is not universal US level agreement on the "best" strategy. The most 
common, and most common-sense, strategy is to catch the disease early. Here detection 
refers to the identification of the first confirmed case of FMD. Early detection is not 
always a simple matter, particularly in a country such as the US that has not had an FMD 
outbreak in almost 80 years, and is not a costless activity. There must be an ex ante 
investment in resources and education to encourage early detection. It is unlikely that the 
disease will be caught very early in the US given the similarity of symptoms to more 
benign problems, the time since the last case of FMD, and the dependence on farmers 
and local veterinarians to report the disease. If, or when, the disease is found in the US 
the eradication process will be costly both in monetary terms and in terms of animal 
lives lost. Simulation studies have shown these losses can be reduced significantly 
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through early detection of the disease (Schoenbaum and Disney; Paarlberg, Lee and 
Seitzinger; Ekboir; Ward et al.,2007). In the 2001 UK outbreak delayed detection 
contributed to the vast magnitude of the outbreak (Anderson, 2002). The later the disease 
is identified, the more aggressive the response will have to be in order to eradicate the 
disease. 
2.4.2. Stamp Out 
The current policy of the US relating to FMD is an aggressive eradication policy that 
relies on the slaughter of all infected and disease-exposed animals called “stamp out”. 
“Stamp out” involves the destruction of all adult and young animals contracting the 
disease as well as the destruction of any dangerous contacts, indirect contacts and 
sometimes contiguous slaughter. A dangerous contact is any animal that has come in 
contact with an infected animal (NAO). In addition, an animal that is an indirect contact, 
which occurs through exposure to a person, feedstuff, or other fomite that has been on 
infected premises, can be slaughtered as well.  Feedstuffs on infected premises are 
destroyed, and buildings are cleaned then left uninhabited for a defined length of time to 
assure the virus is no longer active. Humans should wear protective clothing that is 
changed between premises. Contiguous slaughter involves the slaughter of any animal 
on a property bordering an infected property despite the fact that no direct or indirect 
contact occurs. This particular policy was used in the 2001 UK outbreak, but received a 
backlash of negative response from farmers and residents in the country (Anthony). This 
portion of the response policy is termed “depopulation”. 
Stamping out has proven to be the most epidemiologically effective way to eradicate the 
disease in as short a time as possible.  Indemnity payments are paid to producers equal to 
the fair market value of the depopulated animals. This can be used in conjunction with 
contiguous slaughter, ring or targeted vaccination to reduce disease spread, expanded 
testing or surveillance. Some countries have opted to rely on vaccination and a policy of 
phasing out the disease over time rather than the more aggressive stamp out policy; this 
will be discussed in more detail below.  
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2.4.3. Surveillance 
Another option is the investment in enhanced surveillance both ex post and ex ante. 
Surveillance for FMD is conducted almost entirely by producers and veterinarians 
(Musser). Ex ante surveillance includes checking randomly for the initial case of disease 
and port of entry surveillance. Ex ante investments can also be made in systems to speed 
response and recovery ex post. This would include investments in vaccines and 
diagnostics, increased diagnostic laboratory capabilities, and the National Animal 
Identification System. Ex post surveillance includes the use of additional personnel to 
increase the number of visits or tests run in the surveillance zone.  
2.4.4. Movement Restrictions 
Response zones are another tool for eradicating FMD. Response zones typically mean 
that within that zone, the movement of animals, equipment, feedstuffs, and people is 
severely restricted. These zones consist of multiple layers of protection. The restrictions 
on movement vary by the type of zone and often the disease strategies utilized do as 
well.  
There are three primary zones: the control area (the infected zone and the buffer-
surveillance zone), the surveillance zone and the free zone. Table 1 provides a summary 
for each area. Within the response zones, USDA officials will seek to prevent further 
spread of the disease through restricting unnecessary movements of animals, people and 
equipment. Commercial traffic will be re-routed, and local traffic will be ranked by their 
risk level. A permit system will be put in place for all low to moderate risk local traffic. 
Within the response zones all premises will be given one of four classifications: infected 
premises, contact premises, suspect premises, and at-risk premises as shown in Table 2.  
27 
 
Table 1. Response Areas Defined by the USDA-APHIS 
Zone Size Purpose 
Control Area Entire state, tribal 
nation, or territory at 
minimum 
All animal movement will be 
stopped until the scope of the 
outbreak can be determined.  
Infected Zone 6.2 miles around each 
infected premises 
This will be the area of concentrated 
stamping out of the disease. Within 
this area all movement of animals 
and carriers will be completely 
halted except by special permit.  
Buffer-Surveillance 
Zone 
No minimum size Surveillance of all susceptible 
animals with a minimum of 2 
inspections every 14 days until the 
disease is eradicated 
Surveillance Zone Minimum size is 6.2 
miles beyond the 
perimeter of the 
control area 
Surveillance of high risk herds with 
movement allowable using permits 
Free Zone Surrounds the 
surveillance zone and 
extends to the 
boundaries of the 
U.S.  
Surveillance continues according to 
standard animal health code 
practices.  
Source: USDA-APHIS, 2007c 
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Table 2. Premises Designations Defined by the USDA-APHIS 
Premises Type Status Action 
Infected  The FMD virus has 
been identified or is 
presumed to exist 
All infected premises are located 
within the infected zone. An 
individual level quarantine is 
imposed on each infected premises 
and all susceptible animals are 
euthanized and disposed of.  
Contact Premises has been 
exposed either 
directly or indirectly 
to FMD virus carriers
All contact premises must be inside 
the control area. All susceptible 
animals are euthanized and disposed 
of except in special exceptions. 
Animals exempted from slaughter are 
placed under intensive surveillance 
for not less than 28 days.  
Suspect Premises with 
susceptible animals 
located in any 
response zone, but 
not classified as 
infected or contact.  
Premises are placed under quarantine 
and intensive surveillance for not less 
than 28 days, passing three 
inspections every 14 days, and 
possibly additional surveillance after 
removal from the surveillance zone 
to the free zone.  
At Risk Premises in the 
buffer surveillance 
zone with susceptible 
animals, but no 
clinical sign are 
present.  
Movement is allowed within the 
buffer zone, but not into the free 
zone. Non-susceptible animals may 
move in and out of the free zone with 
a permit.  
Source: USDA-APHIS, 2007c 
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Current APHIS guidelines call for a "stamp out" policy in conjunction with response 
zones. The response zones control the spread of the disease while the "stamp out" 
procedure eradicates the disease within the response zones. Figure 10 provides a timeline 
for the outbreak. This timeline is based on the October, 2007 version of the APHIS 
response guidelines. The series of response zones are put in place as soon as the Foreign 
Animal Disease Diagnosticians (FADDs) receive the positive test result back from Plum 
Island. Prior to this, the FADDs will use their best judgment to put temporary quarantine 
areas in place.   
 
 
Figure 10. Timeline for Outbreak  
 
2.4.5. Vaccination 
Stores of FMD vaccine are required to be stockpiled under the Homeland Security 
Presidential Directive 9 established in 2004. While vaccination is not the first step, it 
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could be considered by APHIS as a way to provide a protective barrier around the 
infected area, potentially reducing disease spread and regionalizing the disease (USDA-
APHIS, 2007c).  
FMD vaccines are produced by growing live virus in laboratories. There are four foreign 
animal disease research facilities located in the US, UK, Australia and Canada that study 
FMD vaccines to protect their own livestock industries and global livestock markets 
(Kitching et al.). Animals are typically vaccinated twice, with protective immunity 
occurring 4-5 days later. The vaccine does not last, and must be re-administered every 4-
6 months. Another challenge of vaccination for FMD is the number of sero-types and 
sub-serotypes since the vaccine must cover the strain present in a particular outbreak. 
FMD vaccines must be kept cool throughout their life, and they do not have a long shelf 
life (Kitching et al.). For these reasons, vaccination has not been proposed to prevent 
disease entry into the US but has been proposed as a means of slowing the spread of the 
disease.  
Economically, there are two sides to the vaccination issue in the case of an FMD 
incursion. First, vaccination has shown in some instances to be useful in acting as a 
retardant for disease spread (Randolph et al.; Kitching et al.). The policy is to slaughter 
vaccinated livestock because the vaccines currently in use are not differentiable (DIVA): 
post-outbreak, it is difficult or impossible to determine if an animal with FMD 
antibodies was infected and recovered or if it has antibodies from vaccination. Second, 
vaccination has trade recovery implications. Countries utilizing vaccine are given a 
status of "FMD Free with Vaccination" which may result in greater trade barriers than a 
status of "FMD Free without Vaccination". DIVA vaccines are currently being tested 
and manufactured, but it is unknown how these vaccines will be treated from this policy 
standpoint. Ekboir outlined several other drawbacks to the use of vaccination, namely 
• Persistence of trade restrictions and movement restrictions 
• Vaccinated animals are not allowed to leave the quarantined area ever 
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• Additional spread risk associated with the interaction of animals and those 
performing the vaccination 
• Welfare implications of more animals being under movement restrictions for 
longer periods of time 
• Longer disruption of processing industries 
• The potential for driving down prices from additional meat supply if vaccinated 
animals enter the meat supply chain.  
The use of vaccine is an ex post strategy, but the stockpiling of the vaccine in the 
anticipation of an FMD outbreak is an ex ante strategy.  Consequently, currently animals 
vaccinated for this reason are almost always slaughtered. Also, vaccines currently in use 
are not differentiable (DIVA) vaccines, meaning there is no way to know if the animal 
has been infected and recovered or if the antibodies are from the vaccine.   
Bearing in mind the current response capability, strategies that have been suggested in 
the literature, and historical events occurring in the U.K., Netherlands and Taiwan, this 
dissertation will seek to add practically and substantially to the literature on the 
economics of animal disease.  
2.4.6. Ex Ante Investment vs. Ex Post Expenditure 
There is considerable uncertainty involved in the probability of an FMD outbreak 
occurring in the US and whether policies are justified given these probabilities. 
Furthermore, the size of the event space in the US is large. If an FMD outbreak were to 
occur in an area with a very low susceptible animal concentration, the decision for ex 
ante investment would seem quite different from the decision to invest in densely 
populated regions because the difference in potential damages is quite large.    
The US currently invests in some prevention and anticipation activities to reduce the 
likelihood of entry or to reduce the impact upon entry of the FMD. These activities 
32 
 
include: restricting the importation of live ruminants and swine from FMD infected 
countries; checking for disease at ports of entry; implementing additional inspections on 
incoming international flights; asking veterinarians to heighten monitoring of domestic 
livestock; cleaning military vehicles and equipment prior to re-entry in the country; and 
implementing an educational campaign to make farmers and ranchers more aware of the 
disease (USDA-APHIS, 2007b). In addition, the US maintains a vaccine stockpile at 
various undisclosed key points, has prepared regional labs with emergency response 
protocols, and has provided additional training to personnel in order to rapidly respond 
to the disease. However, these types of activities must be balanced against the expected 
costs of an FMD under the various control strategies discussed above to determine 
whether they are good investments economically. We were unable to find a dollar figure 
of what is being spent on FMD at this time.  
2.5. Eradicated versus Endemic FMD 
To conclude this essay, the question of whether it is worthwhile to put forth the effort to 
eradicate FMD is addressed. The disease is typically eradicated if a country has export 
markets for domestically produced livestock and livestock products, has a large livestock 
industry with intensive production systems, or have the ability to prevent FMD 
introduction from neighboring countries (James and Rushton). In addition, other 
countries that experience a relatively small outbreak that can be quickly eradicated may 
choose eradication to protect markets for non-livestock goods. These characteristics 
would point to the North America, Europe, Australia, and parts of South America having 
incentive to eradicate as opposed to allowing FMD to become endemic (James and 
Rushton). A case where FMD is largely endemic is India, which houses nearly 15% of 
the world cattle population due to their use as draught animals (James and Rushton). 
Losses per year in India from milk production were estimated to be Rs12,520 million 
($271 million) in trade losses and Rs 16,500 million ($357 million) in domestic losses. 
Losses due to reduced draught power and animal deaths were estimated at Rs18,130 
($392 million) (James and Ellis). In a study of FMD in the Philippines, where FMD was 
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endemic in at least part of the country, Randolph et al. examined the tradeoff between 
endemic disease losses and the costs of eradication. The program in the Philippines was 
based on phasing FMD out using vaccination rather than quickly eradicating it using 
slaughter. The study found that the cost-benefit ratio of investment in eradication ranged 
from 1.6 to 12.0, which indicated that in this country eradication was an economically 
viable alternative (Randolph et al.). Based on these studies, it is reasonable to assume 
that the US and other major livestock producing countries would most likely benefit 
from an eradication program rather than allowing the disease to become endemic, 
despite the high cost of an eradication program.  
2.6. Conclusion 
This essay set the stage for the FMD analysis showing the danger presented by FMD 
through both its impact in other parts of the world and the potential damage it could 
cause in the US. It is most likely that an eradication program would be put in place, 
using standard control policies that have worked in other parts of the world. Thus, these 
control strategies should be examined in greater detail to determine their impact.  
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3. ESSAY 2: COMBINING EPIDEMIC AND ECONOMIC MODELS IN A 
SECTORAL ANALYSIS FRAMEWORK 
3.1. Introduction 
This essay develops a general method for achieving the objective of the dissertation, 
specifically developing a linked economic/epidemic model for FMD event and strategy 
analysis. This methodology can then be used in future combined economic / epidemic 
modeling work.  This study is a part of the larger research and development effort of the 
National Center for Foreign Animal and Zoonotic Disease Defense (FAZD). That effort 
is designed to develop and employ an integrated, database supported economic and 
epidemic modeling system as a part of an overall decision support and strategy analysis 
system. The research is also intended to provide a quantitative approach for analyzing 
alternative strategies for prevention, intervention and recovery to develop information is 
support of planning efforts.   
3.2. Economic/Epidemic Model Development 
To estimate potential economic losses of agricultural contamination from infectious 
animal disease spread as accurately as possible, an integrated economic/epidemic model 
is needed. Epidemic simulation information is necessary to evaluate disease spread and 
strategy implications (Jalvingh et al.; Ferguson et al.).  In turn, the economic model will 
use the epidemic output to evaluate the economic costs of a potential outbreak and the 
use of alternative strategies. The type of economic model used will vary depending on 
several factors such as the geographic scope of interest (farm, region, nation, or world), 
economic factor of interest (employment changes, price changes, trade changes, or 
welfare changes) and the extent of damages expected from a particular disease.  
Such integrated models are primarily used to predict what would happen in the event of 
an outbreak of a specific disease in a specific region or to assess the sensitivity of an 
outbreak to various control strategies.  Ideally, models should capture the recovery over 
multiple time periods from the outbreak, over the period of restocking and recovering 
35 
 
trade relationships, through to the time of full recovery. Furthermore, they should 
capture the geographic implications of the disease in terms of spread to other regions or 
countries (Rich and Winter-Nelson). Moreover, to assess risk through both the epidemic 
portion of the model and the economic portion, the alternative stochastic results from the 
epidemic portion may be run through the economic portion as statistically independent 
trials. This is opposed to the standard practice of running only the averages from the 
epidemic model through the economic model.  
The stochastic parameters in the epidemic model deal with the rate of disease spread and 
the effectiveness of control strategies. The spread rate of an infectious disease will 
determine the severity of epidemic damages, which in turn are used to estimate the 
economic damages and the appropriate combination of necessary prevention and 
response actions. The purpose of prevention activities is to decrease the probabilities of 
intentional or unintentional agricultural contamination incidents. Response, control and 
recovery policies are focused on minimizing damages by stopping the spread of a 
possibly infectious contamination and minimizing the scope of the outbreak, as well as 
fixing the source of vulnerability leading to the outbreak, restoring livestock production, 
replacing the lost production in the food supply chain and rebuilding consumer 
confidence. Figure 11 provides an illustration of how integrated economic-epidemic 
modeling works conceptually.  
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 Figure 11. Conceptual Flow of an Integrated Economic/Epidemic Model 
 
3.2.1. Epidemic Modeling 
The first step in building an integrated model, assuming we have calibrated epidemic 
and economic models, is to determine what control strategies will be examined, and how 
those control strategies will impact the model input parameters. This requires in-depth 
knowledge of the biology of a disease, the effectiveness of control measures in slowing 
or halting the spread of the disease.  The calibration requires a detailed survey of herd 
populations and compositions plus the contact rates in the region of interest. It often falls 
within the purview of the epidemic modeler to collect this data and collaborate with 
those in the biological sciences who have studied animal disease spread, prevention, and 
control in great detail.  
The role of epidemic modeling, when used in a predictive setting, is to simulate the 
spread of an animal disease—given certain control strategies—until the disease is either 
eradicated (episodic modeling) or reaches a stable state (endemic modeling). There are 
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essentially two ways to model epidemics: spatial models based on intensive surveys and 
non-spatial models using approaches such as the Reed-Frost algorithm for disease 
spread. Non-spatially based models provide a useful approximation of disease spread; 
however, the assumption that herds are spread evenly in a geographic area is usually 
problematic, particularly in areas of concentrated animal populations. This is because it 
is based on an assumption that each herd is equally likely to come in contact with every 
other herd (Schoenbaum and Disney). Spatial epidemic models used actual locations of 
premises and contact rates between those premises based on extensive survey work by 
epidemiologists, veterinarians and biologists familiar with the disease. These models are 
better able to explore the full distribution of disease impacts—particularly the highly 
irregular outcomes in the tails (Bickerstaff and Simmons)—under alternative control 
strategies. The tails are an area of concern from a risk management standpoint. This 
requires a stochastic, spatial model. This benefit of spatial epidemic models over non-
spatial approaches is balanced against the high cost in terms of time and effort to build 
spatial models. 
3.2.2. Economic Modeling 
The economic portion of the model is concerned with assessing the ripple effects an 
animal disease outbreak will have on the directly infected region as well as indirectly 
affected regions, livestock industry and economy as a whole. The economic model uses 
the simulated epidemic model outcomes to determine what the distribution of disease 
impact would be. The type of economic model used may vary depending on the type of 
disease being examined—its spread rate, impacts on livestock, and control policies—
because not all diseases have the same impacts. Furthermore, some diseases like FMD 
are classified as being more dangerous economically than others as they result in large 
scale consequences. Thus, the modeler should determine model choice based on the 
characteristics of the disease and the assumptions of the study. Four model types are 
discussed here: a simple cost calculating cost benefit analysis, input-output analysis, 
partial equilibrium and computable general equilibrium models. The various integrated 
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models for FMD that have been done in the past can be grouped by the type of economic 
analysis performed. The remainder of this section will provide a theoretical justification 
for when each model type is most appropriate and past studies that have used them.  
3.2.2.1.  Cost Calculating Cost-benefit Analysis (CCCBA)  
CCCBA is the most basic type of economic analysis, and it also appears to be the most 
commonly used (Rich, Miller and Winter-Nelson). Under this type of analysis the 
benefits in terms of reduced value of animal loss are offset against the direct costs of 
mitigation strategies used to achieve that reduction in the course of an outbreak. CCCBA 
is used to examine the vulnerability of an area to an event as well as examine mitigation 
and management policies. The strength of CCCBA is that it is relatively simple to 
compute, saving in man and computer hours. A criticism of CCCBA is the accuracy of 
the estimate. This is because certain simplifying assumptions are made, such as perfectly 
inelastic supply and perfectly elastic demand.  
First, consider the implications of supply elasticity assumptions. The supply curve for 
livestock and livestock products is assumed to be perfectly inelastic. There is some 
justification for livestock supplies being inelastic in the short run. Livestock follow a set 
production cycle, so quantities cannot adjust quickly to price changes. To increase 
livestock inventories in a region, either animals must be imported or the population can 
be naturally increased over time according to the production cycle.  
If this assumption is made (with no assumption made yet on demand other than the law 
of demand holding), then a parallel reduction in supply occurs. Referring to Figure 12, 
the disease response (i.e. "stamp out") would result in the quantity of livestock in the 
country to shift from q0 to q1. Consequently prices would rise from p0 to p1. Producers 
would experience a loss of area W and a gain of area T (area U cancels out), so whether 
they would gain or lose from the disease would be dependent on the relative sizes of 
those two areas. Consumers would lose area T+U.  
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Figure 12. Illustration of Perfectly Inelastic Supply Assumption 
 
Still another assumption is often made under a CCCBA. The price is assumed to not 
change as a result of the disease, in other words, the demand curve for livestock and 
livestock products is assumed to be perfectly elastic. This might be reasonable when the 
infected region slaughter is too small to make any impact on the aggregate supply so 
producers are price takers in the national market. In addition, it would have to be 
assumed that there is no influence from international trade. Figure 13 shows the impacts 
of a disease outbreak in the infected region under these assumptions. As in Figure 12, 
supply is reduced, but because the national supply and demand relationship is assumed 
to be unchanged price will remain fixed at p1=p0. Producers losses would be equal to 
area U, and there would be no chance of a gain from the outbreak.  
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Figure 13. Illustration of Perfectly Inelastic Supply and Perfectly Elastic Demand 
Assumption 
 
If these assumptions hold, then U should provide a reasonable estimate of the disease 
outbreak loss to the livestock industry. However, with an FMD outbreak the 
international trade restrictions would be expected to have an impact on world markets 
for livestock and livestock products. Even if producers in a particular region are price 
takers and no demand shift is expected from domestic consumers, trade losses can be 
expected at the national level as export levels for livestock and meat products go to zero.  
Consider the short run supply assumption, where the infected region is a small 
contributor to aggregate supply and imports of livestock can still enter the country. The 
consequences of trade losses, even if the outbreak occurs in a small livestock producing 
area, in a meat market where the US is a net exporter (e.g. pork) are given by Figure 14. 
If the infected region (IR) is a small livestock producing region, then US aggregate 
supply will not shift significantly. (It will of course shift by some small amount if even 
one animal is lost, but practically we would expect any change in the US domestic 
market to be quite small from such a small supply shift). Export value (the grey box) 
goes to zero, so domestic price drops to the autarky level, domestic quantity demanded 
increases to the autarky level, and domestic quantity supplied reduces to the autarky 
41 
 
level. US consumers would gain from the lower domestic prices and larger domestic 
quantity supplied. US producers would lose from the lower prices and loss of quantity 
exported. In the infected region, where supply is reduced due to the stamp out policy, the 
new US price is put into place. Producers experience a loss of area U+W from animal 
slaughter, but also would experience a loss of area T due to the price drop. This analysis 
is of course dependent on the assumptions of the relative size of the supply shift and the 
export market, as will be discussed in more detail below.  
 
 
Figure 14. Illustration of International Trade Impacts 
 
In FMD outbreaks occurring in livestock producing countries heavily involved in export 
markets, the trade impacts alone would make the assumption of domestic price 
remaining unchanged difficult to justify. FMD outbreaks occurring in Taiwan (Yang et 
al.), the UK (Thompson et al.) and South American (Rich and Winter-Nelson) countries 
have been explored empirically, all indicate that trade losses combined with supply shifts 
to affect prices.  
Furthermore, comparing policies based on calculating the area U in Figure 13 doesn’t 
take into account impacts in substitute (e.g. poultry) markets or feed markets. CCCBA is 
appropriate for local level, short-run analysis in the context of animal disease that does 
not affect national aggregate supply and would not have large trade impacts or demand 
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impact. Studies that have used CCCBA in the context of FMD are: Disney et al.; 
Randolph et al.; Bates, Carpenter and Thurmond.  
3.2.2.2.  Input-Output (I-O) 
Like CCCBA, I-O analysis is dependent on budgets and pre-specified multipliers plus 
Leontief production functions. Unlike CCCBA, impacts on other sectors (e.g. 
employment) can be estimated. Impact Analysis for Planning (IMPLAN) is a commonly 
used program based on I-O modeling. In an I-O model, sectors are placed in broad 
categories called accounts and impacts to the sector are estimated after the animal 
disease shock.  The multipliers in the model measure the total change throughout the 
economy from a one unit change in the livestock sector. I-O provides a description of a 
local economy and a predictive model to estimate impacts of animal disease shocks to 
that economy (Harris and Doeksen). A weakness of I-O models, that it shares with 
CCCBA and social accounting models is that they do not allow for price changes, input 
substitution or dynamic changes in the sector over time (Rich, Miller and Winter-
Nelson). Figure 15 provides an overview of how I-O models work. Studies using I-O 
type of analysis are: Garner and Lack; Ekboir; and Mahul and Durand.  
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Figure 15. Conceptual Flow Chart for Input-Output Modeling (Harris and Doeksen) 
 
Ekboir simulated the impact of an FMD outbreak in California to estimate economic 
impacts, analyze current response policies, evaluate alternative strategies for dealing 
with the disease, and establish the value of monitoring services versus their costs. He 
finds that, under timely identification of the disease and prompt emergency response, the 
value of public animal health monitoring is high. Also, the state was unprepared at the 
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time to take the prescribed measures to eradicate the disease. The man-power cost of the 
stamping-out policy and the large levels of vaccine that would be required to do ring 
vaccination prove to be very costly.  Their study provides an estimate of almost $5 
billion in cleaning and disposal alone with a total outbreak cost of up to $13.5 billion 
(Ekboir).  
3.2.2.3.  Partial Equilibrium 
Partial Equilibrium (PE) analysis can be used effectively in local, regional and national 
level analysis. PE analysis has the advantage of more closely modeling market 
movements by utilizing econometrically derived parameters; as a result PE analysis, 
while more complex and costly to build than CCCBA, can also give a greater depth and 
scope of detail on an event that has ripple effects throughout the economy given the data 
and manpower necessary to build one. PE analysis assesses the direct and secondary 
effects of an animal disease outbreak because it includes not only initial prices and 
quantities, but also own price elasticities and sometimes cross price elasticities. This 
type of analysis has become more common as the threat of foreign animal disease 
became reality in countries around the world in the early to mid 2000s. Studies that have 
used a partial equilibrium approach include: Paarlberg, Lee and Seitzinger; Mangen and 
Burrell; Rich and Winter-Nelson; Schoenbaum and Disney; Paarlberg et al.; and Pendell 
et al.  
PE uses a set of supply/demand relationships that recognizes interdependencies between 
markets in the US. This means several aspects of the disease outbreak can be considered 
in a single modeling framework, while still making underlying assumptions reflecting 
actual market relationships. In particular, the vertical relationships between meat 
markets and livestock markets can be modeled explicitly; trade implications can be 
considered; the importance of relative supply and demand shift magnitudes on changes 
in consumer and producer surplus can be considered; impacts on infected region 
producers and non-infected region producers can be differentiated; impacts in substitute 
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markets can be derived; and impacts in horizontally linked markets (e.g. feed corn) can 
be assessed. A few of these will be graphically examined here.  
First consider the vertical relationships between meat markets and livestock markets. 
Consider the impact of FMD on cattle and fed beef markets shown in Figure 16. Recall 
from essay 1 that the US is a net exporter of fed beef (high value beef) and a net 
importer of live cattle to feed out. By using partial equilibrium analysis, national level 
fed beef supply and trade impacts can be combined with regional level cattle supply, 
packer demand and trade impacts to get the change in price in fed beef and live animals, 
changes in producer surplus and changes in consumer surplus.  
First examine the bottom two panels that indicate the US live cattle market and the North 
American live cattle market, where the North American live cattle market is the excess 
demand of the US and the combined excess supply of Canada and Mexico for live cattle. 
Here supply has been shown as being very nearly perfectly inelastic to simplify the short 
run analysis. This figure indicates that the shift in short run supply in the infected region 
cattle market (SC-US to S'C-US), reduces the aggregate national short run supply of live 
cattle; however, this changes the excess demand in the North American live cattle 
market and as a consequence the reduction in supply is at least partially offset by an 
increase in imports of cattle for feeding. Thus the reduction in the supply of fed beef in 
the US meat market (top left panel) is smaller than would originally be expected. 
Initially this would increase price of live cattle, the exports of meat and the price of 
meat; however, exports go to zero due to trade restrictions. This pushes the price of meat 
down to level p". Meat consumers stand to gain from lower prices and higher quantities, 
but meat producers would most likely lose given the loss of exports and subsequent 
lower prices. 
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Figure 16. Interdependencies between Meat and Live Animal Markets 
 
The livestock producers in the entire country could gain or lose depending on the 
relative size of the loss from value of production lose and the gain in surplus from the 
price increase. Producer impacts can be further broken down into those for the infected 
region and those for non-infected regions as shown in Figure 17. The demand in the two 
regions have been shown as being very nearly perfectly elastic (regions are price takers) 
to simplify the graphical analysis, which may not be the case particularly when the 
region where the FMD infection takes place is a major livestock commodity producer.  
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Figure 17. Breakdown of Regional Producer Changes 
 
In the infected region, the gain or loss to producers would depend on the relative size of 
the value loss related to the supply shift (U+W) and the gain from the price increase 
(T+U). Given the size of slaughter levels related to the stamp out policy in FMD 
outbreaks occurring in other countries, it is not unexpected that the area of W would be 
larger than the area T. This implies producers in the infected region can expect a loss in 
surplus from the outbreak. Producers in non-infected regions do not have the supply 
shift, but would get the increase in surplus related to the price increase (area A). As a 
result, producers in non-infected regions stand to gain from the outbreak. This is a result 
that has not been explored empirically in integrated analyses, although it has been 
recognized as a possibility theoretically (Paarlberg, Lee and Seitzinger). This may not be 
true of pork markets in the US given an FMD outbreak because of the importance of the 
pork export market; hog producers in the infected and non-infected regions may be 
harmed from an FMD outbreak. 
Other parts of the agricultural sector are impacted beyond the fed beef market (or other 
affected livestock market). A reduction in slaughter cattle inventories implies a shift in 
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feed grain markets (i.e. corn) that will have impacts on the price of corn for feed as 
shown in Figure 18. Another consideration would be the domestic demand shift for 
domestic meat and livestock. This is not explored in this essay, but has the potential to 
cause a decrease in the price of meat and livestock if the demand shift is greater than the 
supply shift.  
 
 
Figure 18. Reduced Demand for Corn for Livestock Feeding 
 
Examining PE studies that have estimated FMD impacts in the US, the studies by 
Paarlberg, Lee and Seitzinger and Schoenbaum and Disney are discussed more 
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extensively. Paarlberg, Lee and Seitzinger estimate the impact of a more widespread 
FMD outbreak in the U.S. similar to what was seen in the U.K. in 2001. The model 
maximized the value of national output subject to resource constraints and minimized 
the cost of resources subject to competitive pricing. Firms are assumed to be price takers 
in input markets and perfectly competitive in final goods markets for beef, pork, poultry, 
lamb, milk, eggs, rice and soybean oil. The model looked at depopulation of infected 
animals as well as expected bans on exportation of livestock, red meat and dairy 
products and reduced demand due to consumer fears in domestic markets for these 
products. Own and cross price elasticities, revenue shares, input costs and substitution 
elasticities were obtained from prior studies. They estimated a loss of $14 million in U.S. 
farm income (Paarlberg, Lee and Seitzinger).   
Schoenbaum and Disney took a more hypothetical approach by choosing alternative 
computer generated animal populations to identify a U.S. policy effective over different 
regions. The model is a cost minimization model where cost is the sum of government 
expenditures for disease control, producer surplus and consumer surplus changes. 
Markets are live cattle, hogs and sheep, dairy, beef, and pork. It includes export market 
losses. They found there was not a universally best strategy, but suggest that ring 
vaccination around contagious areas is least costly due to the shorter duration and 
subsequently smaller numbers of animals slaughtered if done early. If animals were both 
vaccinated and later slaughtered due to the disease, it is clearly more costly. Their cost 
estimates range from $234 million to $2.4 billion (Schoenbaum and Disney).  
3.2.2.4. Computable General Equilibrium (CGE) 
These models combine aspects of all of the models discussed above into a computable 
representation of a complete economy. An advantage of CGE models is that they have 
the potential to give the most complete information possible on the economic impacts of 
an FMD outbreak. However, their complexity and the large data requirements are a 
disadvantage compared to partial equilibrium analysis. Two models have attempted to 
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develop this kind of analysis for foot-and-mouth disease: Perry et al. for South Africa 
and Blake, Sinclair and Sugiyarto for the U.K.  
3.2.3. Risk and Uncertainty 
The consequences of an animal disease outbreak are quite large, but the probability of an 
outbreak happening are virtually unknown for diseases that have not occurred in the US 
for a very long time. The risk vectors to disease spread from other countries exist, but 
the tipping point at which an outbreak would happen is unknown. Furthermore, the 
extent of the outbreak if/when it does happen is unknown. Thus risk and uncertainty 
should also be examined.  
Consider the two most recent instances of Avian Influenza in the US. Neither the 
outbreak in Texas nor the outbreak in Maryland received much attention; particularly 
when compared to the media storm surrounding the AI outbreaks in Asia. Epidemic 
models should capture the uncertainty and risk associated with the disease spread; 
however, economic models must deal with the uncertainty related to consumer reaction, 
international market reaction, and market response. Misinformation about an outbreak of 
FMD could cause significant mispricing in futures markets due to herding behavior, 
momentum trading and spillover effects.  These issues will be explored in Section 6. An 
area that has received virtually no attention is how risk attitude of policy makers at all 
levels will impact which control strategies are preferable in the face of an outbreak, 
which are explored in Section 5.  
3.2.4. Integrated Modeling 
Current combined epidemic/economic models are generally multidisciplinary efforts 
between epidemiologists and economists. The epidemic study focuses on the spread of 
the disease. For example, if a simulated outbreak occurs in a feedlot, the study will 
return a number of animals in each state (e.g. number dead) and numbers of animal 
receiving any sort of mitigation treatment. Usually these involve scenarios depicting the 
use of multiple disease control strategies that can in turn be used as the scenarios for the 
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economic model.  The economic model can give a variety of output, depending on which 
of the model types listed above is used. At a minimum, the economic model gives the 
value of lost animals, the direct cost of treatment and response, the value of lost 
production revenue, and the foregone income from shutdown. After the economic 
analysis results have been examined, the scenarios can be revised if necessary and the 
study refined.  
Thorough, in-depth studies that include the costs of animal disease and evaluate both 
vulnerability and the complete economic consequences of control strategies are needed 
to support planning.   This section has given an overview of the economic impacts where 
of an animal disease attack and the approach to appraisal thereof. We also discuss 
multiple areas that have received little attention.  
Thorough analysis requires collaboration, drawing on expertise from the industry plus a 
science group including those with knowledge in epidemiology, biology, and economics. 
This level of collaboration is difficult, but indispensible in dealing with the needed 
issues. Also key to a quality economic assessment is the integration of models and the 
identification of the right economic impact categories for the disease and region of 
interest. 
3.3. General Framework 
In general, the development of a combined economic/epidemic model requires three 
steps, with an optional fourth step:  
1. Define Scenarios 
2. Make appropriate adjustments in epidemic model to reflect economic questions 
3. Make necessary conversions for the epidemic model output to become the 
economic model input and make appropriate adjustments in the economic model 
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4. Provide a feedback loop from the economic model to better inform the epidemic 
model and or modify the control strategies 
Each of these steps will be described in greater detail below.  
3.3.1. Defining Scenarios 
The first step before starting an integrated economic/epidemic study is to determine the 
focus and scope of the region to be depicted plus the nature of the disease outbreak and 
possible control strategies. This includes whether the disease is episodic or endemic, the 
geographic spread assumptions, what control strategies and control strategy levels may 
reasonably be employed, and assumptions related to the impact on demand and 
international trade. These decisions form the assumptions behind the alternative 
scenarios run and may at least in part determine what kind of epidemic and economic 
model structure is most appropriate. In general there is always a “base” scenario that 
runs the integrated simulation model once for no disease incursion. This makes 
assessment of alternative scenarios more meaningful in that there is a frame of reference 
from which to compare.  
3.3.2. Epidemic Modeling 
The second stage in doing integrated disease modeling is to estimate the animal loss, 
degraded performance and extent of the control effect caused by the disease using 
principles of epidemiology. This is typically done using an epidemic model. Such 
models are usually specific to a particular disease and/or region and rely on estimates of 
parameters for the disease in question.  These parameters are typically based on 
laboratory and field research determining:  
• Susceptible Species 
• Environmental Factors Affecting Death or Spread and Animal Reactions 
• Animal Reaction Rate Distributions (Death, Impaired, Altered Fecundity, etc) 
• Spread Rate Distributions 
• Effectiveness of Control Strategies 
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Epidemic models that are "state transition" models examine how an animal will move 
through a series of states. These states are given different names depending on the 
model, but are all essentially the same four conditions.  
The first state, usually termed "susceptible", identifies the population that could get the 
disease. For example, foot-and-mouth disease (FMD) can be contracted by any type of 
cloven hoofed animal. The total number of cloven hoofed animals in a particular area, 
therefore, makes up the susceptible population.  
The second state goes by many terms ("latent", "sub-clinically infectious", "incubating" 
are used in the models discussed here), but is usually the state in which the susceptible 
animal has contracted the disease but has not yet shown any clinical signs. For many 
diseases animals in this state can still "shed" the disease, meaning other susceptible 
animals can contract it. Day one of the disease episode is assumed to be the day the first 
animal enters this state.  
The third state is the "infectious" or "clinically infectious" period in which the signs of 
the disease become apparent. It is usually at this stage that the disease is diagnosed and 
response begins, but random testing may reveal the disease during the second stage.  
The fourth stage, "recovered/removed", captures both the biological state of the disease 
and the results of disease response activities. Recovered implies animals have either 
developed antibodies to the disease during the period they were sick and are now 
immune from the disease but could be impaired or have some differential performance 
characteristic, or it could also capture the impact of vaccination in conferring immunity 
on animals. Removed implies that animals have died, either due to the disease itself or 
because they were slaughtered for disease control purposes.  
This study will utilize the integration of two such foreign animal epidemic models have 
assessed FMD—AusSpread (Ward et al., 2009) and the DADS model (Bates, Thurmond 
and Carpenter). These models have been integrated with FASOM to assess economic 
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impacts in studies completed under the National Center for Foreign Animal and 
Zoonotic Disease Defense (FAZDD). They are discussed in detail below.  
3.3.2.1.  AusSpread 
The AusSpread model was originally developed by the Australian Department of 
Fisheries and Wildlife (Garner and Lack), but was later re-specified for the High Plains 
of Texas (Ward et al., 2009). AusSpread is a stochastic, state transition model whose 
states are referred to as susceptible-latent-infected- recovered/removed (SLIR).  The 
model is spatially driven, operating within a geographic information system (GIS) 
framework. The model uses initial data on region distributions of livestock species 
including the location and size of feedlots, dairies, large and small beef operations, 
swine, small ruminants (sheep and goats) and backyard herds. Intensive survey work 
was done to estimate these herds predicted contact structure in order to most accurately 
model the spread of FMD within the High Plains region (Ward et al.,2007). The 
AusSpread model uses direct and indirect contact pathways to model disease spread. In 
addition to modeling contacts between herds the model also incorporates disease spread 
due to sale barns, order buyers and windborne spread from large feedlots and swine 
facilities (Ward et al., 2007). 
3.3.2.2.  The Davis Animal Disease Simulation Model  
The Davis Animal Disease Simulation (DADS) Model was developed to simulate FMD 
spread and has been specified to represent conditions in the concentrated dairy 
producing region of the Central Valley of California by Bates, Thurmond and Carpenter. 
The DADS model is a spatial, stochastic epidemic model designed to simulate intra-herd 
and inter-herd transmission of foot-and-mouth disease (FMD). Like AusSpread, the 
DADS model is a state transition model, which tracks herds as they go through disease 
states susceptible, sub-clinically infected, clinically infected, recovered/removed (SIR).  
It uses Monte-Carlo simulations to identify the transition of FMD to naive herds starting 
with a randomly selected index herd, then tracks the progression of the disease after 
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control strategies have been implemented. Livestock premises in the model include beef, 
dairy, swine, goats, and sheep as well as sale yards. The model utilizes species-specific 
transition periods, GIS locations of herds, and probability distributions on direct and 
indirect contacts among herds.   
3.3.3. Economic Modeling 
The third stage is the bridging of the epidemic and economic models and the disease 
related adjustments in the economic model. There are many factors that may determine 
which kind of economic model is appropriate. This would be decided in the first stage 
when the focus and scope of the integrated effort is determined. If the focus is 
geographically small, examining local region impacts only for example, then an 
economic model like an input/output (I/O) model might be appropriate as prices 
probably do not change. If the interest is solely on the cost of one particular control 
strategy compared to another in a small infection area, then a cost calculating cost-
benefit analysis (CCCBA) might be appropriate. If however, the desire is to capture to 
the impacts of the disease to the fullest extent possible, then a partial equilibrium or a 
computable general equilibrium model should be utilized.  
In this particular examination, a model that maintains a great amount of flexibility is 
chosen. The Agricultural Sector Model (ASM) portion of the Forestry and Agricultural 
Sector Optimization Model (FASOM) has the capability to examine all three level of 
focus because it has imbedded within a large partial equilibrium model both the 
capability to do a CBA or an I/O analysis.  
3.3.3.1.  FASOM 
The Forestry and Agricultural Sector Optimization Model (FASOM), is a highly flexible 
mathematical programming model of the forest and agricultural sectors of the United 
States. For detailed mathematical description of the model see "FASOMGHG 
Conceptual Structure and Specification: Documentation" by Adams et al. This model 
uses a price-endogenous, spatial equilibrium market structure that simulates the 
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allocation of land over time to competing activities in both sectors as well as the 
resultant consequences for the commodity markets supplied by this land. The model is 
intertemporal, meaning it can be run dynamically (multiple periods up to 100 years) or 
statically (single year). The model seeks to maximize the net present value of consumer 
and producer surplus or the net returns from the forest and agricultural sector activities. 
The model is designed to allocate resources such that a Pareto Optimal allocation is 
achieved. This structure allows for the simulation of prices, production, land usage, 
consumption, and other economic indicators under the animal disease scenario depicted 
in the epidemic data (Adams et al.). The ASM portion of FASOM focuses solely on the 
allocation of land among agricultural activities—cropland and grassland—rather than 
forestry activities. Since no forces are at work in an animal disease outbreak that might 
change the short term allocation of land into forestry, the focus can remain on the ASM 
portion of the model.  
3.3.3.1.1.  Overview of the ASM Structure 
The Agricultural Sector Model contains budgets for beef, dairy, hogs, sheep, broilers, 
turkeys, egg layers and horses although the last category is treated in a very cursory 
fashion. Within the beef and hog operations a number of intermediate budgets are 
represented to separate out important stages of production.  
• Beef:  Beef animals generate fed and non fed beef with intermediate outputs of 
heifer and steer calves, heifer and steer yearlings and cull cows. We model 
production at the cow-calf, stocker and feedlot stages plus an infusion of calves 
and cull cows from the dairy herd. Specifically we represent cow/calf operations, 
steer and heifer calves in stocker operations, steer and heifer yearlings in stocker 
operations, beef yearlings in feedlots, and beef calves in feedlots.   
• Dairy: Dairy animals generate milk and calves with intermediate outputs of cull 
cows.  
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• Hogs: Hogs generate fed hogs with intermediate outputs of feeder pigs and cull 
sows.  We model production at the (1) farrowing, (2) finishing and (3) farrow to 
finish stages. 
• Sheep: Sheep generate wool, lamb and cull ewes.  
• Turkeys: Turkeys generate turkeys.   
• Broilers: Broilers generate broilers.   
• Egg Production: Hens generate eggs.  A single laying hen on average produces 
257 eggs or just over 21 dozen per year.  
• Horses and Mules: Horses and mules produce horses and mules.  
Livestock budgets in ASM generally depict several major categories of items, which 
might include:  
• production of meat, wool, or milk in pounds produced per year per animal 
• intermediate animals moved to other sectors in cwt – net of usage of animals for 
replacements 
• use of intermediate animals moved from other sectors (negative sign in table) in 
cwt 
• use of feed in cwt 
• use of pasture in acres 
• use of grazing in animal unit months (aum) 
• use of other inputs in $ 
• other costs in $ 
• greenhouse gas emissions in metric tons 
In implementing an animal disease, the focus will be on reducing the production of 
outputs and increasing other costs. This will imitate a “disease shock” on the region of 
interest. Budgets in ASM are normalized to a one animal basis. This means epidemic 
data in terms of head slaughtered, vaccination, or restricted must also be normalized. 
Intuitively, the impact of the disease is spread evenly across an entire region such that 
the average productivity per animal in the region is reduced and the average cost of 
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production per animal is increased. To see how an animal disease shock is imposed in 
the overall conceptual structure, refer to Figure 19. Because of the supply and demand 
relationships in the model, an animal disease shock impact assessment can occur both 
upstream and downstream of the actual livestock production budgets.   
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Figure 19. Basic FASOM Modeling Structure and Disease Shock Imposition  
(adapted from Adams et al.)  
 
3.3.3.1.2.  Geographic Representation 
ASM is built on a county level, results are reported on either a sub-regional basis or are 
aggregated to a regional basis. The full ASM runs over 11 regions and 66 sub-regions. 
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The 66 sub-regions consist of one sub-region for each continental US state except for 
further breakdowns in California, Illinois, Indiana, Iowa, Ohio, Oregon, Oklahoma, 
Texas and Washington. These states have sub-state production regions based on 
differences in production conditions.  
In addition to the trade of goods within the US regions and sub-regions, FASOM also 
allows trade flow with 37 international regions listed below. Figure 20 gives a map of 
these regions. Within the model, animal products the US imports are eggs, wool, non-fed 
beef, fed beef, pork, secondary dairy products (i.e. butter, cheese, dry milk), and some 
live cattle. The US exports of animal products are eggs, fed beef, wool, pork, secondary 
dairy products, chicken and turkey.  
 
 
Figure 20. International Market Regions in ASM 
 
Outputs and inputs are also moved both through time and across space. This means a 
steer calf produced under cow/calf budgeting assumptions in Florida can later become a 
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stocker calf in a stocker calf budget in Kansas. Alternatively, corn raised using a crop 
budget in Iowa can later be fed in a cattle finishing operation in Texas.  
Land allocations for livestock operations are assigned based on the biological carrying 
capacity of land in a particular region. Each animal in a cow/calf or grazing operation 
requires a certain amount of animal months of grazing from pasture land according to 
the budgets within FASOM specific to a particular sub-region. Similarly, feedlots are 
assigned a specific amount of land to operate. ASM can shift land from pasture land to 
crop land, indicating a movement from animal production to crop production or vice 
versa.  
3.3.3.1.3.  Modeling the Market 
The market structure in FASOM includes a mixture of explicit and implicit demand and 
supply curves in a five-year period that are solved such that the affected agricultural 
markets are in equilibrium (Adams et al.).  In the case of animal disease, land cannot 
shift to reach equilibrium but as supplies change in response to the slaughter price will 
shift. From Adams et al. these supply and demand curves include: 
• regional product supply,  
• national raw product demand,  
• regional or national processed commodity demand,  
• regional or national supply of processed commodities,  
• regional or national (depending on commodity) export demand  
• regional or national (depending on commodity) import supply,  
• regional feed supply and demand,  
• regional direct livestock demand,  
• international transport perfectly elastic supply and  
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• country-specific excess demand and supply of rice, sorghum, corn, soybeans and 
the 5 types of wheat   
3.3.3.1.4.  Using FASOM to Model Animal Disease 
FASOM has several benefits in this type of analysis. First, it provides a great deal of 
detail in the effects of a disease outbreak. In animal disease modeling there is an 
immediate death loss, but there is also a reduction in the animals entering the meat chain 
in later periods due to the need to replace breeding stock. For example, in beef cattle, 
heifers that would have been fed out are instead diverted to replacement breeding stock. 
This more fully captures, not just the one shot death loss of the disease, but also the long 
term recovery of the industry from the disease.  
The regional structure also allows more detail since a disease shock can be confined 
(quarantined) to a single region or sub-region and system resilience can be reflected with 
readjustments in the locus of production.  Also inputs like feed are diverted to alternative 
beneficial uses. The FASOM model also captures the change in welfare from an animal 
disease because it calculates a dollar loss of value added net income and a cost of 
commodity prices rising. The trade impacts can also be estimated within FASOM.    
3.4. Modeling Combined Economic/Epidemic Studies 
Imposing a shock like an animal disease requires both the use of an epidemic model that 
specifies animal mortality, infected animals, extent of treatment activities and an 
economic model that captures the broader impacts of the disease beyond death animals. 
This type of analysis has been performed both with an AusSpread-ASM integration and 
a DADS model-ASM integration. This section provides a broad overview of the 
assumptions and general structure of these models for imposing an animal disease 
(FMD) in the US. The following section will discuss the programming details.   
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3.4.1. Integrating Epidemic Model Results into ASM 
In this dissertation, two models—AusSpread and the DADS model—were used to 
examine the consequences of FMD. Since the basic results of both models are so similar, 
so is the general structure of the integration scheme. Thus this section will first present 
the interface simultaneously for both models, covering a discussion of the data drawn 
from the epidemic models, adjustments required in the ASM model and finally the kind 
of output that can be achieved.  
3.4.1.1.  Determining the Problem Parameters  
There are several assumptions that must be made before integrating an epidemic model 
into ASM. First, is the disease assumed to be episodic or endemic? Episodic disease is a 
single outbreak, which is subsequently eradicated through disease management 
strategies over a relatively short period of time. If a disease becomes endemic it will 
periodically resurface in a region either because it could not be eradicated upon entry in 
that region or because it continues to spread from other regions/countries. West Nile 
Virus is an example of a zoonotic disease that has become endemic in the United States.  
In order to assess a single episode of animal disease, ASM—which is an intermediate 
run equilibrium model—is essentially turned into a short run disequilibrium model by 
restricting the model from moving land and herds used in affected livestock production 
to other uses and, in the case of herds, places. This means the ASM model must be 
manually locked down spatially at the production level. Without this limitation the 
model would move the locus of cattle production to other regions and transfer land in the 
infected area from beef production to alternative efficient uses plus adjust feed 
production.  However, for animals moving from birthing to growing operations the 
model should still be able to divert animals moving from non-infected to infected 
regions. Similarly inputs, such as feed, can be diverted from infected regions where pre-
disease input levels are no longer needed as a result of slaughter. If the disease is 
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modeled as endemic, such a re-structuring of the impacted industries would be 
appropriate.  
Second to be considered are the kind of disease management alternatives that are 
realistic in the context being considered. Some of the more dangerous diseases to U.S. 
agriculture have not occurred here in decades. So care must be taken in getting 
parameters that will make the simulation models as accurate a portrayal of reality as 
possible. Also, there are certain disease response alternatives that will be appealing from 
an epidemiology standpoint but may be quite costly. Thus, the costing assumptions in 
the economic model must be comprehensive, gathered carefully and current.  
Finally, what will the secondary impacts of the disease management alternatives be? 
This is a question that cannot be answered in the epidemic model; instead, the economic 
model must seek to examine issue like lost trade, welfare slaughter, processor 
vulnerability and livestock inputs supplier vulnerability. The remainder of this essay is 
dedicated to going through the ASM structure, and then describing each step in 
integrating epidemic models.   
3.4.1.2.  Data Requirements from Epidemic Models to Drive Economic Models 
In order to incorporate results from an epidemic model into the parameters describing 
the sector in the ASM model, data need to be matched up as an input to the economic 
model. This includes first defining a standardized set of inputs to the economic model. In 
general the sets required in the integrated ASM model to run an FMD disease outbreak 
are as follows:   
Altrun: The names of the set of alternative scenarios that are being considered. This will 
be each unique identifier for each scenario name if the model is being run on average 
epidemic results, or it could be a unique identifier for each iteration within each scenario 
if the full distribution of economic losses is desired.  
Iter: The numbers of stochastic replications run in the epidemic model. This must be at 
least 1 if the averages from the stochastic epidemic model are being run through the 
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economic model, but may go up to the maximum number of iterations run in the 
stochastic epidemic model.  For the two epidemic models considered here the standard 
number of iterations was 100.  
Id: A unique identifier for every premises in the affected region. This will vary by region 
and perhaps epidemic model.  
Type: For each premises in the region, the type of that premises should be indicated so 
the appropriate budgets can be adjusted. At a minimum these should indicate operation 
type on a premises (beef grazing, beef feeding, dairy, sheep or swine operation). Ideally, 
more detail would be provided as will be discussed later on.  
All_stock: The total number of animals on each premises.  
Status: The herd status at the end of the run for each unique premises id. This will 
generally be limited to the statuses corresponding to the states of the epidemic model: 
susceptible, infected, dead and vaccinated. Adult animals that contract FMD rarely die 
from the disease, but the current U.S. response policy is to "stamp out" all of the infected 
and dangerous contact animals combined with vaccinate-to-die if vaccination is used. So 
the status of each premises should be categorized as either susceptible or dead at the end 
of the outbreak. This is because all sub-clinically infectious, infectious and immune 
animals are slaughtered. 
In addition, if alternative runs will include movement restrictions of herds then costs 
related to these movement restrictions can be calculated. Since FMD is so contagious, 
current US policy indicates quarantine zones will be used to contain the disease and 
vaccinations may be considered as a means to contain the disease. The data requirements 
from the epidemic model to estimate these movement restriction costs are as follows:  
Restricted: This is an indicator variable used to identify herds in the quarantine zone (0 = 
not restricted, 1 = restricted). This variable may need to be conditioned on later so that 
only restricted premises that were not slaughtered for infection or vaccination are in a 
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separate group. This allows an estimate of the animals that would need to be maintained 
while the movement restriction is in place, but will still be alive at the end of that period.  
When_res: The number of days that the herd is under quarantine.  
Days_left_res: the number of days that the herd will remain under quarantine at the end 
of the epidemic. Some models do not have this number, rather a standardized assumption 
can be made. For example, a 90 day period in which no new cases are identified may be 
the standard policy before movement restrictions are lifted.   
Animals under movement restrictions will also be subject to additional surveillance to 
check for signs of FMD. There will be increased costs associated with the labor and 
materials necessary to perform these surveillance visits, so the following data would be 
required to calculate these increased costs:  
Surv: An indicator variable used to identify herds that will be under surveillance 
N_visits: The number of times the herd is visited before surveillance ceases. This may be 
two visits in which no signs of FMD are observed, or may be weekly for the entirety of 
the outbreak. This is an assumption of the modeler or defined by policy generally.  
A control strategy that is the center of some controversy is the use of vaccine. For 
scenarios involving vaccination an additional piece of data is required: 
Vacc: Indicator variable for herds that are vaccinated (0=no vacc, 1=vacc). If a vaccinate 
to live strategy has been employed, these animals will only be subject to the increased 
cost of the vaccination process and potentially a decline in the value of the animal after 
the movement restriction ban has been lifted. If a vaccinate to die strategy has been 
employed these animals must be added to the death loss from the disease. If vaccination 
is used, under current US policy those animals must also be slaughtered.  
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3.4.1.3.  Incorporating Data from the Epidemic Models into ASM 
Data from both the AusSpread model and the DADS model are reported in terms of 
animal populations receiving particular treatments. The next step in integrating the two 
models is to convert that data into a format used to adjust the budgets in the ASM model. 
This is a simple conversion to percentage impacts. For example, for the animals 
slaughtered:  
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So for the sum over all premises indicated by ids (p) where the status is “dead” is 
divided by the sum of all stock in all statuses for premises’ ids. This calculation would 
be performed for each stochastic replication (i) and each type of herd (t). Thus the data is 
transformed from individual premises impacts to regional impacts where for each type of 
herd (e.g. cow/calf or dairy) the percentage of that particular herd type population in the 
diseased region that is susceptible, dead, vaccinated, or quarantined are calculated for 
each iteration. This allows the regional budgets in ASM to be adjusted as discussed 
earlier.  
3.4.1.4.  Adjustments Performed in the ASM Model 
Herd types in ASM impacted by FMD are beef cattle (cow/calf, stocker and feeder), 
dairy cattle, sheep, and hogs (farrow to finish, feeder pig production and pig finishing).  
Scenarios considered varied between the High Plains study and the California study, but 
in both cases alternative disease mitigation strategies were considered and compared. 
The High Plains study looked at 64 scenarios covering  
• Four infection index herd types (a large feedlot, a backgrounder feedlot, a large 
beef grazing operation and a backyard operation)  
• Sixteen different combinations of disease mitigation strategies  
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o early versus late detection 
o adequate versus inadequate vaccine 
o ring and targeted vaccination 
o regular versus enhanced surveillance   
The California study looked at 15 scenarios for a dairy index herd covering  
• Three different vaccination option (no vaccination, 10 kilometer ring vaccination 
and 20 kilometer ring vaccination) and  
• Five different detection periods (7 day delay, 10 day delay, 14 day delay, 21 day 
delay and 22 day delay).  
Both models made adjustments in ASM as discussed below.  
For each budget two adjustments were made. The first is a decrease in the regional 
output of impacted animal products. For example, in California dairy budgets both the 
number of dairy calves being produced and the amount of milk being produced is 
reduced to reflect the extensive slaughter associated with disease control. The second 
adjustment in the budget is an increase in the other costs of producing livestock in that 
region. These increased costs reflect the costs of disease management and carcass 
disposal. Costs will be discussed in greater detail later in this paper.  
3.4.1.4.1.  Beef Cattle Budgets 
The number of adults in the beef herd was adjusted to reflect reactions due to the death 
of directly infected and indirect contacts as a part of the "stamp out" policy as well as the 
slaughter of infected animals. This necessitated changes in cow calf production, stocker 
operations and feedlot operations as illustrated in Figure 21. The general budget 
adjustment is given in the equation below.  
)_1(*__ ,,Re,,Re ChangePercCattleLBCattleLB AnimalTypegAnimalTypeg −=  
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Where LB_Cattle is the pounds of calves produced by a single cow  
 Reg: the region of infection 
 Type: the type of budget being adjusted  
 Animal: the output of the budget being adjusted 
 Perc_Change: the percentage of disease loss in the infection region 
 
 
Figure 21. ASM Beef Cattle Flow Chart 
 
3.4.1.4.2.  Cow/Calf 
The cow/calf budget is the first step in the production process that includes multiple 
levels of budgets; therefore, by making adjustments in the cow/calf budget effects flow 
through the entire model. The calves coming out of the cow/calf budget are reduced by 
the proportion of death loss. Heifer calves must be diverted as replacement animals for 
the cows that are infected and slaughtered. Herds routinely retain replacement animals 
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from the calves; ordinarily the portion of heifer calves not retained are sent to fed-beef, 
but under a disease outbreak additional demand for replacements would divert some or 
all these animals to replenish breeding stock levels.  The replacement rate must be 
explicitly specified in the model.  
FMD studies were assumed to be episodic, so the size of the cow/calf herd in all 
locations was held fixed to reflect the short term impact of the outbreak without long-
term adjustment. Table 3 provides a national average budget outline for cow/calf 
production. In particular, the steer and heifer calves and the other costs must be adjusted.  
 
Table 3. National Average ASM Cow/Calf Budget 
Baseline specification              National 
Average  
Units / Description 
base.Hay           -0.782       US tons of hay used in production 
base.CullBeefCo          0.664    100 lbs of cull been cow on the hoof 
base.SteerCalve          2.022     100 lbs of steer calves 
base.HeifCalve             1.251     100 lbs of heifer calves 
base.CowGrain0           0.771   100 lbs grain blend for cow/calf operation 
base.CowHiPro0          0.574     100 lbs protein blend for cow/calf operation 
base.Pasture    4.908      Acres of pasture land 
base.AUMS               0.754    Animal unit months 
base.Labor                 8.317    Hours 
base.SaltMiner       4.891   Dollar cost of salt and minerals 
base.CottonSeed       2.222     Lbs of cottonseed 
base.othercosts        201.778   Dollars 
base.Profit                188.441   Dollar difference between revenues and costs 
base.Methane_EntericFerment     0.045 Metric tons methane from enteric fermentation  
base.Methane_Manure          0.002    Metric tons methane from manure management 
base.NitrousOxide_Manure   .00023  Metric tons nitrous oxide from manure management 
base.VolatileSolidsinManure     4.260    Metric tons of volatile solids from manure 
management 
base.Head                  1.000     Budget is for one animal 
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3.4.1.4.3.  Stocker Operations 
The imposition of FMD at the cow/calf level decreases the number of steers and heifers 
that flow into the first and second grazing programs of the stocker operation because of 
the stamp out policy and also because of quarantine restrictions on animals allowed to 
move around in the infected area. Stocked calves can move across regions that are 
unaffected, but they cannot move into or out of the infection region. The yield of stocked 
calves and stocked yearlings subsequently declines. The disease also causes direct death 
loss in the stocker operations. Table 4 gives the national average budget for a steer 
stocker operation; other budgets exist for heifer stockers, steer yearling stockers and 
heifer yearling stockers.   
 
Table 4. National Average Steer Stocker Budget 
Baseline Specification                        National 
Average      
Units / Description 
base.Hay                      -0.022              US tons of hay used in stocker operation 
base.SteerCalve               -4.241     100 lbs steer calf input into stocker op 
base.StockedSCalf                5.843   100 lbs of steer calves after first stocker phase 
ready to feed 
base.StockPro0                   0.362      100 lbs protein blend for stocker cattle 
base.Pasture                  0.789    Acres of pasture land 
base.AUMS                      0.631        Animal unit months 
base.Labor                     1.578   Hours 
base.SaltMiner                 0.419    Dollar cost of salt and minerals 
base.WheatPastu                 9.496     Dollar rental rate of green wheat pasture 
base.othercosts                 60.728   Dollars 
base.Profit                    67.577     Dollar difference between revenues and costs 
base.Methane_EntericFerment       0.045  Metric tons methane from enteric fermentation  
base.Methane_Manure              0.002     Metric tons methane from manure management 
base.NitrousOxide_Manure    2.300000E-4  Metric tons nitrous oxide from manure 
management 
base.VolatileSolidsinManure       0.795        Metric tons of volatile solids from manure 
management 
base.Head                        1.000        Budget is for one animal 
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3.4.1.4.4.  Feedlot Operations 
Like stocker operations, feedlots were not held spatially fixed except in the affected 
region. The amount of fed beef declined due to the reduced number of steers and heifers 
coming out of the stocker operations and direct from cow/calf operators. In addition to 
the reduced number of cattle available for feeding, there was a direct death loss of 
animals in the feedlot. The budgets related to feedlot operations are more complex in 
that multiple types of feedlot operations exist. However, the feedlot beef calf budget, 
which also has alternatives for direct feed out and dairy calf feed out not shown, is given 
in Table 5. A similar budget exists for yearlings in feedlots.  
 
Table 5. National Average Feedlot Calf Budget 
Feedlot Beef Calves   National  
Baseline Specification                           Average    Units / Description 
base.Silage             -0.815       US tons of silage used in feedlot 
base.Hay                 -0.446       US tons of hay used in feedlot 
base.FeedlotBeefSlaughter      11.968    100 lbs fed beef on the hoof 
base.StockedCalf          -5.888         100 lbs of calves after first stocker phase ready to 
feed 
base.biomanure                0.714   US tons manure available for bioprocesses 
base.CatGrain0                 38.991      100 lbs grain blend for finishing cattle 
base.HighProtCa                3.233      100 lbs protein blend for finishing cattle 
base.Pasture                0.006    Acres of pasture land 
base.Labor                 3.328    Hours 
base.othercosts            89.487   Dollars 
base.Profit                  -27.280        Dollar difference between revenues and costs 
base.Methane_EntericFerment     0.045    Metric tons methane from enteric fermentation  
base.Methane_Manure        0.002    Metric tons methane from manure management 
base.NitrousOxide_Manure  2.300000
E-4 
Metric tons nitrous oxide from manure 
management 
base.ManageManureFrac      0.106    Portion of manure managed in a manure 
management system 
base.VolatileSolidsinManure    0.875        Metric tons of volatile solids from manure 
management 
base.LiquidVSManureVolume     0.880    Liquid volatile solids from manure management 
base.HeadinLiquidSystems        1.006     Head involved in liquid management systems 
base.Head                     1.000  Budget is for one animal 
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3.4.1.4.5.  Dairy Cattle Budgets  
Changes in dairy budgets as the result of an FMD outbreak are similar to those in the 
beef herd. Like the cow/calf herd, the number of cows in the dairy herd was spatially 
fixed preventing the model from shifting production to non infected areas. Figure 22 
provides an overview of the dairy cattle budget flow.  
 
 
Figure 22. ASM Dairy Cattle Flow 
 
The dairy herd experienced a rise in the number of deaths and subsequent reduction in 
milk produced. Like the cow/calf operation the off farm yield of dairy calves declined 
due to death loss and replacement needs. The number of dairy steer calves entering the 
fed and non-fed beef markets declined due to death, so the amount of fed and non fed 
beef declines in the impacted region. The impact of the reduced yield of heifer calves 
resulted in a decline in the number of available replacements and a reduction in the 
amount of fluid milk available for sale.  
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Table 6 gives the baseline technology specification of the national average dairy budget. 
Notice the budget produces milk, cull dairy cows and dairy calves, which must be 
reduced as well as an "other cost" line item which must be increased. Similar budgets 
increase for alternative technologies, namely the use of Bovine Somatotropin (BST), a 
20% increase in productivity as a result of improved genetics and a 20% reduction in the 
dairy herd size.  
 
Table 6. National Average Dairy Budget 
Baseline Specification                         National 
Average      
Units / Description 
base.Silage                 -6.600        US tons for dairy production 
base.Hay                   -5.060      US tons for dairy production 
base.Milk                 193.906    100 lbs of raw milk 
base.CullDairyCows             1.657  100 lbs of cull dairy calves 
base.DairyCalves        2.057     100 lbs of dairy calves 
base.biomanure               4.940     US tons manure available for bioprocesses 
base.SoybeanMeal            0.860     US tons soybean meal 
base.DairyCon0             108.529     100 lbs grain blend for dairy cattle 
base.Pasture                 1.750      Acres of pasture land 
base.Labor                    31.587    Hours 
base.othercosts            1272.391  Dollars 
base.Profit                 1435.851   Dollar difference between revenues and costs 
base.Methane_EntericFerment     0.138     Metric tons methane from enteric fermentation  
base.Methane_Manure             0.077      Metric tons methane from manure management 
base.NitrousOxide_Manure      0.001    Metric tons nitrous oxide from manure management 
base.ManageManureFrac           0.039      Portion of manure managed in a manure 
management system 
base.VolatileSolidsinManure     6.698     Metric tons of volatile solids from manure 
management 
base.LiquidVSManureVolume      6.707     Liquid volatile solids from manure management 
base.HeadinLiquidSystems        1.000   Head involved in liquid management systems 
base.Head                     1.000     Budget is for one animal 
 
3.4.1.4.6.  The Sheep Budget 
Sheep production is represented as a single stage process, so the budget has to be 
reduced by the amount of sheep killed under the stamp out policy. The number of sheep 
operations in the infected region was held fixed to reflect the short term impact of the 
outbreak without long-term adjustment. Due to the slaughter in the sheep herds, the 
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amount of lamb available to sale declines as well as the amount of wool that will enter 
the market. Figure 23 provides a flow of the single stage budget and Table 7 provides the 
national average budget for sheep production.  
 
 
Figure 23. ASM Sheep Budget Flow 
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Table 7. National ASM Sheep Budget 
Baseline Specification                        National 
Average   
Units / Description 
base.LambSlaugh 1.541  100 lbs live wt of slaughter lambs 
base.CullEwes   0.663      100 lbs live wt of cull ewes 
base.Wool       31.124   Lbs raw wool 
base.SheepGrn0           1.349    100 lbs grain blend feed for sheep 
base.SheepPro0        1.238   100 lbs protein blend feed for sheep 
base.Pasture         2.215    Acres of pasture land 
base.AUMS            2.714    Animal unit months 
base.Labor                4.792     Hours 
base.SaltMiner      6.688     Dollar cost of salt and minerals 
base.othercosts     47.485   Dollars 
base.Profit                62.694    Dollar difference between revenues and costs 
base.Methane_EntericFerment    0.012     Metric tons methane from enteric fermentation  
base.Methane_Manure         0.001     Metric tons methane from manure management 
base.NitrousOxide_Manure .000007  Metric tons nitrous oxide from manure management 
base.VolatileSolidsinManure    0.257  Metric tons of volatile solids from manure 
management 
base.Head                   1.000    Budget is for one animal 
 
3.4.1.4.7.  Farrow to Finish and Feeder Pig Production Budgets 
There were two ways to address the swine production budgets in ASM when specific 
types of swine operations are not specified in the epidemic data. The first way was to 
adjust at the end using the slaughter hog budget. The second way, and the one used, is to 
adjust at the beginning in the budgets dealing with farrowing. The simple flow of hog 
information through the ASM model is presented in Figure 24.  
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Figure 24. ASM Hog Flow Chart 
 
There are two farrowing operation budgets. Farrow to finish are those operations that 
take a pig from birth to slaughter. These types of operations are in the minority in 
modern slaughter pig production. The second type of budget is feeder pig production, 
which takes the animal from birth to weaning. From there the feeder pig moves into a 
feeding operation followed by slaughter. These two front end budgets are spatially 
locked down in the same way and for the same reasons as the cow/calf budget.  Pig 
finishing is not spatially locked down. In this particular case, hog production losses are 
taken out of the feeder pig production budget, which is provided in Table 8.  
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Table 8. National Average Feeder Pig Budget in ASM 
Baseline Specification                         National 
Average  
Units / Description 
base.FeederPig              8.798     100 lbs live weight of feeder pigs 
base.CullSow              2.289       100 lbs live weight of cull sows 
base.biomanure               1.966     US tons manure available for bioprocesses 
base.FPGGrain0               47.655   100 lbs grain blend for feeder pigs 
base.FPGProSwn0               11.043       100 lbs protein blend for feeder pigs 
base.Labor                     46.327      Hours 
base.FeedMix                    23.314     Dollar cost of feed blending 
base.othercosts              359.592    Dollars 
base.Profit                  373.218    Dollar difference between revenues and costs 
base.Methane_EntericFerment     0.001    Metric tons methane from enteric fermentation  
base.Methane_Manure              0.010    Metric tons methane from manure management 
base.NitrousOxide_Manure  0.00002 Metric tons nitrous oxide from manure management 
base.VolatileSolidsinManure       2.987      Metric tons of volatile solids from manure 
management 
base.LiquidVSManureVolume       2.989       Liquid volatile solids from manure management 
base.HeadinLiquidSystems        1.001     Head involved in liquid management systems 
base.Head                      1.000  Budget is for one animal 
 
3.4.1.5.  Output from the Economic Model 
The ASM Model has several benefits in terms of examining multiple areas impacted by 
the disease shock. The impact categories discussed below are by no means all that can be 
examined, but they are the areas that have been used most intensively for this animal 
disease analysis.  
Change in Welfare: Welfare change is a measure of economic gain/loss that is more 
encompassing than loss measures like GDP or disease mitigation cost (Paarlberg, Lee 
and Mathews) and useful in determining the impact of policy changes and disease 
shocks (Rich, Miller and Winter-Nelson). ASM shows changes in total national 
agricultural welfare from the baseline of no disease and breaks those changes down by 
domestic agriculture producers, consumers and processors. In addition it examines 
changes in welfare for foreign producers, consumers and processors. The focus here will 
be on changes in total US welfare from agriculture.  
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Regional and Sub-Regional Agricultural Producers Surplus: Only examining the total 
US agricultural producers welfare changes may mask the fact that some regions’ 
producers will be hit harder than other regions. In fact, some regions producers who are 
not directly infected could potentially gain from the outbreak. To examine these 
dynamics producers surplus is best examined on a regional and sub-regional basis.  
National Price Changes for Major Raw Commodities in $/Unit: These percentage 
changes in the price from the no disease base are a key benefit to using the ASM model. 
They include not just the commodities impacted directly like beef, pork and milk but 
also the price changes in complement and substitute products. This more fully captures 
the dynamics of who gains and who loses from the disease outbreak.  
Input/Output Analysis: Using multipliers provided by the Food and Agricultural Policy 
Research Institute (FAPRI) model, a simple input/output analysis is performed in the 
impacted region. In particular employment effects are examined.  
Up to this point, this essay has attempted to provide intuition and justification for 
integrated economic/epidemic modeling approach taken. If  a more detailed explanation 
of the programming related to an integrated model is desired, see the Appendix of this 
dissertation. Since the two models are very similar, only the DADS-ASM integrated 
model is presented.  
3.5. Additional Economic Modules  
In addition to the work done in ASM, the output of the economic model can be used in 
additional economic analyses. In particular, analyses could be done on risk aversion by 
decision makers in ranking alternative control strategies as shown in the context of the 
AusSpread-ASM integration and the DADS-ASM integration the examination of trade 
impacts over multiple years into the future, or the balance of pre-event investment to 
event disease control costs.  Ideally, there would be a feedback from the economic 
model to the epidemic model. The economic model results would refine epidemic model 
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assumptions on control strategy parameters. This is an area that could be pursued in the 
future. 
3.6. Summary 
This essay has outlined the key assumptions underlying economic model choice and has 
given an overview of how the linked model has been developed. Of the three most often 
used economic models—CCCBA, I-O, and PE—the choice will depend on the disease 
characteristics, epidemic model (e.g. size of region, spread rate assumptions etc.) and 
international market restrictions policies. The disease characteristics and epidemic model 
will determine the size of the supply shift and the size of the demand shift. Also, the 
assumed size of the outbreak, the region in which it is assumed to occur, and the focus 
on short run versus long run economic impacts determines whether the assumption of 
perfectly inelastic supply or perfectly elastic demand is appropriate. International trade 
restrictions that can be expected from the outbreak will also influence the type of model 
used, particularly when the market being impacted has a large presence in the 
international market (e.g. US pork).  
The integrated model developed here assesses impacts in vertically and horizontally 
linked markets, consumers and producers, and domestic and international markets within 
a single framework. This is a unique contribution among partial equilibrium integrated 
models since most have done some portion of this but have not modeled the entire 
agricultural sector. Rather they have modeled the livestock sector and select related 
sectors to answer specific questions of interest. 
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4. ESSAY 3: A CASE STUDY IN LINKING FMD EPIDEMIC MODELS WITH THE 
ASM MODEL—THE DADS-ASM INTEGRATION APPLICATION IN THE 
CENTRAL VALLEY CALIFORNIA DAIRY REGION 
4.1. Introduction 
Essay 3 carries out a strategy assessment using the methodology developed in essay 2. 
California is the number one dairy producing state in the U.S. with 1.87 million head of 
cows producing $6.5 billion worth of milk and other dairy products in 2007 (USDA-
NASS, 2008). Foot and mouth disease (FMD) is a large potential threat to the health and 
economic productivity of this industry.  Herein a joint epidemic-economic study 
examining the consequences of an FMD outbreak in this industry was carried out to 
examine the effect of a number of management alternatives. The focus of this study was 
the Central Valley in Northern California. The exact index infection point of the 
outbreak will be chosen at random to avoid security sensitivities.   
4.2. Background on California Livestock Agriculture 
According to the 2007 Census of Agriculture, California was ranked as having the 
highest total value of agricultural products sold in the US at $33 billion. The majority of 
this comes from crops, nursery and greenhouse products; however, the production of 
livestock, poultry and their associated products was a $10.9 billion industry (NASS-
USDA, 2008). California is ranked second only to Texas in terms of livestock value.  
In California milk and other dairy products from cows are the highest value  livestock 
commodity group at $6.9 billion in value of sales; this represents 22% of the nation's 
milk supply. This is followed by cattle and calves ($2.5 billion), and poultry and eggs 
($1.5 billion) (USDA-NASS, 2009). Swine, sheep, goats and other animals make up a 
relatively small portion of the state's value of livestock. In terms of numbers of animals, 
poultry were the largest animal category, but cattle and calves represented 5.5 billion 
animals (USDA-NASS, 2009).  
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California is ranked first in dairy production in the US followed by Wisconsin, New 
York, Idaho and Pennsylvania (Dapper et al.). It is hypothesized that these other regions 
could potentially gain from a major animal disease outbreak in California due to slashed 
milk supplies and consequently increased milk prices. In 2008, total annual milk 
production in California surpassed 40 billion pounds (Francesconi et al.). This was a 
record breaking year, and dairy cooperatives and other processing plants initiated base 
caps for producers. There are 34 milk producing counties in the state, but almost 70% is 
produced in Tulare, Merced, Stanislaus, Kings and Kern counties (Dapper et al.). This 
area is the focus of the study presented here, particularly Tulare county.  
The utilization of milk has been primarily for butter and nonfat dry milk powder (34% of 
production) and cheese production (43% of production) where the primary cheeses 
produced are Mozzarella, Cheddar and Jack (Dapper et al.). The leading counties in 
dairy manufacturing capacity are Merced, Tulare, Madera, Humboldt and Yolo 
accounting for a total of 86% of manufacturing capacity among them (Dapper et al.). 
There were 117 plants in California in 2008 (Dapper et al.), creating the potential for a 
bottleneck for remaining facilities if a large number of these facilities are under 
movement restrictions. If the manufacturing facility is located in the county infected by 
disease, it will also be under movement restrictions halting the movement of products 
outside the movement restriction zone. Furthermore, there is a question as yet 
unanswered of whether manufacturing facilities would allow milk from premises under 
surveillance for the disease from entering their operation without stringent testing and 
cleaning of trucks. 
4.3. Study Design 
4.3.1. Scenarios 
The hypothetical FMD outbreak was initiated in a dairy herd by contact with a feral hog, 
and subsequently spread through California's population of domesticated livestock. The 
epidemic was simulated using the DADS model. Resulting data on the losses from the 
epidemic were run through the ASM component of the FASOM model to gain 
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perspective on the economic consequences of the disease, including both the direct 
disease mitigation costs and other economic consequences. Specific disease mitigation 
issues considered here were:  
• Rapidity of detection of an outbreak.  Specifically initial detection of the 
outbreak will be simulated with it occurring 7, 10, 14, 21 or 22 days after the 
initial infection. 
• The use of vaccination versus not using vaccination, plus 10 and 20 km 
vaccination around the infected premises (IP).  
• The hourly cost of delay in detection. Specifically what is the cost to the US for 
every additional hour of delay between 21 and 22 day detection.  
• The effects of disease management on welfare slaughter and milk "dumping".   
Table 9 provides the exact scenarios considered, the results of which are reported 
throughout this report. The DADS model was used to simulate each scenario 100 times 
to characterize a distribution of potential outcomes for the detection and vaccination 
scenarios. In ASM, economic impacts were assessed assuming 100 independent, random 
trials.  Then risk aversion of decision makers in the model was considered and strategies 
evaluated in relation to their risk preference.  The model was also modified to allow 
greater consideration of welfare slaughter and national trade alternatives.    
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Table 9. Epidemic Model Scenario Definitions 
Scenario Name Vaccination Delay 
Base (No disease outbreak) NA NA 
NoVacc_7Day None 7 
NoVacc_10Day None 10 
NoVacc_14Day None 14 
NoVacc_21Day None 21 
NoVacc_22Day None 22 
10Km_7Day 10 km ring around IP 7 
10Km_10Day 10 km ring around IP 10 
10Km_14Day 10 km ring around IP 14 
10Km_21Day 10 km ring around IP 21 
10Km_22Day 10 km ring around IP 22 
20Km_7Day 20 km ring around IP 7 
20Km_10Day 20 km ring around IP 10 
20Km_14Day 20 km ring around IP 14 
20Km_21Day 20 km ring around IP 21 
20Km_21Day 20 km ring around IP 22 
 
4.4. Economic Impact Categorizations 
Economic impacts can be divided into two categories: direct and secondary. Most 
studies examining livestock disease have focused on direct impacts of the disease. Due 
to the highly integrated nature of the modern economy, consequences of agricultural 
contamination at any given point along the supply chain could be manifested in other 
sectors of the economy as well. For example in the recent foot FMD outbreak in the UK, 
the largest category of losses came from tourism. Such losses are termed secondary 
losses.   
The losses that should be examined in any given epidemic-economic study will vary 
depending on the type of disease, species of animals impacted and the importance of 
those species to the economy, as well as regional and international animal disease 
policies.  
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4.4.1. Direct Losses 
Direct losses accumulate to the livestock sector as a direct consequence of an animal 
disease attack. This category of losses has received the most attention because they are 
typically easily quantified, particularly for the supply side. Direct losses are also of 
interest in establishing the cost of a particular response policy from a governing agency 
viewpoint.  
4.4.1.1.  Lost Animals and Changes in Animal Value 
The most obvious direct loss results from animals or herds that are removed from the 
supply chain due to the disease. This may arise from massive preventative slaughter, as 
in the case of FMD, or death due to the disease itself, such as with BSE. It also captures 
increased culling and abortion in young animals for production operations, as would be 
the case with Rift Valley Fever.  
The value of animals lost can be calculated using a schedule of market values based on 
pre-disease market conditions. This is often the method used in studies for calculating 
indemnity payments to producers from preventative slaughter. There are two issues with 
using this method. First, it does not recognize the role of livestock as a capital asset 
(Thompson et al.). In particular for purebred animal producers, the value of an animal 
represents an investment in genetic improvements that may not be accounted for in a per 
pound cash market value as it would for a commercial animal. Second, producers who 
have animals not infected but expecting to absorb the full revenue loss from a negative 
price change may be tempted to claim their herd has been in direct contact with infected 
herds in order to collect a higher price per unit. It is suspected that the payout schedule 
was set too high in the 2001 FMD outbreak, leading to slaughter levels greater than 
necessary for disease control (Anderson, 2002).  
Welfare slaughter is an issue that has not received much attention in the literature, but 
has proven to be a real issue in historical animal disease outbreaks that include 
quarantine zones and strict movement restrictions. These policies may prevent feed 
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grains and pre-made feeds from being shipped into the restricted regions plus movement 
of animals to feeding or other operations. For enterprises employing confined feeding or 
those raising young animals previous to feeding, the amount of feed on hand and 
facilities to keep animals would likely not be sufficient beyond normal movement times 
may be insufficient to allow the animals to be kept. This leads to additional slaughter, 
and consequently higher indemnity payment levels to producers.  As discussed in 
previous sections, producers expecting lower prices for animals post-outbreak may 
volunteer animals for welfare slaughter to prevent additional price change losses. 
Welfare slaughter will be discussed in more detail in Section 4.7.1.1.  
4.4.1.2.  Costs of Disease Management 
The direct costs of disease management account for the resources required for response 
to the disease outbreak including the cost of vaccination, slaughter, disposal, cleaning, 
disinfecting and administrative costs. This would include cost for labor, equipment, and 
materials (Schoenbaum and Disney). The market price changes also will impact the 
losses producers face. Prices could change as a result of the supply shift caused by 
slaughter of live animals, the destruction of milk, meat and meat products ordinarily 
destined for the market and the time lag for operations to return to full production.  Some 
studies have assumed prices do not change at the national level, but this would only be 
the case in a very small disease outbreak that does not change the aggregate national 
supply or affect demand. 
Another cost producers absorb is the loss in quality from withholding market-ready 
animals from slaughter. The additional time to slaughter causes carcasses to be too large 
or not be at the optimal level of conditioning to achieve one of the premium grades, 
which leads to carcass discounts. For some diseases, in order to ship meat products out 
of the region where the infection occurs, carcasses must either be processed into cooked 
meat products to kill the disease causing agent or be put in non-human consumption 
products such as pet food.  
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Carcass disposal becomes a serious issue in a disease outbreak resulting in large scale 
animal mortality or large scale slaughter. Factors such as environmental regulations and 
public health impacts will also determine the disposal method hierarchy established 
(Scudamore et al.) in addition to the cost per unit for disposal and the time required to 
dispose of all carcasses.  The type of control strategy employed can also affect the 
carcass disposal method chosen since it will, hopefully, reduce the number of dead 
animals (Jin, Huang and McCarl). 
4.4.1.3.  Trade Losses 
Animal disease often has significant impacts on international trade. Outbreaks in the last 
decade have increased the volatility in international meat markets through their effects 
on consumer preferences, trade patterns, and reduced aggregate supply (Morgan and 
Prakash). Upon confirmation of an animal disease outbreak, restrictions are often placed 
on where livestock and meat products can be exported as well as what products are 
shipped. The extent of these damages will vary by disease and country, but in general 
countries experiencing an animal disease outbreak will experience immediate restricted 
international trade due to domestic supply changes and world demand shifts until the 
infected country is shown to be disease free for a pre-determined amount of time. 
Domestic market impacts may be partially offset by imports (Thompson et al.).  
If the disease is not carried in the meat, localized cuts in production will reduce the 
livestock and meat products available for export. In addition, movement restrictions in 
the country will prevent normal supplies from reaching the market and export restriction 
shift meat normally shipped overseas to domestic supply (Thompson et al.).   
If the disease is carried in the meat, it either must be cooked to destroy the organism or it 
must be removed from the meat supply chain. Upon confirmation of BSE in the US in 
2003, more than 50 countries either completely stopped beef exports from the US or 
severely restricted them resulting in beef exports at only 20% of the previous year's 
levels (Hu and Jin).  
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Even in the case of diseases that can be transferred to humans through the meat, markets 
have historically been found to recover within two years; however, the nation that 
experienced the outbreak may take longer to recover their share of the world market 
(Morgan and Prakash). At particular risk are developing countries. 
4.4.2. Secondary Losses  
Secondary losses are less easily quantified, but ignoring them in a study can lead to 
severe under-estimation of the total cost of the outbreak. These studies are often done 
separately from the integrated epidemic-economic model analysis; however, they should 
ideally be included in the integrated model as much as possible. In some cases, such as 
environmental costs, the estimation may have to be done separately. 
4.4.2.1.  Related Industries 
Disease outbreaks can have effects that extend well beyond the meat production chain 
(Pritchett, Thilmany and Johnson). While industries directly in the meat production 
chain will typically experience the greater loss and have consequently been the focus of 
disease outbreak economics literature, little work has been done to ascertain the impact 
on service industries linked to the meat industry. Figure 25, adapted from Pritchett, 
Thilmany and Johnson provides a general idea of how interrelated these markets are.  A 
good example is the feed industry. In countries with large concentrated animal feeding 
operations, such as the US, a significant source of demand for feed grains is represented 
by livestock demand. Disease outbreaks leading to large scale animal mortality will 
reduce the domestic demand for feed grains. In addition, movement restrictions in the 
quarantine zone will restrict not only the transport of livestock but the transport of feed 
grain supply trucks/unit trains coming into or out of the region. These disruptions and 
demand shifts will be reflected in the price of feed grains. Other industries that would be 
impacted by a disease outbreak are transportation, veterinary service and supply 
industries, and rendering services (Pritchett, Thilmany and Johnson). 
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Figure 25. Interrelationship of Livestock Sector (Pritchett, Thilmany and Johnson)  
 
4.4.2.2.  Local Economies 
Disease outbreaks will have the greatest monetary impact on the area where the outbreak 
occurs. Local producers whose premises are depopulated must wait to rebuild their 
operation, removing the money that would have been spent on feed, supplies, and 
livestock related services at local businesses. Movement restrictions divert commercial 
and tourist traffic coming through the region, removing income to local businesses like 
gas stations, hotels and restaurants. Businesses may choose to shut down or livestock 
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operations may opt not to repopulate, decreasing the number of jobs available to local 
residents. Alternatively, the process of controlling the disease may provide some 
increased local employment but this would be short term only.  
In the 2001, UK FMD outbreak 44% of the confirmed cases occurred in the county of 
Cumbria (Bennett et al.). Farmers and businesses in the county were surveyed after the 
outbreak to ascertain their losses. Although 63% of farmers in the county said they 
would continue farming, only 46% planned to build back up to their previous level of 
operation. There was an estimated direct employment loss of 600 full-time jobs and an 
indirect employment loss of 900 jobs (Bennett et al.).  
In the entire north east region of the UK, 52% of businesses reported negative impacts 
but these impacts were spread across various sectors (Phillipson et al.). Relatively low 
impacts were felt by construction, education, health care, and personal services and 
moderately impacted firms were retail, transportation, business services and 
manufacturing. Some of these moderately impacted business were able to adapt, for 
example a livestock hauler took other types of overland transport until the livestock 
sector was able to recover. Severely impacted sectors were hospitality, outdoor 
recreation, farm service providers and farming (Phillipson et al.).   
Depending on the area of the country impacted by the animal disease and the size of the 
outbreak, tourism/hospitality can represent a serious source of secondary losses. 
Returning to the Cumbria county survey, after the 2001 UK FMD outbreak the loss in 
gross tourism revenues in that county were expected to be around £400 million. Reports 
predicted the recovery of the county economy would largely depend on the long term 
recovery of the tourism industry (Bennett et al.). On a national level, tourism was the 
largest source of losses related to the FMD outbreak at £2.7 to £3.2 billion (Thompson et 
al.).  
The macro-level data from the UK did not show the level of impact that was initially 
expected considering the impact on UK agriculture. Lessons learned from this outbreak 
90 
 
provide valuable information for increasing the resiliency of the US economy to a 
similar outbreak. First, timing is everything. The two years prior to the outbreak were 
strong years for the economy, allowing firms to build up a buffer against a bad year 
(Phillipson et al.). Similarly, households were in a position to absorb some of the impact. 
Second, the economic impacts from the outbreak may be spread over multiple years in a 
'lag effect' of the outbreak (Rich and Winter-Nelson). This gives firms and households 
time to make adjustments, softening its immediate impact in the overall economy to a 
gradual decline and gradual recovery.  
Continuity of business, or the ability of small firms to cope with the impacts, is an issue 
that is identified as an important issue, but little has been done to quantify it. The most 
straight forward way of examining this issue is to examine impacts at the household 
level since small firms and households are closely interdependent (Phillipson et al.). 
Coping during a crisis, such as an animal disease, occurs in phases where earlier phases 
are characterized by protection of future earning capability and later phases are 
characterized by downsizing and the sale of core assets. Vulnerability then is defined by 
high exposure of risk factors and low levels of assets that can be used to keep the firm in 
the black (James and Ellis).  
4.4.2.3.  Environmental Impacts 
There are two primary environmental impacts related to animal disease outbreaks: water 
and air quality. Ground water can be negatively impacted by disease carcasses being 
buried in areas where materials can leach from decomposing carcasses. Preventing this 
could restrict the amount of on-farm burial in the event of an animal disease outbreak, 
leading to additional spread risks by moving animals to suitable sites or delays in 
disposal by alternative methods. Water quality is also impacted by runoff from cleaning 
depopulated premises and from dumping infected milk as a result of movement 
restrictions. In a study of the 2001 FMD outbreak in the Netherlands, the illegal 
discharge of milk into sewage systems, rivers and smaller waterways lead to a high to 
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very high probably of spreading the disease to other cattle operations within 6-50 km of 
the dump site (Schijven, Rijs, and de Roda Husman).   
Air quality can be impacted when animal pyre burning or curtain burning of carcasses is 
employed. Curtain burning is preferred since it reduces the emissions into the air, but it 
is not always feasible since it requires more time and resources than pyre burning 
(Scudamore et al.). Studies in the UK, where pyre burning was used extensively at one 
point in the outbreak, have examined the levels of dangerous compounds in livestock, 
dairy products and eggs produced nearby. Slight increases in concentrations of 
dangerous compounds were found in lamb, chicken and eggs, but these were not samples 
destined for the food chains. Milk tests indicated dangerous compound concentrations 
were within acceptable ranges. Overall, the study concludes there is no evidence that the 
pyres were responsible for contaminating food produced in that region (Rose et al.).  
Human health has been another concern related to air quality. Pyre burning releases 
considerable amounts of ash and pollutants into the atmosphere that can be breathed in 
by carcass disposal workers and local residents. A study in Cumbria county in the UK 
found that levels of respiratory irritants, although elevated above normal levels from the 
pyres, did not exceed air quality standards or exceeded them by very little. Furthermore, 
the pollutants were unlikely to cause damage to all but the most sensitive (e.g. 
asthmatics and those with weak lungs) individuals (Lowles et al.). 
4.4.2.4.  Meat Demand 
Consumer demand response comes from two sources in an animal disease outbreak. The 
first is the easier of the two to quantify, the adjustment in consumption patterns from 
price changes. Historically, consumers have experienced a small net loss in overall 
welfare although this is partially offset by lower domestic prices (Thompson et al.). The 
second impact is substitution in consumption patterns as a result of changes in consumer 
confidence. How much of an impact reaches consumers depends on several factors such 
as industry organization, consumer demographics, and information release policies. 
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4.4.3. Cost Assumptions Specific to this Study  
The DADS model simulations done herein, outbreaks were restricted to California since 
the premises locations and other model parameterizations that DADS uses are most 
accurately estimated for this state.  The index herd in the scenario was a large dairy 
(>2000 animals) selected at random from among all large dairies in CA. On the date of 
initial infection, it was assumed one cow was in the 1st day of her latent disease state in 
the index herd and the disease spread from there using random draws from disease 
spread parameter distributions.  
Vaccination was limited to dairy herds and dairy calf/heifer operations within a 10 km 
ring around the diagnosed infected premises (IP) and was not constrained by a specific 
number of doses. This is reasonable for two reasons. First, the outbreak simulation was 
being constrained to a specific region of the country. Realistically, we assume vaccine 
availability would be 250K doses in 4 days, 500K a week later and then 1 million doses 
a week thereafter. Since the outbreak is being limited to California, vaccination will 
likely only occur for 1-2 weeks. Second, this kind of unconstrained information will be 
useful in guiding policies on what kind of vaccine availability should be in place.  
Other assumptions are: (1) slaughter of all herds in which at least one animal has been 
diagnosed as infected; (2) restricted movement for 10 days in the infected area that is 
placed in a 10 km radius around the IP; (3) restricted movement for 10 days in the 
surveillance area that is placed in a 20 km radius around the IP; and (4) a 3-day 
statewide ban on animal movement.  
 The direct cost incurred as a result of an FMD outbreak has two components. The first 
component is the disease management cost, which is the number of animals affected 
times the cost per head of disease management. This included the cost to test animals 
that are slaughtered and animals that are restricted, veterinary charges to visit infected 
premises and to check restricted premises, and vaccination cost for those animals within 
the ring vaccination area. Cost of disease management is added to the second element, 
which is the cost of carcass disposal. It is assumed that all infected animals are 
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slaughtered. The cost of carcass disposal included: the cost of appraising the herd for 
slaughter, cost of euthanasia, cost of cleanup and disinfection of premises, and cost of 
carcass disposal. The costs are based on a schedule that varies by the size of the herd. 
Costs are as follows: 
• The cost of appraisal for slaughter for small (<100 head), medium (100-500) and 
large (>500) herds was assumed to be $300, $400 and $500 per herd, 
respectively. 
• Euthanasia costs were assumed to be $5.00 per head, regardless of herd type. 
• The cost of disposal of a culled animal was assumed to be $11 per head in small 
(<100 head) and medium (100-500) herds, and $12 per head in large herds. 
• The cost of cleaning and disinfection for small (<100), medium (100-500) and 
large (>500) herds was assumed to be $5,000, $7,000 and $10,000 per herd, 
respectively. 
• A dose of vaccine was assumed to cost $5.50 per head. The cost of vaccine is 
likely more complicated than this given the cost of contracting to produce the 
required number of doses, even if they are not used in the outbreak, and increasing 
vaccine production; however, this cost assumption was based on previously 
published work by Ward et al. (2007).  
• Fixed costs were assumed for vaccination: $300, $500 and $800 for small (<100 
head), medium (100-500) and large (>500) herds. 
• Fixed surveillance costs were assumed to be $150, $200 and $400 for small (<100 
head), medium (100-500) and large (>500) herds. 
• It was assumed that suspect herds were visited twice a week during a 30-day 
period for regular surveillance strategies, and 4 times a week for enhanced 
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surveillance strategies. The cost of these visits were assumed to be $50, $75 and 
$100 for small (<100 head), medium (100-500) and large (>500) herds. 
• The cost per trip (one way) into or out of the movement restriction zone will require 
truck cleaning in the amount of $130 per trip.  
• The feed cost for dairy blend feed ration for lactating cows is $310 per ton 
delivered. This does not include the cost of roughage, which will likely be stored on 
farm. The number of deliveries required per day is 3 for large dairies, 1 for medium 
dairies and 0.5 for small dairies. Using a medium representative dairy operation in 
California, it is estimated that dairy producers will only have to bring in only a 
portion of feed from the outside; using on-farm production to account for the rest. 
This is a cost per animal of $4.97 per cow per day out of the total cost per cow per 
day of feed of $7.23. Feed costs typically are about half of the cost cwt of milk, so 
this number is not unreasonable given recent farm milk prices. 
Animal price assumptions are presented in Table 10. These assumptions are used to 
calculate indemnity payments. The meat demand assumption made here is that international 
demand for US meat will go to zero as well as international demand for non-pasteurized 
dairy products. Domestic meat and dairy demand is not assumed to shift as a result of the 
FMD outbreak. Finally, the trade assumption is that regionalization is not utilized and as a 
result there is a total lockdown of all livestock, meat and non-pasteurized dairy products.  
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Table 10. Market Price Assumptions  
  Animal Type Average Weight Average Market Price per Head
Steers:  Stocker 600 lb class 654.00 
 Feeder 800 lb class 685.60 
 Fed 1000 lb class 857.00 
 Fed 1200 lb class 1028.40 
 Fed 1400 lb class 1199.80 
Heifers:  Stocker 600 lb class 644.00  
 Feeder 800 lb class 678.60  
 Fed 1000 lb class 850.00  
 Fed 1200 lb class 1021.40 
 Fed 1400 lb class 1192.80 
Milk Cow Replacement Heifer  1280 
Cull Cow Dry Cow  400 
Sheep Cull Ewe  160 lb 46.40 
 Replacement Ewe  80 lb 83.20    
 Ram  230 lb 66.70 
 Whether  90 lb 93.60   
 Male Feeder Lamb 60 lb 62.40  
 Female Feeder  Lamb  50 lb 52.00 
Hogs cull sows  215 lb 60.63 
 rep gilt  180 lb   79.56 
 boars  225 lb   99.45 
 feeder  140 lb 61.88 
 
4.4.4. Herd Demographics 
 The breakdown of herd types is given in Table 11 from the DADS model. These 
groupings are aggregated in ASM as: (1) Cow/Calf (2) Sheep (3) Dairy (4) Feeder Pig 
Production and (5) Hog Farrow to Finish. Goats are captured in the sheep category, dairy 
calf operations are listed as small feedlots, and backyard and saleyard are folded into the 
beef cattle categories. Table 12 provides their inventories and the total inventory of 
animals in the region of interest.  
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Table 11. Herd Definitions from DADS Model 
Herd Type Definition 
Large Beef More than 250 head beef cattle 
Small Beef 1 to 250 head beef cattle 
Large Dairy More than 2000 head dairy cattle 
Medium Dairy 1001 to 1999 head dairy cattle  
Small Dairy 1 to 1000 head dairy cattle 
Large Dairy Calf  More than 250 head dairy calves 
Small Dairy Calf 1 to 250 head dairy calves 
Large Swine More than 2000 head hogs 
Small Swine Less than 2000 head hogs 
Goat  All size goat operations 
Sheep All size sheep operations 
Backyard Less than 10 head on premises 
Saleyards Mixed stock sale yard facilities 
 
Table 12. Inventories of Animals in Susceptible Region When Moved to ASM 
Operation Type Inventory (head)
Cow/Calf 911,805 
Sheep 388,920 
Dairy 1,382,305 
Swine 45,594 
TOTAL 2,728,624 
 
In the DADS model, herd status is defined as susceptible, sub-clinically infectious, 
clinically infectious, immune or dead. At the end of the outbreak period (day 120), it is 
assumed that all infectious herds have been slaughtered or are destined to be slaughtered. 
Thus the "status" variable is defined as either susceptible (status = 0) or dead (status = 3) 
when it enters the economic part of the model. Susceptible implies that the herd is 
composed of animals that could be infected with FMD and the herd lives in the Central 
Valley region, but at day 120 the herd had not become infected with the disease. Dead 
implies that the herd was slaughtered for disease control purposes.   
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4.5. Epidemic Model Results 
Basic statistics for the epidemic model data across each scenario's 100 random trials 
were calculated, including mean, standard deviation, coefficient of variation, median, 
min, max, and 25% and 75% probability intervals. The proportion of animals 
slaughtered or restricted out of the total population represented by the approximately 
22,000 livestock premises in California that is modeled in the DADS model is also 
presented.  
4.5.1. Animals Slaughtered for Disease Control  
Summary statistics for the number of head slaughtered is presented in Table 13. For a 
graphical representation, Figure 26. Spread of Disease Control Slaughter Distribution 
shows across the different scenarios that slaughter will increase as the delay to detection 
increases but the maximum of the number slaughtered distribution is reduced by the use 
of vaccination. These results will motivate examination of delays in detection and 
slaughter later in the economic results overview.  
 
Table 13. Summary Statistics for Disease Control Slaughter3 
 Min 25% Median 75% Max Mean StDev 
NoVacc_7Day  5  5,020  8,730  14,618 39,504  10,625  7,622 
NoVacc_10Day  3,000    14,949   30,443   42,675   88,944   30,378  18,566 
NoVacc_14Day  14,369    42,185  62,558  86,389  48,675    66,886  29,615 
NoVacc_21Day   74,207  175,273 213,693 249,692 364,539  211,138   62,791 
NoVacc_22Day 72,580  202,269 260,370 305,071 419,274  252,761   77,045 
10Km_7Day   650   4,968 7,798 15,397  50,205    11,062   8,697 
10Km_10Day  2,340   14,748   26,042  37,595 113,998   28,735    18,958 
10Km_14Day 14,095  46,440  67,784 86,712 141,755  67,698   28,058 
10Km_21Day 69,278  169,581 210,315 255,654 348,933  213,891  66,192 
10Km_22Day 72,730  221,787 256,861 303,541 454,588  260,291  70,882 
20Km_7Day     170  5,013 10,605 15,618 43,172  11,898  8,106 
20Km_10Day 3,175   19,151 28,771 40,131 90,992  30,573  17,650 
20Km_14Day  2,000  51,670 72,163 91,266 173,107  73,280  29,860 
20Km_21Day 74,631  148,962 201,092 245,888 366,220  199,984  66,773 
20Km_22Day 83,201  203,149 253,127 296,203 392,806  248,659  69,573 
 
                                                 
3 Variables for summary statistics tables are defined in Table 9.  
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Figure 26. Spread of Disease Control Slaughter Distribution4 
 
4.5.2. Herds Placed Under Movement Restrictions 
Summary statistics for the number of herds quarantined is presented in Table 14. Figure 
27 shows across the different scenarios the herds placed under movement restrictions 
will increase as the delay to detection increases but the maximum herds restricted of the 
herds quarantined distribution is decreased by vaccination.  
                                                 
4 For Figure 26 - Figure 28, the vertical line represents the spread from min to max, the 
square indicates the 75th percentile, the circle represents the 25th percentile and the 
triangle represents the median. The vertical axis is in number of head or herds as 
indicated in the text, and the horizontal axis is the scenario considered. Variables are 
defined in Table 9.  
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Table 14. Summary Statistics for Herds Quarantined 
  Min  25% Median 75% Max Mean  StDev
NoVacc_7Day  73   401   677  1,092   4,728     968    881 
NoVacc_10Day   169     873  1490  2,192  5,294   1,756   1,155 
NoVacc_14Day   793   2,051  2,683  4,444   7,994    3,287   1,658 
NoVacc_21Day   1,873   4,028  5,240  7,304  10,032    5,486   2,124 
NoVacc_22Day  1,765   4,625  6,211  7,470  11,109   6,126   2,212 
10Km_7Day    68    451   767  1,112   3,435    926    677 
10Km_10Day    246   1,005  1,588  2,603   6,069    1,963   1,310 
10Km_14Day    783   2,014  2,783  3,799   6,842   3,005   1,307 
10Km_21Day    931   4,043  5,491  6,950  8,848   5,321   2,090 
10Km_22Day   2,020   4,927  6,114  7,603  10,574    6,187   1,795 
20Km_7Day   43    383  823  1,308  4,575    1,049     898 
20Km_10Day    219     998  1,606  2,785  5,778    2,019   1,376 
20Km_14Day    68   1,991  2,794  3,891  7,387    3,064   1,453 
20Km_21Day   1,433   3,853  5,381  6,556  9,186   5,215   1,929 
20Km_22Day   1,807   4,574  5,770  7,248  10,305    5,804   1,907 
 
 
 
Figure 27. Spread of Herds Quarantined Distribution 
 
4.5.3. Animals Slaughtered for Welfare Purposes 
The movement restrictions put in place create the potential for welfare slaughter in the 
movement restriction zone because feed and critical services cannot be brought to the 
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livestock in a cost effective manner without increasing the risk of greater disease spread. 
The summary statistics for the number of head that would be slaughtered for welfare 
purposes if feed could not be brought into the quarantine zone are presented in Table 15. 
As shown in Figure 28, vaccination could be an effective way to prevent excessive 
welfare slaughter under late detection. However, if the disease is caught early enough 
vaccination may not be necessary. This will be discussed in more detail in the economic 
results section.  
 
Table 15. Summary Statistics for Head in Danger of Slaughter for Welfare Purposes 
 Min 25% Median 75% Max Mean StDev 
NoVacc_ 
7Day 
5,940   235,661  352,331  453,797 696,395 332,491  151,155 
NoVacc_ 
10Day 
51,573  324,767  456,937 545,969 948,431 448,722  150,845 
NoVacc_ 
14Day 
246,473  510,457 570,849 748,747 1,138,469 615,726  204,872 
NoVacc_ 
21Day 
195,180  560,001 704,347 967,424 1,197,707 735,976  266,263 
NoVacc_ 
22Day 
162,137  611,594 839,106 936,171 1,293,811 772,731  263,361 
10Km_ 
7Day 
27,504  235,996 302,006 434,349 810,378 330,125  155,252 
10Km_ 
10Day 
89,664  404,407 505,213 587,915 892,516 484,373  155,054 
10Km_ 
14Day 
268,452  511,539 565,245 659,013 992,671 582,999  152,569 
10Km_ 
21Day 
181,645  582,792 688,260 868,456 1,182,927 682,257  243,904 
10Km_ 
22Day 
9,358  630,434 739,431 908,970 1,373,980 747,872  239,304 
20Km_ 
7Day 
7,660  237,569 300,983 450,758 951,683 342,446  171,887 
20Km_ 
10Day 
72,470  386,820 490,207 584,427 1,061,914 488,398  188,681 
20Km_ 
14Day 
28,644  488,024 561,779 684,081 1,063,976 580,934  175,106 
20Km_ 
21Day 
6,320  564,407 675,494 883,045 1,420,058 672,584  281,457 
20Km_ 
22Day 
43,638  606,228 761,650 893,865 1,151,420 731,483  227,340 
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Figure 28. Spread of Head in Danger of Welfare Slaughter 
 
4.6. Economic Model Results 
 The data above were used to adjust the sheep, cow/calf, dairy, farrow to finish, and 
feeder pig production budgets in ASM in the outbreak region, Northern California in this 
case. All animals infected were assumed to be slaughtered for disease control. Each of 
these groups will be addressed separately. For an overview of the thought process behind 
integrating animal disease into ASM see essay 2.  
 In this study the FMD outbreak was restricted to the Northern California region (Figure 
29). However, since this region of California is a significant contributor to national 
supply of livestock products and since the US is a significant player in the world market, 
effects will be felt through the entire country and the rest of the world. The ASM model 
captures the change in economic welfare5 or economic surplus from an animal disease 
                                                 
5 Economic welfare loss is the loss in the aggregate well-being of participants in a 
market based on alternative allocations of scarce resources. This is sometimes referred to 
as economic surplus. The second term will be used here to prevent confusion with the 
term welfare slaughter.   
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because it calculates a dollar loss of value added net income and a welfare cost of 
commodity prices rising. The trade impacts are also be estimated within ASM.  The 
results presented below include the trade losses assuming the export of FMD affected, 
non-pasteurized products is closed for the entire country for the remainder of the year 
after the outbreak is brought under control. 
 
 
Figure 29. ASM Sub-Regional Breakdown of California 
 
4.6.1. National Agricultural Economic Surplus Impacts Under Alternative Delays 
in Detection and Vaccination 
Examining results first from a national level, the change in total agricultural economic 
surplus is examined resulting from the outbreak. These results include international trade 
impacts, but do not examine a policy of regionalization of production to limit trade 
impacts. Table 16, Table 17, and Table 18 provide summary statistics for each of the 
alternative scenarios where losses are measured in millions of year 2004 dollars. As 
detection of the disease is delayed, median losses increase. Furthermore, median loss 
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under vaccination exceeds losses under no vaccination. This is due to the increased 
slaughter and costs accompanying a vaccination scenario.  
Table 16. Summary Statistics for National Loss in Total Agricultural Surplus-No 
Vaccination (Millions of 2004$)  
 NoVacc_7Day NoVacc_10Day NoVacc_14Day NoVacc_21Day NoVacc_22Day 
Mean -2,700.15 -7,234.44 -15,955.49 -52,773.11 -64,690.18 
StDev 2,064.24 4,985.89 8,980.83 23,399.11 29,789.40 
95 % LCI -3,169.90 -8,369.06 -17,999.22 -58,097.94 -71,469.21 
95 % UCI -2,230.40 -6,099.83 -13,911.77 -47,448.29 -57,911.15 
Min -10,712.43 -22,841.37 -41,302.48 -103,456.86 -129,949.90 
Median -2,292.40 -7,105.06 -15,234.25 -55,433.41 -68,980.89 
Max 34.05 34.05 34.05 29.87 -13.83 
Skewness -1.11 -0.62 -0.32 0.65 0.59 
Kurtosis 1.61 0.25 -0.01 0.46 0.14 
 
 
Table 17. Summary Statistics for National Loss in Total Agricultural Surplus -- 10 Km 
Ring Vaccination (Millions of 2004$) 
 10Km_7Day 10Km_10Day 10Km_14Day 10Km_21Day 10Km_22Day 
Mean -3,956.72 -9,328.42 -19,724.10 -60,253.28 -74,859.55 
StDev 3,055.83 6,255.07 9,568.56 26,957.88 31,680.93 
95 % LCI -4,652.12 -10,751.86 -21,901.57 -66,387.95 -82,069.03 
95 % UCI -3,261.31 -7,904.99 -17,546.62 -54,118.60 -67,650.08 
Min -15,322.41 -35,228.20 -44,211.64 -112,697.26 -149,809.74 
Median -3,128.46 -9,359.11 -19,460.55 -60,683.94 -76,907.02 
Max 34.05 34.05 34.05 29.87 -15.28 
Skewness -1.24 -0.89 0.23 0.55 0.70 
Kurtosis 2.19 2.05 0.16 0.35 1.13 
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Table 18. Summary Statistics for National Loss in Total Agricultural Surplus -- 20 Km 
Ring Vaccination (Millions of 2004$) 
  20Km_7Day 20Km_10Day 20Km_14Day 20Km_21Day 20Km_22Day 
Mean -4,954.40 -10,546.03 -21,907.81 -50,091.27 -71,682.91 
StDev 3,301.69 6,279.97 10,670.21 31,551.89 30,347.65 
95 % LCI -5,705.75 -11,975.14 -24,335.98 -57,271.38 -78,588.98 
95 % UCI -4,203.05 -9,116.93 -19,479.64 -42,911.16 -64,776.84 
Min -66.64 -59.55 -48.71 -62.99 -42.34 
Median -13,927.17 -26,563.21 -53,727.52 -121,195.84 -125,492.53 
Max -4,776.39 -10,880.95 -22,772.48 -55,622.56 -78,792.09 
Skewness 34.05 34.05 34.05 29.87 -15.28 
Kurtosis -0.43 -0.19 0.18 0.31 0.92 
 
A graphical representation can help understand the results. Examining the change from 
the no-disease baseline in millions of dollars, Figure 30 gives the results for no 
vaccination. The median national agricultural economic surplus loss is increasing as the 
delay in FMD detection increases as would be expected. The spread of the distribution of 
national agricultural surplus losses also increases, indicating a greater risk of large scale 
events.  
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Figure 30. Box Plot of National Agricultural Surplus Loss Spread -- No Vaccination6 
 
 
                                                 
6 The box plot can be read as follows: The vertical axis is the change in national 
agricultural surplus in millions of dollars. The line closest to zero is the minimum loss in 
national agricultural surplus from the no-disease base in millions of dollars. The vertical 
line represents the spread between the minimum and maximum loss. The lowest 
horizontal line is the maximum loss in national agricultural surplus from the no-disease 
base in millions of dollars. The box represents the spread from the 25th to 75th 
percentile in national agricultural surplus losses. The two horizontal lines inside the box 
represent the mean and median loss value of the distribution of losses.  
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When vaccination is used as a way of controlling the spread of the disease, the same 
pattern is seen but with a greater success in reducing the spread of national agricultural 
surplus losses. Figure 31 shows results when 10 km ring vaccination is employed and 
Figure 32 shows results when 20 km ring vaccination is employed. Under the latest days 
to detection (21 and 22) the 10 kilometer ring vaccination is not as successful in 
reducing the spread of national agricultural surplus loss as the 20 kilometer ring 
vaccination. However, the mean and median national agricultural surplus loss is not 
reduced by vaccination. Based on these results, 20 kilometer ring vaccination would be a 
viable control strategy to minimize national agricultural surplus losses under late 
detection if decision makers wish to reduce the probability of an extreme outcome, but 
does not appear to provide any additional benefits under earlier detection scenarios or in 
reducing mean and median national agricultural surplus losses.  
 
 
Figure 31. Box Plot of National Agricultural Surplus Loss Spread -- 10 Km Ring 
Vaccination 
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Figure 32. Box Plot of National Agricultural Surplus Loss Spread -- 20 Km Ring 
Vaccination 
 
Clearly, the vaccination policy would be set without clear knowledge of how many days 
might expire before the disease is detected. Figure 33 shows the box plot of national 
agricultural surplus losses under alternative vaccination strategies across all delays in 
detection. While 10 km ring vaccination does not provide benefits outweighing the costs 
in terms of additional slaughter required (recall the "vaccinate to die" assumption) and 
additional costs of disease mitigation, it appears 20 km ring vaccination does provide 
sufficient benefits to reduce the spread of national agricultural surplus losses. Even 20 
km ring vaccination does not appear to reduce the mean or median national surplus loss. 
Thus in this particular study, vaccination of dairy herds in a 20 km ring around infected 
premises is not a viable policy for slowing the spread of the disease and minimizing the 
mean or median national surplus losses from the disease. It may however, be a viable 
option for reducing the chance of an extreme disease outcome occurring.  
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Figure 33. Box Plot of National Agricultural Surplus Loss Spread Under Alternative 
Vaccination 
 
4.6.2. Risk Aversion Analysis 
Under alternative delays in detection, earlier detection is always preferred to later 
detection across all risk neutral and risk averse individuals. This corresponds to prior 
studies that have consistently found early detection to be preferable to later detection as 
a way of reducing the duration of an FMD outbreak, the level of slaughter employed to 
eradicate the disease, and the national costs of controlling the disease.  
Vaccination has both pros and cons. First under current "vaccinate to die" strategy more 
slaughter is employed and second vaccination is costly in terms of supplies and man-
hours. However, the goal of vaccination is to slow the spread of the disease. Thus, it 
should be examined as a risk reduction technique. Stochastic Efficiency with Respect to 
a Function (SERF) is used here. The SERF method identifies where dominance between 
two alternatives switches (breakeven risk aversion coefficients) given bounds on the 
absolute risk aversion coefficient (ARAC). SERF allows for estimation of the utility-
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weighted risk premiums between alternatives to provide a cardinal measure for 
comparing the payoffs between risky alternatives (Hardaker et al.). Figure 34 presents 
the SERF diagram showing that the highest expected utility is obtained from 20 Km 
vaccination as the ARAC rises. For vaccination, as risk aversion rises vaccination 
becomes the preferred strategy. However, for risk neutral decision makers, choosing no 
vaccination may be a preferable strategy since vaccination does not reduce the mean or 
median national agricultural welfare loss.  
 
 
Figure 34. SERF Diagram Under Alternative Scenarios7 
                                                 
7 The three scenarios compared are no vaccination (NoVacc), 10 km ring vaccination 
(10Km Vacc) and 20 km ring vaccination (20Km Vacc) averaged across all delays in 
detection. The vertical axis represents the utility of loss under a negative exponential 
utility function.  The horizontal axis represents the absolute risk aversion coefficient at 
which the corresponding level of loss occurs.  
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4.6.3. The Cost of an Additional Hour Delay in Detection 
The 2001 UK FMD event was a late detection outbreak. Authorities reported detection 
occurred 21 days after the initial infection was found and although early detection has 
been shown to always be a good strategy for minimizing disease losses, just how much 
is gained per hour of faster delay has not been examined. Thus in this study, the 
increased cost per hour of delay between 21 and 22 days was examined.  
The number of head slaughtered increased by almost 1,900 per hour delay and an 
additional 28 herds were placed under movement restrictions per hour delay.  The 
median national economic surplus loss increased by $4.3 million per hour of delay 
between 21 and 22 days detection under no vaccination without trade losses, but 
including trade losses it increased by $370 million per hour of delay between 21 and 22 
days detection under no vaccination.  
As an extension of the risk aversion analysis, the cost of an additional hour delay under 
alternative vaccination strategies can be compared as shown in Figure 35. The average 
cost of an additional hour of delay increases with vaccination, but 20 km ring 
vaccination second order stochastic dominates both 10 km ring vaccination and no 
vaccination. Thus even in examining results by hourly national welfare loss under late 
detection, vaccination is an appealing strategy for reducing the risk of greater losses.  
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Figure 35. Box Plot of Cost per Hour of Delay between 21 and 22 Days 
 
4.6.4. Price Impacts 
Price impacts under this set of assumptions are driven by the reduction in supply 
associated with slaughter and trade restrictions. Results are broken out by live animal 
impacts, meat and livestock impacts excluding dairy, dairy price impacts and price 
impacts for feed grains.  
4.6.4.1.  Price Impacts for Live Animals 
Recall that ASM is acting almost as a short run equilibrium model where price and 
quantity changes are a reflection of the animal disease shock but herd adjustments are 
not allowed. There are two sources of movement in live animal prices. The first is 
obviously the shift in supply resulting from massive slaughter of animals in California, 
dairy calves in particular. The second, forces driving quantity demanded and supplied in 
other regions such as a greater surplus of grain available for feeding and increased 
domestic meat prices due to international trade restrictions. These two forces will be 
moving against each other, and the direction of the price change expected will depend on 
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the relative sizes of these shifting factors. Table 19 provides results across all 
vaccination levels for beef animals.  
Other than dairy production operations, feeding operations for dairy calves and some 
beef calves make up the remainder of cattle production in California. The majority of 
cattle feeding occurs in lower Sacramento, San Joaquin and Imperial Valleys (CCA).  
Simulation results indicate a reduction in the number of yearlings and fed cattle in the 
region, but this is offset by an increase in the production of yearlings and fed cattle in 
other regions (particularly the Great Plains). The increase in production in other regions 
could be from lower feed prices encouraging expansions in feeding operations or 
increased imports to take advantage of higher domestic fed beef prices, which in turn 
pulls up prices on yearlings and slaughter cattle.  
For cow/calf operations, a supply shift from California will not significantly change the 
aggregate national supply of beef animals. California had only 662,423 beef cows in 
their national inventory as of 2007 (USDA-NASS, 2008). National cow/calf quantity is 
not affected enough to shift aggregate supply of calves or stockers. However, demand 
for calves and stockers would change due to effects trickling down from changes in calf 
demand in feeding operations and supply changes in other regions, resulting in a lower 
price for calves. 
 
Table 19. Mean Prices of Live Cattle  Under Alternative Days of Detection8 
Mean Feedlot 
Beef 
Slaughter 
Steer 
Calve 
Heifer 
Calves 
Stocked 
Calf 
Stocked 
HCalf 
Stocked 
SCalf 
Dairy 
Calves 
Stocked 
Yearling 
Base 73.554 122.206 130.051 87.129 103.329 103.212 122.206 85.356 
7Day 73.554 118.114 117.432 84.060 103.291 103.017 119.922 87.751 
10Day 73.554 118.125 118.214 84.069 103.432 103.081 119.930 89.440 
14Day 73.554 118.140 119.231 84.082 103.595 103.123 119.945 90.244 
21Day 73.728 118.623 121.195 84.447 103.622 103.128 120.443 89.474 
22Day 73.962 119.257 122.293 84.927 103.656 103.133 121.096 89.267 
                                                 
8 Variables are delays in detection averaged across all vaccination scenarios.  
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California is not a major producer of hogs and pigs, ranking 29th in the nation (USDA-
NASS, 2009). However, international trade restrictions without the use of zoning implies 
that pork will also be a restricted commodity. The US is a major exporter of pork, so a 
block of pork exports means lower demand for hogs for slaughter and feeder pigs. Price 
changes in these commodities reflect these adjustments. California is ranked third in 
sheep and goat production, but with no trade impacts and relatively small quantity 
impacts in the region in question there is not enough market forces being brought to bear 
in order to shift lamb or mutton prices. Table 20 provides results across all vaccination 
levels for hogs and sheep.  
 
Table 20. Mean Prices of Live Hogs and Sheep Under Alternative Days of Detection 
Mean HogsforSlaughter FeederPig CullSow LambSlaugh CullEwes 
Base 66.681 122.009 38.906 47.457 22.545 
7Day 66.5882 121.26801 38.8452 47.457 22.545 
10Day 66.561 121.12786 38.8273 47.457 22.545 
14Day 66.5546 121.09496 38.8231 47.457 22.545 
21Day 66.5658 121.15661 38.8304 47.457 22.545 
22Day 66.5674 121.16923 38.8315 47.457 22.545 
 
Although poultry production is not affected by FMD directly, chicken and turkey serve 
as a substitute for beef and a complement for pork (Davis et al.). Thus demand effects 
will be moving in opposite directions as a result of an FMD outbreak. The direction of 
the price change will depend on which is larger. The change in the price of chicken and 
turkey will determine the changes in the price of broilers, turkeys and eggs. The next 
section provides an overview of these results. Table 21 provides the prices changes in 
eggs, broilers and turkeys.  
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Table 21. Mean Prices of Eggs and Live Poultry Under Alternative Days of Detection 
Mean Eggs Broilers Turkeys
Base 0.919 47.219 54.894 
7Day 0.915 47.433 55.318 
10Day 0.915 47.433 55.318 
14Day 0.915 47.433 55.318 
21Day 0.915 47.433 54.495 
22Day 0.915 46.778 54.495 
 
4.6.4.2.  Price Impacts for Meat and Livestock Products Excluding Dairy 
A key assumption that is worth stating again is that domestic meat consumption is not 
reduced due to "fear factors" about meat safety. Rather, price changes are driven by 
supply shifts in live animals and international trade impacts. Table 22 provides prices for 
beef, pork and poultry over all vaccination scenarios. For beef, changes in national 
supply were apparently small enough to not affect price in the earlier days to detection 
but does increase price under the latest detection scenarios. Pork price however, most 
likely due to the international trade impacts, is reduced. Chicken and turkey prices are 
increased under early detection scenarios; however, under 22 day detection chicken price 
decreases below the pre-disease base and under 21 and 22 day detection turkey price 
decreases below the pre-disease base. This may be reflective of the role of poultry as a 
substitute for beef. One other commodity price that could be mentioned here is the price 
of wool. As the number of sheep is reduced, the supply of wool available will decrease 
and consequently the price of wool is increased as shown in Table 23.   
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Table 22. Mean Prices of Beef, Pork and Poultry Under Alternative Days to Detection 
Mean FedBeef Pork Chicken Turkey 
Base 127.2 79.12500 61.069 75.208 
7Day 127.2 79.00023 61.337 75.805 
10Day 127.2 78.96373 61.337 75.805 
14Day 127.2 78.95515 61.337 75.805 
21Day 127.5 78.97017 61.337 74.644 
22Day 127.8 78.97232 60.518 74.644 
 
Table 23. Mean Price of Wool Under Alternative Days to Detection 
Mean WoolClean
Base 0.739 
7Day 0.739 
10Day 0.739 
14Day 0.739 
21Day 0.740 
22Day 0.740 
 
4.6.4.3.  Price Impacts for Dairy Products 
Perhaps one of the most important price impact categories to discuss under this 
particular set of scenarios is the impact on the prices of dairy products. Table 24 shows 
prices under the base and each delay in detection averaged across all vaccination 
strategies. The first column is the price per cwt of milk at the farm. The remaining 
columns are prices of processed milk products. Note that price impacts do not reflect 
international trade restrictions as long as products are pasteurized. The pasteurization 
process has been found to kill the FMD virus (Thurmond and Perez).  Furthermore, there 
is little international trade in dairy products.  
Most products see the price increase that would be expected from the reduction in supply 
associated with slaughter. Farm level milk prices increase on average across the nation, 
which will be reflected in the change in producer wellbeing in other major dairy 
production regions. Furthermore, whole and low fat milk, cream, evaporated condensed 
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milk, butter, cheeses and ice cream all experience price increases. Only skim milk and 
non-fat dry milk have price decreases as a result of the outbreak.   
 
Table 24. Mean Price of Dairy Products Under Alternative Days to Detection 
Mean Milk Fluid 
Milk 
Whole 
Fluid Milk 
Low 
Fat 
Skim Milk Cream Evap CondM 
Base 14.927 0.3350 0.3120 0.1330 0.690 0.349 
7Day 15.049 0.3359 0.3121 0.1330 0.706 0.354 
10Day 15.136 0.3363 0.3126 0.1329 0.717 0.357 
14Day 15.362 0.3375 0.3131 0.1326 0.746 0.365 
21Day 15.977 0.3404 0.3143 0.1316 0.823 0.387 
22Day 16.144 0.3412 0.3148 0.1315 0.843 0.392 
Mean Non Fat Dry Milk Butter Amer Cheese Other Cheese Cottage Cheese Ice Cream 
Base 1.1470 1.4020 1.7600 2.0210 1.5950 1.8380 
7Day 1.1444 1.4366 1.7720 2.0291 1.5974 1.8675 
10Day 1.1423 1.4614 1.7808 2.0349 1.5994 1.8883 
14Day 1.1368 1.5260 1.8035 2.0499 1.6046 1.9423 
21Day 1.1224 1.7009 1.8650 2.0910 1.6189 2.0888 
22Day 1.1206 1.7444 1.8818 2.1024 1.6227 2.1261 
 
4.6.4.4.  Price Impacts for Feed Grains 
A final price impact category that usually receives little attention is feed grains. Feed 
grain price changes are the result of changes in demand for feed grains when livestock 
operations are subject to a disease outbreak. Slaughter in California means a reduction in 
the demand for feed grain in that region, which in turn results in additional supply for 
other regions. This is reflected in the decrease in feed grain prices shown in Table 25.   
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Table 25. Mean Price of Feed Grains Under Alternative Days to Detection 
Mean Corn for 
Beef Cattle 
Corn for 
Dairy Cattle 
Corn for 
Hogs 
Corn for 
Poultry 
Base 4.6160 4.40000 4.5770 4.44100 
7Day 4.6087 4.39516 4.5727 4.43856 
10Day 4.6083 4.39445 4.5723 4.43825 
14Day 4.6080 4.39428 4.5722 4.43819 
21Day 4.6076 4.39439 4.5723 4.43826 
22Day 4.6075 4.39427 4.5722 4.43818 
 
 
4.6.4.5.  Summary of Price Changes 
Intuitively, these price changes could reflect the following scenario. The supply of dairy 
products goes down as well as the supply of calves coming from California. Fed cattle 
numbers go up nationally, possibly supplemented by increased imports of live animals, 
fueled by the higher price of beef compounded with lower grain prices caused by a 
surplus of unused grain originally destined for cattle use. The supply decrease in 
domestic fed cattle and yearlings is more than offset by increased demand for fed cattle 
and yearlings. However, since imports are still allowed from Canada and Mexico, this 
demand effect does not appear to trickle down into grazing operations (stockers and 
calves), which just experience the supply shift resulting in lower prices of stockers and 
calves.  
4.6.5. Regional Livestock Producer Surplus Impacts 
Ranking scenarios based on losses to national economic wellbeing includes the sum of 
changes in consumer, producer and processor surplus. However, simply looking at 
national agricultural surplus may over or under estimate impacts to regional livestock 
producers who are expected to be the hardest hit by the outbreak. This section will break 
down livestock producer surplus impacts by ASM region, a map of which are shown in 
Figure 36.  
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Figure 36. ASM Regions and Sub-regions 
 
Based on what is known about production demographics in various parts of the country, 
the following analysis examines individual regions to determine those who gain and 
those who lose from the disease. Note, when the term "producer" is used in this section it 
means livestock producers not all agricultural producers including crop farmers.  
4.6.5.1.  Total US Livestock Producer Surplus Changes 
When looking at the change in producer surplus in the nation as a whole, the median loss 
from a no disease base is $15.8 billion as shown in Table 26. Summary Statistics for 
Total Livestock Producers' Surplus Changes Relative to the Base. Comparing across 
delays in detection for all vaccination types, early detection still second order stochastic 
dominates late detection. This implies that producers should have an incentive to 
participate in earlier detection if it is clear the losses that could be sustained from later 
detection. Comparing across different vaccination strategies, a different ranking is 
discovered. Producers prefer that vaccination not be used during the outbreak, followed 
by 20 km ring vaccination. Only under the latest detection scenario, when risk aversion 
is increasing does 20 km ring vaccination become preferred to no vaccination. This is 
not unreasonable from a producer standpoint given the additional slaughter inherent in 
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the use of vaccination. Examining the producer surplus loss in the nation as a whole may 
underestimate the producer impacts in the infected region, so the remainder of this 
section will examine the producer impacts region by region.  
 
Table 26. Summary Statistics for Total Livestock Producers' Surplus Changes Relative 
to the Base Scenario9 
  Mean StDev Min Median Max 
 Total_7Day      (3,590.50) 2901.029842     (14,521.48)     (2,879.86)      142.98 
 Total_10Day      (8,601.54) 5803.350086     (33,790.68)     (8,649.68)      142.98 
 Total_14Day    (18,350.00) 9635.195504     (51,795.76)   (18,583.05)      142.98 
 Total_21Day    (52,438.08) 26895.06769   (118,096.74)   (55,095.09)      143.18 
 Total_22Day    (68,298.85) 29995.8705   (146,141.28)   (72,506.45)      (81.73)
 
 
4.6.5.2.  Pacific Southwest (PSW) 
Starting with the region of outbreak it can reasonably be expected that producers’ 
wellbeing in this region will fall more than in any other region. As expected the median 
change in national producer surplus from the no-disease base is $16.5 billion as shown in 
Table 27. This is the largest loss region in the simulated outbreak under all scenarios. 
Comparing this to the total US producer surplus change, not examining this region 
individually would underestimate the loss producers would face. Rankings of strategies 
remain the same. Early detection is always preferred to later detection and no 
vaccination is the preferred strategy unless detection occurs late and decision makers are 
more risk averse.  
 
                                                 
9 Variables are the total US economic surplus change averaged across alternative 
vaccination strategies for delays in detection.  
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Table 27. Summary Statistics for California (Pacific Southwest) Livestock Producers' 
Surplus Changes Relative to the Base Scenario 
  Mean StDev Min Median Max 
 PSW_7Day      (3,860.17) 2965.57     (15,188.63)     (3,197.30)      (26.60)
 PSW_10Day      (8,979.70) 5951.003     (34,888.22)     (8,980.65)      (26.60)
 PSW_14Day    (19,025.03) 9927.107     (53,264.65)   (19,160.05)      (26.60)
 PSW_21Day    (53,927.82) 27540.89   (120,504.57)   (56,798.49)      (24.33)
 PSW_22Day    (69,855.60) 30620.06   (148,931.84)   (74,348.53)      (33.23)
 
4.6.5.3.  Dairy Producing Regions 
As stated earlier, California is the top dairy producing state in the US followed by 
Wisconsin (which resides in the Lake States region), New York, Pennsylvania (which 
are both in the Northeast region), and Idaho (which is in the Rocky Mountains region). 
Given the decrease in dairy coming from California as a result of the outbreak, there is a 
strong potential that producers in these regions could gain as a result of higher dairy 
prices. As shown in Table 28, under all delays in detection and vaccination strategies, 
the producers in the Lake States (LS) and Northeast (NE) regions gain from the 
outbreak. Producer surplus gains in the LS region ranged from a median $35 million 
under the earliest detection scenario to $372 million under the latest detection scenario, 
in which dairy prices are highest.  
Results in the Rocky Mountain (RM) region were more mixed. Median producers 
surplus in the RM region falls under early detection at 7 days by $35 million; however, it 
should be noted that some of the cattle production in California is shipped to Idaho to be 
fed out.  Starting with detection at 10 days though, simulations indicate producers begin 
to gain in median surplus. This gain ranges from $7.6 million at 10 days to $469 million 
at 22 days. 
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Table 28. Summary Statistics for Other Dairy Producing Regions Livestock Producers' 
Surplus Changes Relative to the Base Scenario10 
  Mean StDev Min Median Max 
 LS_7Day  40.34  15.90662 5.45  35.92  103.06  
 LS_10Day  62.36  33.09408 5.45  57.96  208.16  
 LS_14Day  120.31  60.93538 5.45  108.34  281.77  
 LS_21Day  274.58  125.5223 0.92  315.02  435.73  
 LS_22Day  318.85  117.2334 0.25  372.59  544.38  
           
 NE_7Day  21.85  12.93702 (6.01) 18.00  72.74  
 NE_10Day  40.10  27.04435 (6.01) 37.00  159.50  
 NE_14Day  87.58  49.56092 (6.01) 77.16  218.98  
 NE_21Day  216.45  102.0455 (6.49) 249.03  347.06  
 NE_22Day  245.99  95.34417 (13.55) 288.97  429.32  
           
 RM_7Day  (35.07) 29.25864 (92.95) (46.14) 91.33  
 RM_10Day  7.68  58.28563 (92.95) 4.69  258.78  
 RM_14Day  108.82  101.9264 (92.95) 100.51  372.48  
 RM_21Day  379.94  217.4802 (95.04) 443.59  692.07  
 RM_22Day  469.19  210.46 (95.06) 534.19  866.20  
 
 
4.6.5.4.  Other Livestock and Grain Production Regions 
Regions that are major producers of cattle largely realized gains from the disease 
outbreak. This includes the Great Plains (GP) region that realized gains in median 
producer surplus ranging from $282 million under 14 day delay in detection to $320 
million under 22 day detection--the region also had gains at 7, 10 and 21 days delay. 
This region houses a thriving cow/calf and cattle feeding industry as well as grain 
production. Producers in that region stand to benefit from lower grain prices for cattle 
and increased prices for fed cattle resulting from the outbreak.  Results are shown in 
Table 29.  
                                                 
10 Here the Lake States region is abbreviated LS, the Northeastern region is abbreviated 
NE and the Rocky Mountain region is abbreviated RM.  
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Table 29. Summary Statistics for Great Plains Region Livestock Producers' Surplus 
Changes Relative to the Base Scenario 
  Mean StDev Min Median Max 
 GP_7Day  300.47  12.37781 249.56  307.35  315.62  
 GP_10Day  289.19  16.72731 238.40  287.75  319.25  
 GP_14Day  282.78  18.05414 239.45  287.03  317.80  
 GP_21Day  300.59  36.94364 229.46  299.61  384.63  
 GP_22Day  316.65  40.06479 222.26  320.91  379.60  
 
Producers in the Southwest (SW) region realize a small loss in producers surplus at 7 
day delay in detection of $4 million, but realize gains under later detection ranging from 
$2 million at 10 day delay in detection to $64 million at 22 day delay in detection. Dairy 
producers in the region will gain from higher milk and dairy product prices and lower 
grain prices. Fed beef operations will gain from lower grain prices and higher fed beef 
prices resulting from the outbreak.   Results are shown in Table 30.  
 
Table 30. Summary Statistics for Southwest Region Livestock Producers' Surplus 
Changes Relative to the Base Scenario 
  Mean StDev Min Median Max 
 SW_7Day  (4.05) 6.955987105 (14.81) (4.02) 17.96  
 SW_10Day   2.41  9.423441148 (14.81) 1.96  32.81  
 SW_14Day  15.58  13.24821979 (14.81) 17.05  46.79  
 SW_21Day  49.58  30.18861476 (15.67) 53.26  109.51  
 SW_22Day  59.10  31.94402985 (21.85) 64.41  111.54  
 
The Corn Belt (CB) is where the majority of the hog production in the US occurs. As 
such, this region experiences losses in median producer surplus ranging from $4.7 
million at 22 days delay in detection to $28.5 million at 7 days delay in detection. These 
losses will most likely occur as a result of the trade restriction moving the price of hogs 
123 
 
and pork down, although it may be partially offset by the decrease in the price paid for 
feed corn.  Results are shown in Table 31.  
 
Table 31. Summary Statistics for Corn Belt Region Livestock Producers' Surplus 
Changes Relative to the Base Scenario 
  Mean StDev Min Median Max 
 CB_7Day          (8.17) 31.10313      (33.31)      (28.54)         41.25  
 CB_10Day       (10.39) 29.34425      (33.31)      (27.55)         45.58  
 CB_14Day          (7.46) 29.14301      (33.31)      (21.11)         50.85  
 CB_21Day            4.09  31.47634      (34.84)         (6.99)         66.18  
 CB_22Day            7.98  31.26028      (35.14)         (4.74)         69.03  
 
Producers in the South Central region of the US lose in median surplus under these 
simulated outbreaks except for under a 21 day delay in detection. This may be due to the 
mixed production in that region, with losses resulting from cow/calf production impacts. 
Results are shown in Table 32. 
 
Table 32. Summary Statistics for South Central Region Livestock Producers' Surplus 
Changes Relative to the Base Scenario 
  Mean StDev Min Median Max 
 SC_7Day            (47.17) 6.947994686              (58.98)           (49.80)      (16.39) 
 SC_10Day            (37.21) 12.53958739              (58.98)           (36.79)         14.53  
 SC_14Day            (15.97) 20.68908048              (58.98)           (14.97)         33.64  
 SC_21Day               35.23  47.36841891              (64.66)              44.25       115.77  
 SC_22Day            (72.62) 49.13154456           (196.10)           (70.66)         14.33  
 
The Southeast region covering Florida, Georgia, North and South Carolina and Virginia 
will have producers gaining in median wellbeing by a small amount under each scenario 
except for the 7 day delay in detection as shown in Table 33. These results, like the 
South Central region may be mixed due to the mix of livestock producer types in the 
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region. Florida, in particular is a large cattle production state but North Carolina is a 
large hog production state. Thus the impact on this region will vary depending on the 
size of the outbreak. At only a 7 day delay in detection, the trade impact to hog 
production appears to be outweighing the impact to cattle and poultry producers.  
 
Table 33. Summary Statistics for Southeast Region Livestock Producers' Surplus 
Changes Relative to the Base Scenario 
  Mean StDev Min Median Max 
 SE_7Day  0.54  16.93687 (27.51) (1.31) 53.82  
 SE_10Day  10.66  21.32897 (27.51) 5.00  83.00  
 SE_14Day  38.85  32.21059 (27.51) 39.66  116.72  
 SE_21Day  100.96  66.44067 (46.55) 120.58  217.94  
 SE_22Day  59.14  64.31642 (115.29) 82.61  171.37  
 
 
4.6.6. Trade Impact Analysis 
Results from an animal disease outbreak must include trade impacts to truly measure the 
extent of the outbreak impacts. Trade impacts are a demand side shift that is fairly 
certain since it is a proven policy when countries have a case of FMD within the borders. 
The extent and duration are uncertain though. Although the results presented here are 
including trade impacts, this may actually be a "worst case scenario" of the trade 
impacts. The likelihood of having a lockdown of all non-pasteurized livestock products 
for a full year even though the disease is contained within a few months is somewhat 
unlikely.  
First, there is the possibility of zoning the disease to a particular region. In this study, 
zoning might mean that because the disease is contained in California only California 
exports arising from California would be restricted. This certainly would reduce impacts 
related to pork since California is such a small producers of this commodity, which 
makes up a large expected trade impact. Even if zoning were not utilized, some trade 
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may be resumed before the end of the year where this assumes the remainder of the year 
trade restrictions will be in place.  
Second, trade analysis was not taken out into future years since trade restrictions remain 
in place at some level 2-5 years into the future. This only looks at year 0, the year of the 
outbreak. In particular, for the use of vaccination trade will be restricted longer since the 
US would have a "FMD Free with Vaccination" status for several years. This may 
warrant allowing the ASM model to find a dynamic equilibrium since longer term trade 
restrictions may alter the livestock industry in the US. The future years of the restrictions 
would need to be considered to truly assess the disease outbreak with full trade impacts. 
The limitations described in this section could be explored in a separate extension of the 
study.   
4.7. Movement Restriction Implications in the Central Valley 
Response zones typically mean that within that zone, the movement of animals, 
equipment, feedstuffs, and people is severely restricted. The restrictions on movement 
vary by the type of quarantine area. An FMD outbreak initiating on a dairy in Tulare, 
Fresno, and King counties in California could have significant direct implications for 
dairy producers, but would also cause additional costs in moving necessary goods and 
equipment into and out of the quarantine area. This section will examine the additional 
costs producers will incur as a result of the movement restrictions put in place by 
quarantine zone measures. In particular, the impacts on milk movements out of the area 
and the ability of feed trucks to get into the area will be examined since these are key 
services producers need to ensure continuity of business for premises that are restricted 
but not subject to depopulation for disease control reasons. It is likely that feed will be 
able to get in and milk will be able to get out, but at an increased cost. Therefore three 
sets of total disease mitigation costs will be discussed: those under complete movement 
lockdown, milk "dumping", and business as usual with an increased cost of allowing 
these activities to continue in a secure way during the outbreak.  By identifying how 
disease impacts go up without these increased costs, it allows policy decision makers to 
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determine what is reasonable in the movement restrictions from an economic 
perspective. 
4.7.1. Ex Ante Preparations for Animal Disease Outbreaks 
An FMD outbreak in the Central Valley region would have substantial consequences, 
not only in direct disease mitigation costs but also in secondary and tertiary costs. 
Besides the stamping out of the infected, dangerous contact and suspected premises, 
carriers of the disease would have to be addressed. Feedstuffs on infected premises (hay, 
silage, grains) could be destroyed to prevent further spread of the virus (Bates, Carpenter 
and Thurmond). Milk would have to either be discarded on premises or taken out at 
considerable cost due to additional testing of the milk and disinfection of the truck. 
Other fomites that would require restriction, destruction or cleaning include: barns, feed 
bunks, on-farm equipment, roads, and manure treatment and disposal. Human carriers, 
like truck drivers and artificial insemination (AI) technicians, would have to be restricted 
and their vehicles and equipment disinfected at an increased cost. 
4.7.1.1.  Welfare Slaughter  
In the 2001 U.K. FMD outbreak, 2.5 million animals were slaughtered for welfare 
reasons; this was the largest slaughter category in the outbreak. Welfare slaughter occurs 
when movement restrictions prevents the farmer/rancher's ability to bring feed to the 
animals, to sell a slaughter weight animal at market, or to sustain very young, susceptible 
animals. Most dairy farms in California will have some amount of silage and hay on 
premises during the majority of the year making the timing of the disease important. 
However, some things like corn and concentrates would be purchased through the year. 
Some experts and livestock industry professionals feel that, in a U.S. outbreak, feed will 
be made available to farmers/ranchers at an increased cost. The increased cost would 
cover the disinfection of trucks moving into and out of the restricted area.  
4.7.1.2.  Milk Dumping  
Testing can be difficult due to diminished milk yield of infected cows and the increased 
chance of a false negative due to dilution of infected milk with uninfected milk 
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(Thurmond and Perez). Thurmond and Perez found that the use of a PCR assay in bulk 
milk would provide sensitive, early detection for FMD but at an increased cost. Milk 
production of infected animals is decreased, but still consumable if pasteurized. 
However, the value of the milk must be weighed against the additional cost of 
disinfection and testing. It may be more reasonable for the government to pay for the 
milk and dump it on premises, rather than ship it out of the response zone. 
4.7.1.3. Alternative Movement Restriction Policies 
In this preliminary analysis of the offset between the increased costs of allowing 
movement and the strict lockdown of a quarantine zone, the distribution of costs of 
disease mitigation will be compared across three policies. These policies are: 
• "Lockdown": Complete movement restrictions on fomites such as feed trucks, AI 
technicians, and milk tankers. 
• "Dumping Only":  Milk is not allowed to exit the quarantine zone due to fears 
about false negatives for the PCR tests. Thus the milk is dumped within the 
quarantine zone. However, through additional costs of cleaning and disinfecting, 
feed trucks and AI technicians can move into and out of the quarantine zone.  
• "Business As Usual": Both milk tankers and feed trucks can move into and out of 
the restricted zones, but at an increased cost of cleaning and disinfecting.  
The purpose of examining these three policies specifically is to consider those policies 
that may be realistic in the California region. “Lockdown” may be the ideal from a 
disease management standpoint, but not practical. “Dumping Only” would be the 
situation in which a higher risk activity is restricted, but feed is still brought in despite 
the risk in an attempt to allow faster recovery of the region. Finally, “Business as Usual” 
is the situation producers may prefer since it would mean bringing feed in and taking 
milk out albeit at a higher cost for cleaning and disinfection.  
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4.7.2. Cost Categories 
Table 34 provides a brief description of the different components of costs that were 
calculated in this analysis. These components are combined to get the total cost of 
disease mitigation under total lockdown, milk dumping only and business as usual but at 
an increased cost for cleaning and disinfection. Each of these cost categories and its 
calculation will be discussed in more detail below.  
 
Table 34. Cost Category Descriptions 
COST CATEGORIES  
 dumping_indemnity  payment for milk dumped 
 disease_indemnity   payment for animals slaughtered for disease control 
 welfare_indemnity  payment for animals slaughtered for welfare reasons 
 welfare_foregoneincome forgone income for premises depop for welfare reasons 
 disease_foregoneincome foregone income for premises depop for disease control reasons 
 disease_costsslaughter the cost to slaughter animals for disease reasons including herd appraisal-
euthanasia-disposal 
 welfare_costsslaughter the cost to slaughter animals for welfare reasons 
 costcleaning_slaughter  cost of cleaning premises after depopulation 
 costcleaning_fdtrucking  cost of cleaning feed trucks 
 costcleaning_mktrucking cost of cleaning milk trucks 
 costsurv_herds     cost of testing and surveillance on herds 
 costsurv_milk  cost of testing on milk 
 costvacc    cost of vaccination 
 additionalfeedcost  cost of bringing feed into the region 
TOTAL COSTS  
 total_dumpingonly   total cost which includes bringing feed in but not getting milk out 
 total_lockdown  total cost if feed cannot be brought in and milk cannot be taken out 
 total_bau  total cost if feed can be brought in and milk taken out 
 welfarefd   total cost of welfare slaughter were feed can be brought in and milk taken 
out 
 welfarenf   total cost of welfare slaughter were feed cannot be brought in or milk taken 
out 
 costdiseasemgmt   cost per animal of  foregoneincome-truck cleaning-surveillance-vaccination 
 costcarcassdisposal cost per animal of cleaning and slaughter which includes appraisal-
euthanasia-disposal 
 
4.7.3. Cost Calculations 
This section examines the algebra used to calculate the cost categories above in detail. 
Cost calculations are based on those presented in a working paper by Jin et al. with 
adjustments and additional cost categories appropriate for this study.  
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4.7.3.1. Indemnity Payments 
Indemnity payments are those payments made by the government to producers who lose 
assets because of disease control. In California this will include those animals 
slaughtered due to disease control, but it would also reasonably include milk that had to 
be dumped and payments for animals that had to be slaughtered because feed could not 
be brought into the region.  
4.7.3.1.1.  Dumping Indemnity 
 The total value of indemnity payments made for dumped because it cannot be taken out 
of the quarantine zone is calculated as:  
 
 
where:  N is the head of animals in a particular (id) 
HerdType is 0 if the herd id (id) is not a small, medium or large dairy 
State is an indicator variable that is 0 if the herd (id) is susceptible (status=0). Diseased 
herds would be slaughtered, so it is assumed there is no reason to milk those animals.  
Milk the cwt of milk produced per cow per day 
MilkValue is the market value of a cwt of raw fluid milk to producers  
Q is the number of days that particular premises (id) has been quarantined during the 
outbreak.  
4.7.3.1.2.  Disease Indemnity 
The total value of indemnity payments made for animals slaughtered for disease control 
purposes is calculated as:  
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where: N is the number of animals in a particular herd id (id) 
HerdType is 0 if the herd id (id) is not the same as the type of herd (herd) being 
examined 
State is an indicator variable that is 0 if the herd (id) at the end of the outbreak is in the 
susceptible state (status) and 1 if the herd has entered the disease cycle (sub-clinically 
infectious, infectious, immune or dead).  
Composition is a matrix used for the breakdown of a herd (herd) into animal types (type) 
MV is the market value of a particular type of animal (type) as shown in Table 10. 
Market Price Assumptions . 
4.7.3.1.3.  Welfare Indemnity 
 The total value of indemnity payments made for animals slaughtered for welfare control 
purposes is calculated as:  
 
 
where: N is the number of animals at a particular premises (id) 
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W is an indicator of whether that particular premises (id) is in danger of welfare 
slaughter, meaning it has been quarantined for more than a particular number of days 
associated with an assumption of the feed on hand.  
HerdType is 0 if the herd id (id) is not the same as the type of herd (herd) being 
examined. Herd types that are grazing operations are eliminated from the pool of welfare 
slaughter eligible animals.  
State is an indicator variable that is 0 if the herd (id) at the end of the outbreak is in the 
susceptible state (status) and 1 if the herd has entered the disease cycle (sub-clinically 
infectious, infectious, immune or dead). This prevents double counting with herds that 
will be slaughtered for disease control purposes.  
Composition is a matrix used for the breakdown of a herd (herd) into animal types (type) 
MV is the market value of a particular type of animal (type) as shown in Table 10. 
Market Price Assumptions . 
4.7.3.2.  Forgone Income 
By using the market value of animals slaughtered at the time the outbreak occurs, the 
current value of the herd is captured but not the future value until that premises is 
repopulated. There is a wait period from the time of depopulation until the premises is 
deemed safe to be repopulated; in this study that period is assumed to be 60 days. 
Forgone income captures the daily revenue lost during those 60 days. This allows 
disease control totals to capture both the indemnity payment the government makes to 
operators and the loss in the future stream of revenues incurred directly by operators.  
4.7.3.2.1.  Disease Forgone Income 
The first of the two forgone income calculations focuses on just those premises 
depopulated for disease control purposes.  
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where: N is the number of animals at a particular premises (id) 
HerdType is 0 if the herd id (id) is not the same as the type of herd (herd) being 
examined.  
State is an indicator variable that is 0 if the herd (id) at the end of the outbreak is in the 
susceptible state (status) and 1 if the herd has entered the disease cycle (sub-clinically 
infectious, infectious, immune or dead).  
Composition is a matrix used for the breakdown of a herd (herd) into animal types (type) 
DI is the daily income of a particular type of herd (herd). The daily income estimation 
used in Ward et al. (2007) was used here.  
Time is the number of days between depopulation and repopulation. This was assumed 
to be 60 days.  
4.7.3.2.2.  Welfare Forgone Income 
The second forgone income calculation focuses on those premises in danger of welfare 
slaughter.  
 
 
where: N is the number of animals at a particular premises (id) 
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W is an indicator of whether that particular premises (id) is in danger of welfare 
slaughter, meaning it has been quarantined for more than a particular number of days 
associated with an assumption of the feed on hand.  
HerdType is 0 if the herd id (id) is not the same as the type of herd (herd) being 
examined. Herd types that are grazing operations are eliminated from the pool of welfare 
slaughter eligible animals.  
State is an indicator variable that is 0 if the herd (id) at the end of the outbreak is in the 
susceptible state (status) and 1 if the herd has entered the disease cycle (sub-clinically 
infectious, infectious, immune or dead). This prevents double counting with herds that 
will be slaughtered for disease control purposes.  
Composition is a matrix used for the breakdown of a herd (herd) into animal types (type) 
DI is the daily income of a particular type of herd (herd). The daily income estimation 
used in Ward et al. (2007) was used here.  
T is the number of days between depopulation and repopulation. This was assumed to be 
60 days.  
4.7.3.3.  Slaughter Cost 
The cost of slaughter is made up of several elements, each related to the depopulation of 
a herd. This includes the cost of appraising a herd for slaughter, the cost of euthanasia, 
and the cost of carcass disposal. The cost of appraisal is a schedule of fixed cost per herd 
varying with the three herd size levels. The cost of euthanasia has two components, a 
fixed component and a variable component. The fixed component is for the labor 
required per herd and the variable component is the cost per animal for supplies. The 
cost of carcass disposal is a per animal cost. These cost levels were obtained from Ward 
et al. (2007). Since the fixed component is based on a schedule varying by a herd size 
categorization (small, medium and large), fixed cost here was divided by the average 
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number of animals in each herd size categorization so that each herd level cost was 
transformed to a per animal cost but still varying based on the herd size categorization.   
4.7.3.3.1.  Disease Slaughter Cost 
The cost of slaughter and disposal of herds slaughtered for disease control purposes: 
 
 
where N is the number of animals at a particular premises (id) 
HerdType is 0 if the herd id (id) is not the same as the type of herd (herd) being 
examined.  
State is an indicator variable that is 0 if the herd (id) at the end of the outbreak is in the 
susceptible state (status) and 1 if the herd has entered the disease cycle (sub-clinically 
infectious, infectious, immune or dead).  
CApp is the cost of herd appraisal per animal for a particular herd size (herd) 
CEU is the cost of euthansia per animal for a particular herd size (herd) 
EU is a variable cost per animal of euthanasia regardless of herd size 
CDisp is the cost per animal of carcass disposal regardless of herd size 
4.7.3.3.2.  Welfare Slaughter Cost 
The cost of slaughter and disposal of herds slaughtered for welfare purposes: 
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Where N is the number of animals at a particular premises (id) 
W is an indicator of whether that particular premises (id) is in danger of welfare 
slaughter, meaning it has been quarantined for more than a particular number of days 
associated with an assumption of the feed on hand.  
HerdType is 0 if the herd id (id) is not the same as the type of herd (herd) being 
examined. Herd types that are grazing operations are eliminated from the pool of welfare 
slaughter eligible animals.  
State is an indicator variable that is 0 if the herd (id) at the end of the outbreak is in the 
susceptible state (status) and 1 if the herd has entered the disease cycle (sub-clinically 
infectious, infectious, immune or dead). This prevents double counting with herds that 
will be slaughtered for disease control purposes.  
CApp is the cost of herd appraisal per animal for a particular herd size (herd) 
EU is a variable cost per animal of euthanasia regardless of herd size 
CDisp is the cost per animal of carcass disposal regardless of herd size 
4.7.3.4.  Cleaning Cost 
The FMD virus is extremely hardy and in ideal conditions it can stay alive on a premises 
that has been depopulated, creating a risk of a secondary outbreak. Thus premises, 
people and equipment coming in contact with the disease must be cleaned and 
disinfected to prevent such a secondary outbreak. This cost of cleaning is a schedule of 
fixed cost varying by herd size.  
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4.7.3.4.1.  Disease Premises Cleaning Cost 
There is no additional cost of cleaning associated with premises depopulated for welfare 
slaughter reasons since the virus was not present there. The cost of cleaning and 
disinfecting diseased premises before repopulation is as follows.  
 
 
Where  N is the number of animals at a particular premises (id) 
HerdType is 0 if the herd id (id) is not the same as the type of herd (herd) being 
examined.  
State is an indicator variable that is 0 if the herd (id) at the end of the outbreak is in the 
susceptible state (status) and 1 if the herd has entered the disease cycle (sub-clinically 
infectious, infectious, immune or dead).  
CC is the cost per animal of cleaning and disinfecting the premises varying by herd size 
category (herd). The cost estimates used by Ward et al. (2007) were used here.  
4.7.3.4.2.  Cost of Cleaning Feed Trucks 
Any vehicle moving into or out of the restricted zone would need to be cleaned and 
disinfected to prevent further disease spread and secondary infection. If feed trucks are 
allowed to bring feed grains into the zone, they must be cleaned at each trip. The cost of 
cleaning feed trucks is as follows:  
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Where  W is still an indicator of whether that particular premises (id) is in danger of 
welfare slaughter, meaning it has been quarantined for more than a particular number of 
days associated with an assumption of the feed on hand.  Only in this case those herds in 
danger of welfare slaughter would have feed brought in at additional cost rather than 
slaughter animals.  
HerdType is 0 if the herd id (id) is not the same as the type of herd (herd) being 
examined. Herd types that are grazing operations are eliminated from the pool of herds 
requiring feed during the outbreak. 
State is an indicator variable that is 0 if the herd (id) at the end of the outbreak is in the 
susceptible state (status) and 1 if the herd has entered the disease cycle (sub-clinically 
infectious, infectious, immune or dead).  
Q is the number of days that particular premises (id) has been quarantined during the 
outbreak 
FDays is the number of days the herd can go without having a feed delivery--or the 
number of days feed on hand. This was assumed to be 5 days on average across different 
premises types, although dairy operations may be able to stretch on farm grain supplies 
further and calf raisers may not be able to go that long.  
FeedReq is the number of feed trips required per day to supply that herd varying by the 
size of the herd (herd). These numbers were calculated based on the daily feed 
consumption in pounds per animal, the average number of animals in a particular herd 
size category and the assumption that a feed truck will haul a maximum of 23 tons per 
trip.  
CCT is the cost of cleaning a truck per trip. This is based on an interview with a feed 
truck washing facility. It is assumed that existing permanent facilities along major 
transportation routes are used to wash trucks since cost information for portable facilities 
were not available.  
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4.7.3.4.3.  Cost of Cleaning Milk Tankers 
Milk tankers picking up milk from farms inside the movement restriction zone would 
also need to be cleaned more stringently than normal. The cost of cleaning milk tankers 
is as follows:  
 
 
Where DH is the number of premises (id) that are small, medium or large dairy herds 
HerdType is 0 if the herd id (id) is not the same as the type of herd (herd) being 
examined.  
State is an indicator variable that is 0 if the herd (id) at the end of the outbreak is in the 
susceptible state (status) and 1 if the herd has entered the disease cycle (sub-clinically 
infectious, infectious, immune or dead).  
Q is the number of days that particular premises (id) has been quarantined during the 
outbreak 
MPickup is the number of tankers per day visiting a particular premises. This number is 
calculated based on the daily milk production of a particular herd size category and the 
size of a standard milk tanker. This is assumed to be 3 trips for large dairies (>2,000 
head), 2 trips per day for medium dairies, and 1 trip per day for small dairies. This is not 
necessarily a trip that fills the tanker, rather a single tanker may visit multiple premises. 
The washing would need to occur at each trip though rather than each full tanker.  
CCFT is the cost of cleaning a truck per trip. This is based on an interview with a feed 
truck washing facility. It is assumed that existing permanent facilities along major 
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transportation routes are used to wash trucks since cost information for portable facilities 
were not available.  
4.7.3.5.  Surveillance 
Surveillance of herds inside a movement restricted zone is performed to assure that all 
infected and dangerous contact herds are found and eradicated. This includes a visit by a 
veterinarian and testing. Milk is also tested as an FMD carrier as it leaves the zone.  
4.7.3.5.1.  Herds 
Although the DADS model does not have a parameter for the number of surveillance 
visits made on a particular premises, it is assumed that at least two visits to a restricted 
herd occur. The first is an initial assessment, which is performed on every herd 
quarantined. The second a follow up visit to assure herds not deemed infected on the 
first visit and consequently slaughtered are still FMD free. At each visit there is a fixed 
cost per animal varying by herd size category for the veterinarian visit and a fixed cost 
per animal varying by herd size category of testing and equipment.  
 
 
Where  HQ is an indicator for whether a particular premises (id) has been restricted 
HerdType is 0 if the herd id (id) is not the same as the type of herd (herd) being 
examined.  
State is an indicator variable that is 0 if the herd (id) at the end of the outbreak is in the 
susceptible state (status) and 1 if the herd has entered the disease cycle (sub-clinically 
infectious, infectious, immune or dead).   
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CS is the cost per animal of premises of a single surveillance visit varying by herd size 
category (herd). The cost estimates used by Ward et al. (2007) were used here.   
4.7.3.5.2.  Milk 
 Testing must also be done on milk to assure each tanker is untainted before entering 
processing facilities. Although the pasteurization process has been shown to kill the 
FMD virus (Thurmond and Perez) it is unlikely that facilities untainted by the virus 
would risk its introduction onto their equipment. This is calculated as follows:  
 
 
Where DH is the number of premises (id) that are small, medium or large dairy herds 
HerdType is 0 if the herd id (id) is not the same as the type of herd (herd) being 
examined.  
State is an indicator variable that is 0 if the herd (id) at the end of the outbreak is in the 
susceptible state (status) and 1 if the herd has entered the disease cycle (sub-clinically 
infectious, infectious, immune or dead).  
Q is the number of days that particular premises (id) has been quarantined during the 
outbreak 
MPickup is the number of tankers per day visiting particular premises. This number is 
calculated based on the daily milk production of a particular herd size category and the 
size of a standard milk tanker. This is assumed to be 3 trips for large dairies (>2,000 
head), 2 trips per day for medium dairies, and 1 trip per day for small dairies. This is not 
necessarily a trip that fills the tanker; rather a single tanker may visit multiple premises. 
The washing would need to occur at each trip though rather than each full tanker.  
141 
 
CSM is the cost of testing a truck per trip. This is based on an interview with the Texas 
testing facility for a PCR assay test and is assumed to be $10.    
4.7.3.6.  Vaccination 
 Since vaccination is a disease control alternative being considered here 
 
where N is the number of animals at a particular premises (id) 
HerdType is 0 if the herd id (id) is not the same as the type of herd (herd) being 
examined.  
HV is an indicator that is 1 if the herd (id) has been selected for vaccination and 0 
otherwise 
Vacc is the cost of herd vaccination per animal for a particular herd size (herd) 
VaccD is the cost per dose of vaccine regardless of herd size 
4.7.3.7.  Additional Feed Cost 
The final individual cost category is the cost of the additional feed being brought into the 
region.  
 
 
Where  W is still an indicator of whether that particular premises (id) is in danger of 
welfare slaughter, meaning it has been quarantined for more than a particular number of 
days associated with an assumption of the feed on hand.  Only in this case those herds in 
142 
 
danger of welfare slaughter would have feed brought in at additional cost rather than 
slaughter animals.  
HerdType is 0 if the herd id (id) is not the same as the type of herd (herd) being 
examined. Herd types that are grazing operations are eliminated from the pool of herds 
requiring feed during the outbreak. 
State is an indicator variable that is 0 if the herd (id) at the end of the outbreak is in the 
susceptible state (status) and 1 if the herd has entered the disease cycle (sub-clinically 
infectious, infectious, immune or dead).  
Q is the number of days that particular premises (id) has been quarantined during the 
outbreak 
FDays is the number of days the herd can go without having a feed delivery--or the 
number of days feed on hand. This was assumed to be 5 days on average across different 
premises types, although dairy operations may be able to stretch on farm grain supplies 
further and calf raisers may not be able to go that long.  
QCPA is the cost per day per animal of feed being brought in. This is based on a cost 
quote of $310 per ton for delivered feed including labor and fees.  
4.7.3.8.  Total Costs 
The total cost of disease mitigation from different quarantine zone policies on the 
movement of feed and milk in California are calculated as follows.  
4.7.3.8.1.  Dumping Only 
total_dumpingonly = 
          dumping_indemnity +  disease_indemnity +  disease_foregoneincome + 
          additionalfeedcost + disease_costsslaughter + costcleaning_slaughter + 
          costcleaning_fdtrucking + costsurv_herds + costvacc 
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4.7.3.8.2.  Lockdown 
total_lockdown = 
dumping_indemnity +  disease_indemnity +  welfare_indemnity +    
 disease_foregoneincome + welfare_costslaughter + disease_costsslaughter + 
 costcleaning_slaughter + costsurv_herds + costvacc 
4.7.3.8.3.  Business As Usual 
total_bau= 
disease_indemnity +  disease_foregoneincome + disease_costsslaughter + 
 costcleaning_slaughter + costcleaning_fdtrucking + costcleaning_mktrucking + 
 additionalfeedcost + costsurv_herds + costsurv_milk + costvacc 
4.7.3.8.4.  Welfare Cost Only When Feed is Brought In  
It may be interesting to note the cost of avoiding welfare slaughter in the region. In this 
case it would be the additional cost of cleaning and disinfecting the feed trucks required 
to bring feed in and the cost of the feed itself.  
Welfarefd = costcleaning_fdtrucking + additionalfeedcost 
4.7.3.8.5.  Welfare Cost Only When No Feed is Brought In 
The welfare cost when feed is brought in can be compared against the welfare cost when 
no feed is brought in. Such would be the case if all additional risk of disease spread is 
avoided, but it should be evaluated as whether the benefits in terms of lessening disease 
spread is weighed against the associated additional slaughter necessary for welfare 
reasons.  
Welfarenf = welfare_indemnity + welfare_foregoneincome + welfare_costsslaughter 
4.7.3.9.  ASM Cost Per Animal  
In the ASM budget adjustment, the cost for each operation should be increased by the 
cost of disease management and the cost of carcass disposal. However, total costs must 
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be distributed across the region, so they are divided by the inventory in that region to get 
a per animal normalization. Given the confidence that feed will be able to be brought in, 
business as usual assumptions are made. The exception to the total business as usual cost 
calculation is that indemnity payments are not included since these are transfer 
payments.  
Costdiseasemgmt = (disease_foregoneincome + costcleaning_fdtrucking + 
 additionalfeedcost + costcleaning_mktrucking + costsurv_milk + costsurv_herds 
 + costvacc) /  totalinventory 
Costcarcassdisposal = (disease_costsslaughter + costcleaning_slaughter) / totalinventory  
4.7.4. Results 
Total results are presented and compared against each other followed by conclusions as 
well as the implications for producers and policy makers in California.  
4.7.4.1.  Business as Usual 
Under business as usual (BAU) feed can be brought in and milk taken out. First, 
comparing across days to detection regardless of vaccination strategy in Table 35, the 
cost of controlling the disease clearly increases as detection is delayed. Looking at 
Figure 37. Cost Spread Under Business as Usual for Alternative Delays in Detection the 
spread in the distribution of costs increases as well. This reiterates the value of earlier 
detection. In fact, between 21 and 22 days the increase in cost under BAU would 
increase by $522 million per hour.  
The BAU movement restriction zone policy was used in running the ASM results. 
Looking at the last two rows of Table 35, the cost per animal in that region of controlling 
the disease also increases with the delay in detection ranging from $330 per head to 
$2,343 per head in disease management and from $558 to $18,093 per head in carcass 
disposal cost. The total cost per animal with a 7 day delay in detection is $888. If 
detection is delayed from 7 to 10 days the cost of disease management almost doubles 
(an increase of $1,526), and it more than doubles for an increase in delay from 10 to 14 
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days (an increase of $3,808). A drastic increase occurs between 14 and 21 days delay (an 
increase of $10,092) and a slightly smaller but still large increase between 21 and 22 
days delay (an increase of $4,129). The point being, with such large increases in cost of 
disease control with greater delays in detection ex post, there is motivation to examine 
ex ante investments that would give a higher probability of early detection of the disease 
even if they are somewhat costly per animal.  
 
Table 35. Cost of Disease Control Under Business as Usual for Alternative Delays in 
Detection11 
BAU 7 day 10 day 14 day 21day 22 day 
(Million $) Median Median Median Median Median 
disease_indemnity $3.5  $10.8  $26.1  $81.9  $103.6  
disease_foregoneincome $2.4  $6.3  $14.7  $44.4  $60.8  
disease_costsslaughter $1,521.1 $4,780.0 $11,242.0 $34,816.7  $42,991.1
costcleaning_slaughter $1.8  $63.9  $418.9 $4,553.1  $6,795.6  
costcleaning_fdtrucking $0.0015 $0.0029 $0.0050  $0.0091  $0.0105  
costcleaning_mktrucking $147.6  $205.5  $247.5  $334.1  $381.6 
costsurv_herds $34.6  $73.5  $128.8  $250.0  $278.6  
costsurv_milk $0.1790 $0.3713 $0.6314  $1.2 $1.3  
cost_vacc $1,043.4 $2,116.4 $3,049.4  $5,982.7  $6,912.0  
additionalfeedcost $135.9  $218.6  $297.9  $307.8  $344.2  
total_bau $2,600.8 $6,845.8 $12,315.6 $43,511.3  $56,052.9 
 
($ per head)      
costdiseasemgmt $330  $643  $1,765  $1,799  $2,343  
costcarcassdisposal $558  $1,771  $4,450  $14,508  $18,093  
 
                                                 
11 Business as Usual (BAU) involves allowing feed to come into the movement 
restriction zone and milk to leave the movement restriction zone, but at a higher cost of 
cleaning and disinfecting people and equipment.  
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Figure 37. Cost Spread Under Business as Usual for Alternative Delays in Detection12 
 
The results under alternative vaccination regardless of the delay in detection are not as 
straight forward, as shown in Table 36. No vaccination results in lower median costs of 
control compared to vaccination, but whether 20 km ring vaccination or 10 km ring 
vaccination results in lower costs varies by cost category. Looking at the spread of the 
distribution on total control cost shown in Figure 38, no vaccination minimizes the 
median cost of disease control. The median cost of control is very close between the two 
vaccination strategies with 10 km ring vaccination having a slightly lower median cost. 
However, in examining the 75th percentile and the maximum, 20 km ring vaccination 
clearly has an advantage in reducing these highly undesirable tail in the control cost 
distribution. Risk analysis reveals a preference for 20 km ring vaccination as a means of 
reducing the risk of extreme outbreaks.  
                                                 
12 For Figures 38 - 42, the vertical line is the spread from the minimum value to the 
maximum value, the top dashed line is the 75th percentile, the bottom dashed line is the 
25th percentile and the solid line with the triangles is the median value. The vertical axis 
is the cost of disease mitigation in dollars and the horizontal axis is the number of days 
delay in detection.  
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Table 36. Cost of Disease Control Under Business as Usual for Alternative Vaccination 
BAU No Vaccination 10 Km Vacc 20 Km Vacc 
  Median Median Median 
disease_indemnity $25,818,334  $27,522,171  $27,046,753  
disease_foregoneincome $14,074,812  $14,364,441  $15,497,555  
disease_costsslaughter $10,841,631,280 $11,670,285,666 $11,818,576,473 
costcleaning_slaughter $413,082,791  $477,143,983  $464,488,458  
costcleaning_fdtrucking $5,135  $4,879  $4,717  
costcleaning_mktrucking $239,596,321  $242,373,099  $232,456,033  
costsurv_herds $124,511,173  $128,959,656  $135,493,365  
costsurv_milk $621,330  $601,700  $602,140  
cost_vacc N/A $2,856,037,580  $3,384,640,248  
additionalfeedcost $244,750,930  $249,205,144  $245,654,029  
total_bau $12,121,339,089 $16,225,569,000 $16,676,277,737 
costdiseasemgmt $239  $1,288  $1,500  
costcarcassdisposal $4,121  $4,569  $4,435  
 
 
Figure 38. Spread of Cost of Disease Control Under Business as Usual for Alternative 
Vaccination 
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4.7.4.2.  Lockdown 
Under total lockdown of movements of animals, feed and milk in the region additional 
costs are incurred. Theoretically, this would be the policy that has the smallest risk of 
further spread of the disease. Unfortunately, such stringent movement restrictions could 
also result in higher levels of cost due to additional slaughter where feed cannot be 
brought in and indemnity payments for milk that must be dumped. Looking across the 
different delays in detection, Table 37 shows early detection still results in lower costs 
than later detection. Figure 39 shows the min, 25th percentile, median, 75th percentile and 
max. As the delay in detection increases the spread also increases.  
 
Table 37. Cost of Disease Control Under Lockdown for Alternative Delays in Detection 
(Millions $)13 
Lockdown 7 day 10 day 14 day 21day 22 day 
  Median Median Median Median Median 
dumping_indemnity $9.2 $14.0 $15.2 $16.2 $18.2 
disease_indemnity $3.5 $10.9 $26.1 $81.9 $103.6 
welfare_indemnity $1,949.8 $3,136.8 $3,636.7 $4,416.8 $4,939.8 
welfare_foregoneincome $338.6 $544.6 $631.4 $766.8 $857.6 
disease_foregoneincome $2.4 $6.3 $14.7 $44.5 $60.9 
disease_costsslaughter $1,521.0 $4,779.1 $11,242.0 $34,816.7 $42,991.1 
welfare_costsslaughter $50,835.1 $81,784.4 $94,816.1 $115,156.0 $128,791.6
costcleaning_slaughter $1.8 $63.9 $418.9 $4,553.1 $6,795.2 
costsurv_herds $34.6 $73.5 $128.8 $250.0 $278.7 
cost_vacc $1,043.4 $2,116.4 $3,049.5 $5,982.7 $6,912.0 
total_lockdown $55,892.2 $91,612.1 $98,961.4 $162,963.1 $188,387.6
 
 
                                                 
13 Lockdown involves full movement restrictions on feed and milk shipments, where no 
movement is allowed for feed going in or milk going out. Indemnity payments are made 
for animals slaughtered and milk dumped as a result of this policy.  
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Figure 39. Spread of Cost of Disease Control Under Lockdown for Alternative Delays 
in Detection 
 
For alternative vaccination scenarios, Table 38 shows no vaccination again yields the 
minimum total cost of disease control. However, unlike in the BAU results, this is 
followed by 20 Km ring vaccination then 10 km ring vaccination. Results are quite close 
across the vaccination scenarios though as can be seen in Figure 40.  
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Table 38. Cost of Disease Control Under Lockdown for Alternative Vaccination 
Lockdown No Vaccination 10 Km Vacc 20 Km Vacc 
  Median Median Median 
dumping_indemnity $14,444,844 $14,600,258 $14,360,820 
disease_indemnity $25,818,334 $27,522,171 $27,046,753 
welfare_indemnity $3,512,588,965 $3,576,514,445 $3,525,549,955 
welfare_foregoneincome $609,847,748 $620,946,345 $612,098,006 
disease_foregoneincome $14,074,812 $14,364,441 $15,497,555 
disease_costsslaughter $10,841,631,280 $11,670,285,666 $11,818,576,473 
welfare_costsslaughter $91,581,121,932 $93,247,803,485 $91,919,044,211 
costcleaning_slaughter $413,082,791 $477,143,983 $464,488,458 
costsurv_herds $124,511,173 $128,959,656 $135,493,365 
cost_vacc N/A $2,856,037,580 $3,384,640,248 
total_lockdown $108,687,546,625 $113,789,812,489 $111,744,359,127 
 
 
 
Figure 40. Spread of Cost of Disease Control Under Lockdown for Alternative 
Vaccination 
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4.7.4.3.  Milk Dumping 
A third movement restriction policy would be to allow feed trucks in, but not take the 
milk out. There may be several reasons for this. First, it may be decided that taking a 
final product that can carry the disease out of the movement restriction zone is too risky. 
Second, manufacturing operations may not wish to risk introducing the virus to a clean 
facility. Finally, even though it is assumed labs can provide a fast turnaround on the 
additional testing of milk that would be needed, it is possible that milk could not be 
tested fast enough to prevent spoilage.  
A policy of dumping milk in the movement restriction zone is similar in terms of delays 
in detection. As shown in Table 39, early detection minimizes the cost of disease control. 
Figure 41 shows the spread is largest at 14 days delay in detection, but is reduced under 
the latest delays in detection.  
 
Table 39. Cost of Disease Control Under Milk Dumping for Alternative Delays in 
Detection (Millions $)14 
Dumping Only 7 day 10 day 14 day 21day 22 day 
  Median Median Median Median Median 
dumping_indemnity $9.2 $14.0 $15.2 $16.2 $18.2 
disease_indemnity $3.5 $10.9 $26.1 $81.9 $103.6 
disease_foregoneincome $2.4 $6.3 $14.7 $44.5 $60.8 
disease_costsslaughter $1,521.1 $4,780.0 $11,242.0 $34,816.7 $42,991.1 
costcleaning_slaughter $1.8 $63.9 $418.9 $4,553.1 $6,795.6 
costcleaning_fdtrucking $0.0015 $0.0029 $0.0050 $0.0091 $0.0104 
costsurv_herds $34.6 $73.5 $128.8 $250.0 $278.6 
cost_vacc $1,043.4 $2,116.4 $3,049.5 $5,982.7 $6,912.0 
additionalfeedcost $135.9 $218.6 $297.9 $307.8 $344.2 
total_dumpingonly $2,437.7 $6,652.6 $19,777.6 $43,290.3 $55,616.0 
                                                 
14 Milk Dumping would prevent milk from leaving the movement restriction zone but 
allow to be brought in at a higher cost for cleaning and disinfecting to prevent excessive 
slaughter.  
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Figure 41. Spread of Cost of Disease Control Under Milk Dumping for Alternative 
Delays in Detection 
 
Across different vaccination policies, Table 40 shows that the median total cost of 
disease control is minimized by using no vaccination. This is followed by 10 km 
vaccination and 20 km vaccination. However, the spread of the distribution of total cost 
of disease control is reduced more by 20 km vaccination over 10 km vaccination as 
shown in Figure 42.  
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Table 40. Cost of Disease Control Under Milk Dumping for Alternative Vaccination 
Dumping Only No Vaccination 10 Km Vacc 20 Km Vacc 
  Median Median Median 
dumping_indemnity $14,444,843.62 $14,600,257.60 $14,360,819.81 
disease_indemnity $25,818,334.27 $27,522,171.03 $27,046,752.78 
disease_ 
foregoneincome 
$14,074,811.75 $14,364,441.01 $15,497,555.34 
disease_ 
costsslaughter 
$10,841,631,280.46 $11,670,285,665.88 $11,818,576,472.89 
costcleaning_ 
slaughter 
$413,082,791.00 $477,143,982.70 $464,488,458.20 
costcleaning_ 
fdtrucking 
$5,134.64 $4,879.15 $4,717.10 
costsurv_herds $124,511,173.32 $128,959,655.88 $135,493,364.64 
cost_vacc N/A $2,856,037,579.56 $3,384,640,248.11 
additionalfeedcost $244,750,930.20 $249,205,143.60 $245,654,028.90 
total_dumpingonly $11,740,229,861.79 $15,883,074,388.56 $16,285,706,874.35 
 
 
 
Figure 42. Spread of Cost of Disease Control Under Milk Dumping for Alternative 
Vaccination 
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4.7.4.4.  Comparison Across Quarantine Zone Policies 
The median cost of disease control is minimized by implementing a policy for milk 
dumping followed by business as usual. These two policies result in similar costs; 
however, a total lockdown results in the highest costs. Thus it is not worthwhile to take 
milk out of the movement restriction zone. However, it is worthwhile to allow feed in 
even at a higher cost. In fact, if just the welfare cost when feed is brought in is compared 
against the welfare cost when feed is not brought in as shown in Table 41, the cost of 
bringing feed in is outweighed by far by the cost of additional indemnity payments and 
forgone income for producers who must slaughter animals when feed is not brought in.  
 
 
 
Table 41. Sum of Welfare Cost Categories Only (Million $) 
 7 day 10 day 14 day 21day 22 day 
welfarefd $135.9  $218.6  $297.9  $307.8  $344.2  
welfarenf $53,123.4 $85,465.7 $86,065.2 $120,339.7  $134,589.0  
 
Even when risk attitude is included in the ranking, both milk dumping and BAU are 
preferred to a total lockdown in a first degree stochastic dominance sense. Generalized 
stochastic dominance reveals that both risk neutral and risk averse decision makers 
prefer a milk dumping policy over a business as usual policy, but only very slightly.  
4.8. Conclusions and Implications 
This study of the California Central Valley provides results that are comparable to other 
economic studies of FMD done in that region, but the use of an integrated epidemic-
economic framework provides greater detail that was has previously been provided. A 
study done by Ekboir provides a useful frame of reference as well as the most recent 
census of agriculture in California. This section will briefly provide evidence as to the 
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reasonableness of results. Ekboir estimated the total cost of the outbreak to range from 
$6.7 to $13.5 billion in 1999. This did not include price changes and national economic 
surplus changes since his model was an input/output model. Thus this report is not only 
an update of the impacts of FMD in California, but also a more thorough examination 
compared to prior studies.  
The median amount of disease related slaughter, herds under movement restriction and 
potential welfare slaughter increases as the delay in detection increases. Vaccination 
increases the median slaughter, but reduces the median number of herds subject to 
movement restrictions and consequently in danger of welfare slaughter. Vaccination 
does however appear to reduce the tail of the distribution of animals placed under 
movement restrictions.  
National economic surplus losses increase as the delays in detection increase and also 
increase at the median with vaccination; however, when risk aversion is taken into 
account 20 kilometer ring vaccination becomes a preferred strategy as risk aversion 
rises. This indicates that policy makers may be willing to implement a policy with a 
higher median loss in order to avoid an extreme outcome.  
Producers in California clearly suffer the largest levels of losses in the country from an 
outbreak in that region. However if only the national levels of welfare are examined, the 
losses to that region may be underestimated since other producers in the country gain 
from higher prices and lower feed grain costs.  Similarly if only regional effects are 
considered without consideration of price changes than the losses will be overstated.  
The costs of disease control are comparable to other studies done in this region. Looking 
across different quarantine zone policies, a policy of allowing feed into the region at an 
increased cost for cleaning and disinfection provides a lower cost than a policy of not 
allowing feed in due to the increased slaughter for welfare reasons. However, a policy of 
not allowing milk out of the region is preferred to taking milk out at a higher cost of 
testing and cleaning the tanker trucks. This is not an unreasonable conclusion if dairies 
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have at least part of their feed needs on the farm, then fewer trips are needed to bring in 
sufficient feed. Also, as long as cows are still in production and the milk is simply being 
dumped in a safe manner somewhere inside the movement restriction zone the value of 
the dairy cow is not reduced. These quarantine zone results have interesting implications 
in terms of the producers’ ability to prepare for an animal disease outbreak. Education 
programs for producers and policy makers should stress the importance of emergency 
preparedness plans that would allow dairies and other operations inside movement 
restriction zones to maintain the viability of their businesses throughout the time of 
restriction. However, this analysis of movement restriction zone policies is not without 
limitations. Ideally, these results would be fed back into the epidemic model since the 
implications of welfare slaughter on slowing the spread of the disease have not been 
taken into account. 
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5. ESSAY 4: INTEGRATING DECISION MAKER RISK AVERSION INTO 
ECONOMIC ANALYSES OF FMD OUTBREAKS 
5.1.  Introduction  
 Risk and uncertainty is a factor that must be considered in planning for animal disease 
outbreaks. One cannot readily observe the effects of FMD control strategy decisions 
using observed data as the incidence of FMD has fortunately not been extensive and 
regular in the US. The extent of the outbreak if/when it does happen in modern US 
livestock agriculture is uncertain. Many different strategies have been used in other parts 
of the world but their effects cannot be observed here since a US outbreak of FMD has 
not occurred since 1929.  Uncertain parameters such as the contacts between susceptible 
animals in a region, environmental factors and human behavior can alter the size and 
extent of an outbreak.  Such is true in the case of FMD outbreak simulations in Texas, 
which show outcomes vary by more than an order of magnitude under alternative event 
possibilities (Ward et al., 2007).  In the face of a possible FMD outbreak it is important 
to study how control strategy decisions that can be made either before or during the 
outbreak would impact the associated economic loss. The objective of this essay is to 
determine how disease control strategies contribute to the resiliency of the livestock 
industry and how this may differ from the traditional view of control strategies as a 
means of minimizing the expected cost of the outbreak.  
Few prior studies have examined the implications of risk and risk preference in 
economic ranking of disease mitigation strategies. Many studies choose to evaluate 
control strategies based on the average outcome (Ekboir; Paarlberg, Lee and Seitzinger; 
Schoenbaum and Disney; Ward et al. (2007); Rich and Winter-Nelson; Paarlberg et al.).  
This essay provides a unique contribution to the literature in that risk ranking techniques 
are applied to control strategy evaluation when a partial equilibrium economic model has 
been integrated with an epidemic model. A study by Elbakidze examined the 
implications of risk in the Texas High Plains, but did so using only the disease 
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mitigation costs. This study found losses to the local cattle industry alone of up to $1 
billion and a control strategy combination of slaughter, early detection and regular 
surveillance was dominant (Elbakidze, 2009). Here, rather than focusing on the local 
cattle industry loss, the national economic surplus loss as calculated from the integrated 
economic/epidemic simulation model introduced in essay 2 is used. The simulations 
evaluate an FMD outbreak in the Texas High Plains and use risk ranking methods to do 
a pair wise control strategy ranking including risk aversion on the part of policy makers. 
Recall from essay 2, epidemic models should capture the uncertainty and risk associated 
with the disease spread; however, economic models must deal with the implication of 
this risk in the broader economy as well as uncertainty related to consumer reaction, 
international market reaction, and domestic market response. 
The strategies evaluated include varying time to availability of vaccination, surveillance 
intensity, and delays to detection of the first confirmed incidence of FMD. The work will 
be done using a three stage modeling approach involving using (1) the AusSpread 
epidemic disease simulator; (2) the ASM economic disease evaluation; and (3) a post 
processor economic/statistical calculator that carries out a risk evaluation over the 
various strategy outcomes.  The AusSpread-ASM integration examines impacts on 
agricultural industry profitability—both in the infected region and in non-infected 
regions—as well as consumer surplus under a range of potential demand side shifts.  
However, the focus here will be on national surplus changes since policy making bodies 
would most likely set a response plan for the country ex ante. For more details on these 
models see essay 2.  
In the consequent risk analysis, results will be examined in several ways. First, disease 
mitigation strategies will be ranked by effectiveness in reducing average losses due to 
the outbreak under the assumption that decision makers are risk neutral. Second, we will 
use standard statistical measures of risk to examine which strategies have the potential to 
be risk reducing strategies.  Third, we will consider an expected utility based approach 
looking at distribution characteristics including examining breakeven risk aversion 
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coefficients (BRACs) to determine the level of risk aversion at which decision makers 
will switch strategies.  
5.2. Evaluation of Risk in Disease Control Alternatives  
 The evaluation of risk by a decision maker is subjective (Reutlinger). Subjective 
expected utility theory argues that if states "are not associated with recognizable, 
objective probabilities, consistency-like restrictions on preferences among gambles still 
imply that decision makers behave as if utilities were assigned to outcomes, probabilities 
were attached to states of nature, and decision were made by taking expected utilities" 
(Mas-Colell, Whinson and Green, pg. 205). In other words, even though we cannot 
observe probabilities, we can still use expected utility. Under subjective expected utility 
theory, risky alternatives will be weighed based on subjective probabilities imposed by 
the decision maker on the possible outcomes of the risky decision (Hardacker et al.). The 
epidemic model yields a simulated distribution of possible outcomes. This simulation 
model provides the data run through the economic model, developing the distribution of 
losses from animal disease.  
The degree of a particular decision maker’s aversion to risk is given by the risk aversion 
coefficient (RAC). If a risk aversion coefficient analysis stops at examining the expected 
levels of economic losses with no credence given to their embodied risk, this is an 
assumption that all decision makers are risk neutral—meaning they are indifferent to the 
chance of extreme outcomes and only care about the expected (or average) outcome. 
This is unlikely a realistic assumption in the context of animal disease, and one that must 
be relaxed in examining control strategies as a means of reducing risk, and consequently 
boosting sector resiliency. Most decision makers will likely be adverse to higher 
probabilities of large losses.  
Decision makers who determine which control strategies to employ during an animal 
disease outbreak could compare the expected loss from the outbreak simulations to 
determine which strategy minimizes expected loss; however, this does not account for 
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the risk of large loss outcomes. Consider two strategies, one with a low expected loss but 
a long right tail as we examine the loss pdf. If this were compared to a strategy with a 
higher expected loss, but a short right tail the decision maker who is minimizing 
expected loss would choose the first strategy despite the fact that it has a greater chance 
of an extremely high loss level. In FMD control strategy evaluations, this may not be 
reasonable given that producers and policy makers should wish to reduce the risk of the 
outbreak as well. The underlying theory in this essay is that operation managers will 
attempt to reduce not only expected loss but also the magnitude of "worst" outcomes. It 
is possible that a strategy may have on average a slightly greater loss, but are 
worthwhile in reducing the chance of an extremely bad outcome.  
Strong assumptions are often made in order to discriminate among risky prospects 
including defining a range in which the risk aversion coefficient (RAC) must fall. This 
implies some knowledge of exactly how risk averse decision makers are; however, there 
is no way to observe the level of risk aversion making specifying the RAC range 
difficult. As a results it is often done using the results of other studies or setting the risk 
aversion coefficient rather arbitrarily. This is commonly done when using stochastic 
dominance with respect to a function or mean variance programming models (McCarl, 
1988).  Improperly specifying the RAC range (i.e. setting it too narrow or too wide) can 
cause misleading results that may imply certain strategies are never preferred, always 
preferred or that no ranking can be achieved. McCarl (1988) discussed an approach 
called the BRAC method, in which the data are explored to see what risk aversion 
coefficients differentiate among prospects under some specific assumptions. When using 
BRACs, one does not need to specify the RAC rather it is calculated given bounds that 
are based on various criteria related to the distribution. Here the confidence interval will 
be used to set the bounds. This methodology finds RACs that define a breakpoint at 
which a given distribution dominates. In other words, it finds the roots at which the 
expected utility between two strategies are equal.  
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More recently, this type of analysis has been programming into a Microsoft Excel add-in 
called Stochastic Efficiency with Respect to a Function (SERF).  An advantage of the 
SERF method in calculating BRAC points is that, in addition to identifying where 
dominance between two alternatives switches, SERF allows for estimation of the utility-
weighted risk premiums between alternatives to provide a cardinal measure for 
comparing the payoffs between risky alternatives (Richardson). These methods will be 
discussed in more detail in the methodology section.  
5.3. Methodology 
For each group of control strategy levels examined below, alternatives are compared 
using mean loss analysis, coefficient of variation (CV), standard deviation, stochastic 
dominance, and stochastic efficiency with respect to a function (SERF) utilizing 
breakeven risk aversion coefficient (BRAC) analysis.  By using techniques incorporating 
not only the uncertainty related to the disease itself, but also the decision makers’ 
attitudes toward that uncertainty a more realistic picture can be made as to why gaps 
exist between the ranking of control strategies based on minimizing the average 
epidemic loss and actual preference of control strategies in historical outbreaks. This in 
turn, provides a better understanding of the decision making dynamics in future 
outbreaks and can better inform policy decisions. This section will present each of these 
measures as well as their relative strengths and weaknesses as tools for risk rankings. 
5.3.1. Mean, Standard Deviation, Coefficient of Variation 
Perhaps the simplest way to examine and rank mitigation strategies would be to use 
simple statistical measures of the outcome distribution. Most studies have ranked 
strategies based on their ability to minimize the mean or median loss related to the 
outbreak. This study will also examine how strategies compare based on mean losses, 
but will recognize also the importance of risk as measured by the standard deviation and 
coefficient of variation.  
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The most basic way to examine the impact of uncertainty is to look at the standard 
deviation or coefficient of variation. Both of these are basic statistical risk measures, the 
difference being that standard deviation is an absolute measure of risk and coefficient of 
variation is a relative risk measure. The coefficient of variation may be more useful in 
this instance since the two alternatives may have widely divergent means and failure to 
normalize could result in an over or under estimation of the risk. Finally, examining the 
minimum and maximum of the range of losses gives an idea of how different strategies 
compare in reducing the extreme outcomes of the distribution. These risk methods are 
simple to calculate and can be used to determine if a strategy has the potential to be a 
risk reducing strategy, but results will rarely be clear as to whether one strategy 
dominates another as a means of reducing risk.  
5.3.2. Stochastic Dominance  
Stochastic dominance can be used to determine strategy choice under the weakest 
possible assumptions. Under stochastic dominance analysis a decision maker is given a 
choice between two alternatives and will choose the action that maximizes expected 
utility. In addition to the assumption of expected utility maximization, other assumptions 
are made included. First, alternatives are mutually exclusive, meaning one or the other 
must be chosen, but not a convex combination of both. This excludes the possibility of 
portfolio effects. Second, the stochastic dominance analysis is developed based on 
population probability distributions (McCarl, 2008). Population probability distributions 
are, in this case, simulated disease outcomes meaning they are subjective. This is a 
potential problem, but no observational data is available for US FMD outbreak losses.   
First degree stochastic dominance would imply that if the expected value of one strategy 
(f) is greater than the expected value of another strategy (g) for every level of 
probability, then the non-satiation property would indicate that f is always at least as 
good as g and therefore preferred to g (McCarl, 2008). Although this is straight forward 
intuitively, it does not really add anything to the existing method of ranking strategies 
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based on expected value. Furthermore, in animal disease analysis it is not very probable 
that one strategy will consistently outperform the other over a large simulation sample.  
Second degree stochastic dominance requires two additional assumptions. First, the 
second derivative of utility with respect to the variable x (in this case losses) is negative 
everywhere implying diminishing marginal utility. Second, the integral of the difference 
between two cummulative distribution functions (CDFs) must be positive. This implies 
that CDFs  can cross, but the difference in areas before they cross must be greater than 
the difference in areas after they cross (McCarl, 2008). This allows the ranking of 
strategies with one crossing, allowing ranking of strategies that would be undetermined 
under first degree stochastic dominance; however, the assumptions used are restrictive 
and will likely be problematic.  
There are two primary problems with using stochastic dominance in this framework 
outlined in McCarl (2008). The first is the issue of non-discrimination or low crossings. 
If the distribution shows a vast improvement under all the observations but the lowest 
one, then stochastic dominance will not hold in any form. In other words, it ranks 
strategies close to the left hand side of the CDF. The second issue is that portfolios of 
control strategies cannot be considered. There are an infinite number of control strategy 
combinations that could be more effective when used together rather than used 
individually; however, under the mutual exclusivity assumption, one ignores this 
possibility. Finally, sample size of the simulation model iterations. This method is 
sensitive to outlyers and a too small sample may yield misleading results or the inability 
to make rankings using stochastic dominance. As a result of these problems, other 
methods have been developed that can be implemented here.    
Generalized Stochastic Dominance (GSD) was developed by Meyer in 1997 as a way in 
which preferences are ranked such that dominance of one risky alternative is guaranteed 
over another between breakeven risk aversion coefficients (BRACs) (McCarl, 1996). 
GSD overcomes the problem of low crossings, but requires several assumptions. GSD 
does not need to be developed in much detail here since the BRAC method will not 
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identify a strategy as being dominant that is not identified by GSD as dominant. 
Meaning, one cannot span a BRAC with GSD. Instead, the BRAC method will be 
developed in greater detail.  
5.3.3. Breakeven Risk Aversion Coefficient Analysis 
The goal of BRAC analysis is to find the level of a decision maker's RAC under which 
that decision maker will be indifferent between two alternatives. By finding these roots, 
a determination can be made as to which strategy would be preferred to the left of the 
BRAC and to the right of the BRAC. The basis for this method was derived by 
Hammond and fully developed by McCarl (1988) as a way to use data to determine what 
RAC level differentiates among all risky prospects under four principle assumptions: (1) 
constant absolute risk aversion (CARA) utility functional form; (2) mutually exclusive 
prospects; (3) discrete distribution; and (4) data free of sampling error. Hammond 
showed that given two alternatives which cross once that under these assumptions, there 
is a break-even risk aversion coefficient (BRAC) that differentiates between those two 
alternatives. Here an assumption is made on utility (i.e. it must be a form that exhibits 
CARA), but the RAC level can still vary between defined bounds.  
5.3.3.1.  Deriving the BRAC 
Hammond begins by noting that the expected utility problem under the CARA 
assumption is a form of moment generating function. The moment generating function, 
which is used to characterize the distribution, can then be used to derive the roots of the 
RAC given a distributional assumption. If the assumption is that the loss distribution is 
Normal(r, ut), the associated moment generating function can be defined for each control 
strategy (t). The variable (r) gives the constant absolute risk aversion coefficient 
(ARAC). Setting the moment generating functions equal for two alternative control 
strategies and solving for the value of r will yield at least one root at r=0 and a second 
root where  
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As a result, we no longer need to know a decision maker's RAC level, only whether this 
is a reasonable level given two bounds.  This method still has two problems. First, the 
normality assumption may not hold for the distribution in question and second, the 
CARA assumption may not hold in reality. However, these assumptions will be made in 
order to further the examination of risk in control strategy choice.  
There may be more than two roots; in fact, the number of roots will equal the number of 
times the two alternatives' CDFs cross. In McCarl's extension of Hammond's method, 
which looks at  
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and solves for the values of r at which this holds, roots will always be found at r=0 and  
where r = ∞.  
There is still a potential problem posed by sampling error. The FMD outbreak under a 
particular strategy was simulated 100 times in this analysis; however, this may not be a 
sufficient number of simulations to get a robust sample size. Other sampling issues are 
that when distribution means and variances get close together, the probability of 
improper conclusions can become quite high and using a moment generating function to 
find the dominance points is not as good as using an empirical distribution based 
method.  
5.3.3.2.  Finding Bounds 
When examining levels of upper and lower bounds, a few points are worth noting. First, 
when r1 = 0 and r2 = ∞ we get second degree stochastic dominance, and when r1 = -∞ 
and r2 = ∞ we get first degree stochastic dominance. It may not be reasonable to look at 
values ranging between negative infinity and positive infinity, rather there may be a 
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reasonable range within which the analysis needs to be focused. Thus a rule has been 
established for finding those bounds. First, the bound levels of zero, negative infinity 
and positive infinity are discussed followed by a discussion of the bounding rules 
established by McCarl and Bessler.  
If the RAC level falls anywhere in the negative range such that -∞≤r(x)<0 then the this 
would indicate the preferences for someone who is risk loving or risk seeking. This type 
of individual will seek out situations in which uncertainty is high. In the context of 
animal disease it may be safe to rule out individuals seeking out strategies where there is 
a high probability of extremely high loss levels.  
If the RAC level is exactly zero, then the decision maker is strictly risk neutral. This 
implies the decision maker will decide the portfolio of control strategies to use based 
strictly on minimizing the average loss, with no credence given to the importance of 
minimizing the outcomes in the tails of the loss distribution. This is how strategies have 
historically been ranked, but should be compared to how strategies are ranked if 
individuals weight their optimal control strategy decision with the risk of extreme 
outcomes. Such individuals are considered risk averse.  
Risk aversion implies decision makers will wish to minimize the average loss under 
alternative control strategies, but they will also want to reduce the chance of an extreme 
outcome. Given the uncertainty inherent in the spread of FMD, the range of the possible 
outbreak outcomes can be quite large. If one were to visualize a distribution of simulated 
outbreak losses, the right tail would be quite long indicating that there is at least some 
chance of an “extreme” bad outcome with catastrophic losses such as what was seen in 
the UK in 2001. Strategies ranked simply on the mean or median may not take into 
account the influence of this tail on the policy choice among possible control strategies. 
If an individual is risk averse, their risk aversion coefficient will range such that 0<r(x)≤ 
+∞.  
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It is possible then to set the range of RACs examined such that all RACs for risk neutral 
and risk averse individuals are examined. This would imply r1=0 and r2=+∞, which is 
still a large range and may widely exceed the reasonable level of the upper RAC. Often 
one can define a narrower range in which the risk aversion coefficient (RAC) must fall. 
This is discussed in McCarl and Bessler. The bound conditions can be derived three 
ways.  
• Where the certainty equivalent ignoring wealth is non-negative or equivalently 
where the risk premium is no greater than the mean 
• Where the risk premium is bounded above by a confidence interval 
• Where the risk premium does not exceed those found in applied MOTAD studies 
This essay will focus on the second method, which utilizes the confidence interval. In 
this instance, McCarl and Bessler show that the bound on r(x) can be derived by making 
the assumption that the number of standard deviations in the confidence interval (D) is 
related to the risk premium such that the bound condition 
YDxr σ/)2()( ∗≤  
By using this method, a bound is determined in which, under a normality assumption, 
the level of confidence for the BRAC can be derived as 
2/))()(( xxrD σ∗=  
The D can be looked up in the standard normal (Z) table to get the level of the 
confidence interval (McCarl, 2008).  
5.3.3.3.  Stochastic Efficiency with Respect to a Function 
Recently, BRAC procedures have been built into a Microsoft Excel add-in called 
Stochastic Efficiency with Respect to a Function (SERF). An advantage of the SERF 
method in calculating BRAC points is that, in addition to identifying where dominance 
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between two alternatives switches, SERF allows for estimation of the utility-weighted 
risk premiums between alternatives to provide a cardinal measure for comparing the 
payoffs between risky alternatives (Hardaker et al.). If no BRACs are found, then a 
message will be printed out indicating one distribution dominates everywhere. If BRACs 
are found, messages will be given identifying the dominant prospect over particular 
RAC ranges. Therefore, we combine both CDFs and SERF for each scenario so we can 
easily understand how dominant the mitigation strategy could be. 
5.4. Case Study in the High Plains Concentrated Feeding Region 
A region of the country vulnerable to FMD is the concentrated feeding region of the 
High Plains of Texas. This area is characterized by a large number of feedlots, varying in 
size from large company owned feedlots to smaller backgrounder feeders. Although beef 
cattle far outnumber other susceptible species, the area also has hog, dairy and sheep 
operations. This study particularly focuses on an eight county region that has a large 
number of feedlot operations.  
The AusSpread Model and the ASM model with the included cost model were used for 
this analysis. For details on these models please refer to essay 2. In the following results, 
we are evaluating the mitigation strategy by using the concept of welfare comparisons 
among consumers, processors, and producers, and the concept of stochastic dominance 
with the preliminary average simulated High Plain data of economic modeling with the 
FASOM model by using GAMS. We use the same assumptions and the original 64 
scenario settings with different three mitigation strategies outlined by Ward et al. (2007). 
The major differences will be the expansion of the economic consequences of the 
potential animal disease outbreak in the Texas High Plain area by estimating the welfare 
losses with and without using mitigation strategies from the perspectives of consumers, 
processors, and producers in the United States and in the specific geographic regions and 
the risk analysis. A more detailed report of the disease mitigation costing results can be 
found in Elbakidze et al.  
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5.5. Simulation and Experimental Results 
The stamp out policy and movement restrictions were assumed to be standard (refer to 
essay 1); these two policies are well established as reducing disease spread. In the future, 
comparisons of alternative methods of enforcing these policies could be considered—for 
example ring slaughter versus targeted slaughter. However, the focus here is on three 
control strategies--detection, surveillance and vaccination. For each strategy two “levels” 
of enforcement are considered.  
• Detection: For this strategy early detection occurring on day 7 after the first 
animal becomes sub-clinically infection is compared to late detection on day 14 
after the first animal becomes sub-clinically infected.  
• Surveillance: Regular surveillance were each premises under surveillance is 
visited twice a week to check for signs of FMD is compared to enhanced 
surveillance were each premises under surveillance is visited four times a week 
to check for signs of FMD. Since there is a cost per visit, enhanced surveillance 
will increase the cost per animal under surveillance, but the question is whether it 
reduces the overall impact of the disease. 
• Vaccination: Regular vaccine availability implies vaccine is available and on site 
one week (7 days) after the day the disease is detected. This implies vaccination 
begins on day 14 under early detection and day 21 under late detection. Regular 
vaccine availability is compared to rapid vaccine availability were vaccine is 
available and on site on the day the disease is detected. This implies vaccination 
beings on day 7 for early detection and day 14 for late detection. Since current 
vaccination policy is a “vaccinate to die” policy, all animals vaccinated must be 
slaughtered.   
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5.5.1. Expected Welfare Gain/Loss Comparison under Different Mitigation 
Strategies 
Rather than using the minimization of losses or maximization of gains in surplus to any 
one group, policy makers may instead choose to minimize losses of the disease outbreak 
over all groups. In other words, the goals of control strategy choice may be to minimize 
the national average economic surplus loss. This analysis would be valid in ranking 
control strategies as long as policy makers are risk neutral. The three control strategies 
are examined below using this criterion.  
5.5.1.1.  Early versus Late Detection 
The literature indicates early detection should be preferable overall (Schoenbaum and 
Disney; Paarlberg, Lee and Seitzinger; Ekboir; Ward et al., 2007). In the expansion of 
the High Plains study results are mixed. Early detection resulted in a shorter epidemic 
length (on average 16 days less) and less herds slaughtered (on average 12 herds less), 
but economic results indicate it may not be an average national loss minimizing strategy. 
For early versus late detection strategies, Table 42 gives the total surplus loss as well as 
the components that make up the total surplus loss. Under the early detection section, in 
parentheses, is the percentage change from late detection results. Consumers gain the 
most on average under early detection, except for when the disease outbreak initializes 
in a backyard operation. Thus early detection would be an appealing strategy to risk 
neutral decision makers seeking to maximize consumer gains. Early detection yields 
lower average losses in producer surplus when infections start in backyard operations 
but higher losses when infections start in large and small feedlots or large grazing 
operations. Over all infection points (average effect row), early detection results in a 
higher total loss by $160,000 on average (0.01% increase). Only infections beginning in 
backyard operations results in an overall decrease in the average national surplus loss 
from early detection.  
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Table 42. National Economic Surplus Gain/Loss Under Alternative Detection (Millions 
$2004) 
  Early Detection 
  Change in 
Consumer 
Surplus 
Change in 
Processor 
Surplus 
Change in 
Producer 
Surplus  
Total Change 
in National 
Surplus 
Average Effect  158.48  
(0.56%) 
-13.46 
(0.17%) 
-945.18 
(0.10%) 
-800.16 
(0.01%) 
Large Feedlot IP 163.59 
(2.28%) 
-16.18 
(18.22%) 
-948.09 
(0.15%) 
-800.68 
(0.04%) 
Small Feedlot IP 156.02 
(1.91%) 
-11.02 
(-15.70%) 
-944.70 
(0.55%) 
-799.70 
(0.02%) 
Large Grazing IP 162.39 
(1.15%) 
-14.31 
(17.33%) 
-948.80 
(0.01%) 
-800.72 
(0.04%) 
Backyard IP 151.93 
(-3.12%) 
-12.33 
(-16.61%) 
-939.15 
(-0.294%) 
-799.55 
(-0.04%) 
     
 Late Detection 
 Change in 
Consumer 
Surplus 
Change in 
Processor 
Surplus 
Change in 
Producer 
Surplus  
Total Change 
in National 
Surplus 
Average Effect  157.60  -13.43  -944.17  -800.00   
Large Feedlot IP 159.94  -13.68  -946.59  -800.34  
Small Feedlot IP 153.09  -13.08  -939.50 -799.49  
Large Grazing IP 160.53  -12.19  -948.66  -800.32  
Backyard IP 156.83  -14.78  -941.92  -799.87  
 
 
5.5.1.2.  Rapid versus Regular Availability of Vaccine 
Since the assumed vaccination policy is a “vaccinate to die” policy, all animals 
vaccinated are be slaughtered without entering the meat supply.  The appeal of 
172 
 
vaccination is as a retardant to disease spread, but at a higher cost in terms of animal life 
and dollar expenditure on disease control cost. Here, regular availability of vaccine is 
compared to rapid availability of vaccine in the hopes that having vaccine available more 
quickly would allow the disease to be contained to a smaller area. Rapid availability of 
vaccine supply resulted in a shorter epidemic length (on average 1 days less) and less 
herds slaughtered (on average 2 herds less), but again does not necessarily imply a 
smaller economic loss.  
For rapid versus regular availability of vaccine, Table 43 gives the total surplus loss as 
well as components that make up the total surplus loss. Under the rapid vaccine 
availability column, in parentheses, is the percentage change from regular vaccine 
availability.  Consumers gain on average slightly more when outbreaks begin in large 
feedlots under regular vaccine availability, but for other types of infection points 
consumers gain more under rapid vaccine availability. Producers lose less on average 
under regular vaccine availability for all infection points except large feedlots, where 
losses range from $945 million to $943 million for rapid vaccine availability and from 
$937 million to $947 million for regular availability. Rapid vaccine availability results in 
a $163,000 increase in national surplus loss on average across all infection points, or an 
increase of 0.03%. Only for large feedlot infection points does rapid vaccine availability 
reduce the average national surplus loss, but even then it is by a very small amount 
(0.004%). Risk neutral decision makers would not find vaccination to be an appealing 
policy to minimize the national economic surplus loss from an animal disease incursion. 
173 
 
Table 43. National Economic Surplus Gain/Loss Under Alternative Availability of 
Vaccine (Millions $2004) 
 Rapid Vaccine Availability 
 Change in 
Consumer 
Surplus 
Change in 
Processor 
Surplus 
Change in 
Producer 
Surplus  
Total Change in 
National 
Surplus 
Average 
Effect  
$157.17 
(1.06%) 
-$14.69 
(13.13%) 
-$942.58 
(0.02%) 
-$800.08 
(0.03%) 
Large Feedlot 
IP 
$158.52 
(0.11%) 
-$13.38 
(-11.67%) 
-$945.38 
(0.18%) 
-$800.24 
(-0.004%) 
Small Feedlot 
IP 
$154.63 
(1.16%) 
-$13.55 
(-6.98%) 
-$940.97 
(0.34%) 
-$799.89 
(0.04%) 
Large Grazing 
IP 
$160.48 
(3.54%) 
-$17.27 
(37.48%) 
-$943.56 
(0.14%) 
-$800.29 
(0.06%) 
Backyard IP $155.05 
(1.24%) 
-$14.55 
(1.11%) 
-$940.39 
(0.23%) 
-$799.89 
(0.05%) 
     
 Regular Vaccine Availability 
 Change in 
Consumer 
Surplus 
Change in 
Processor 
Surplus 
Change in 
Producer 
Surplus  
Total Change in 
National 
Surplus 
Average 
Effect  
$155.52 -$12.98 -$942.38 -$799.85 
Large Feedlot 
IP 
$158.70 -$11.82 -$947.09 -$800.21 
Small Feedlot 
IP 
$152.85 -$14.57 -$937.83 -$799.54 
Large Grazing 
IP 
$154.99 -$12.56 -$942.23 -$799.80 
Backyard IP $153.15 -$14.39 -$938.24 -$799.47 
 
5.5.1.3.  Enhanced versus Regular Surveillance 
In comparing enhanced versus regular surveillance, the benefit in terms of reduced 
disease outcomes is weighed against the increased cost of additional surveillance. 
Enhanced surveillance resulted in a shorter epidemic length (on average 1 days less), and 
less herds slaughtered (on average 1 herd less).  
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For enhanced versus regular surveillance strategies, Table 44 gives the total surplus loss 
as well as the components that make up the total surplus loss. Under the enhanced 
surveillance column, in parentheses, is the percentage change from regular surveillance 
results. Enhanced surveillance results in a lower consumer surplus gain for feedlots and 
backyard operations on average. For producers, the loss in surplus is lower on average 
when enhanced surveillance is employed in feedlot infection points. However, producers 
stand to lose greater amounts of surplus on average when enhanced surveillance is used 
and the infection point is a large beef grazing operation or a backyard operation. Over all 
infection points (average effect row), enhanced surveillance results in a lower loss by 
$120,000 on average (0.01% decrease). Infections beginning in large feedlots and large 
beef grazing operations results in an overall increase in the average national surplus loss 
from enhanced surveillance. So enhanced surveillance may be an appealing strategy to a 
risk neutral policy maker for reducing the average impact of the disease where the 
infection point is unknown.  
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Table 44. National Economic Surplus Gain/Loss Under Alternative Surveillance 
(Millions $2004) 
 
5.5.2. Simple Statistical Ranking  
The first examination of the risk of alternatives is simply comparing the standard 
deviation and coefficient of variation (risk measures). The min and max are also 
  Enhanced Surveillance 
  Change in 
Consumer 
Surplus 
Change in 
Processor 
Surplus 
Change in 
Producer 
Surplus  
Total Change 
in National 
Surplus 
Average Effect  $159.39 
(-0.89%) 
-$13.60 
(-0.52%) 
-$945.99 
(0.15%) 
-$800.20 
(-0.01%) 
Large Feedlot IP $158.48 
(-6.33%) 
-$13.89 
(-1.34%) 
-$944.77 
(-1.19%) 
-$800.18 
(-0.11%) 
Small Feedlot IP $154.19. 
(-3.87%) 
-$13.27 
(1.52%) 
-$940.53 
(-0.71%) 
-$799.62 
(-0.04%) 
Large Grazing IP $165.87 
(6.36%) 
-$13.41 
(19.40%) 
-$953.35 
(0.92%) 
-$800.88 
(0.11%) 
Backyard IP $159.03 
(0.77%) 
-$13.81 
(-15.18%) 
-$945.32 
(0.37%) 
-$800.11 
(-0.01%) 
     
 Regular Surveillance 
 Change in 
Consumer 
Surplus 
Change in 
Processor 
Surplus 
Change in 
Producer 
Surplus  
Total Change 
in National 
Surplus 
Average Effect  $160.84 -$13.67         -$947.49      -$800.32      
Large Feedlot IP $169.21      -$14.08         -$956.23      -$801.11      
Small Feedlot IP $160.41      -$13.08         -$947.33      -$800.00      
Large Grazing IP $155.94      -$11.23         -$944.64      -$799.93      
Backyard IP $157.80      -$16.29         -$941.76        -$800.24      
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provided as a means of examining the spread of the distribution. Results for each of the 
three control strategies will be examined separately.  
5.5.2.1.  Early versus Late Detection 
Consider Table 45 and Table 46, which show the results for early and late detection 
scenarios respectively across the four infection points considered (large feedlot, small 
feedlot, large beef grazing operation, and backyard operation) for the three groups that 
make up total US economic surplus (consumers, processors and producers).  
Both processors and producers stand to lose surplus from the outbreak, while consumers 
stand to gain. The primary focus of this analysis will be on the producer losses. Looking 
at risk measures, standard deviation indicates that early detection yields less risk when 
infections start in large feedlots, small feedlots and large grazing operations for 
consumers and producers but more risk when infections start in backyard operations for 
consumers, producers and processors. Examining the coefficient of variation, which is a 
relative risk measure, consumers reduce risk through early detection for large feedlot, 
small feedlot and large grazing infection points but increase risk for a backyard infection 
point. Processors realize a smaller CV for infection points in large and small feedlots, 
but not large grazing operation or backyard infection points. Producers realize a smaller 
CV under late detection for large feedlot, small feedlot and large grazing infection points 
but a larger CV for backyard infection points.  
These mixed results do not give a clear picture of whether the detection difference 
considered here (one week) is enough to make early detection act as a risk reducing 
strategy. More detailed analysis will be needed.  
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Table 45. Early Detection Summary Statistics (Millions $2004) 
  Early Detection    
Large Feedlot IP StDev CV Min Max 
Change in US Consumer Surplus 
 
35.76 21.86 $26.46 $214.21 
Change in US Processor Surplus 
 
12.62 -77.97 -$44.88 $13.13 
Change in US Producer Surplus 
 
36.12 -3.81 -$1024.77 -$815.26 
Small Feedlot IP        
Change in US Consumer Surplus 
 
40.57 26.00 $26.46 $200.41 
Change in US Processor Surplus 
 
8.28 -75.06 -$15.20 $13.13 
Change in US Producer Surplus 
 
40.85 -4.32 -$998.55 -$815.26 
Large Grazing IP         
Change in US Consumer Surplus 
 
34.81 21.43 $26.46 $214.21 
Change in US Processor Surplus 
 
10.25 -71.61 -$44.88 $13.13 
Change in US Producer Surplus 
 
35.29 -3.72 -$998.55 -$815.26 
Backyard IP         
Change in US Consumer Surplus 
 
41.12 27.07 $26.46 $200.41 
Change in US Processor Surplus 
 
12.04 -97.61 -$44.88 $13.13 
Change in US Producer Surplus 
 
40.87 -4.35 -$1024.77 -$815.26 
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Table 46. Late Detection Summary Statistics (Millions $2004) 
  Late Detection    
Large Feedlot IP StDev CV Min Max 
Change in US Consumer Surplus 
 
39.27 24.56 $26.46 $214.21 
Change in US Processor Surplus 
 
11.14 -81.41 -$44.88 $13.13 
Change in US Producer Surplus 
 
38.94 -4.11 -$998.55 -$815.26 
Small Feedlot IP        
Change in US Consumer Surplus 
 
42.69 27.89 $26.46 $200.41 
Change in US Processor Surplus 
 
11.74 -89.75 -$44.88 $13.13 
Change in US Producer Surplus 
 
43.46 -4.63 -$1024.77 -$785.58 
Large Grazing IP         
Change in US Consumer Surplus 
 
37.30 23.23 $26.46 $200.41 
Change in US Processor Surplus 
 
7.567 -62.03 -$15.20 $13.13 
Change in US Producer Surplus 
 
37.40 -3.94 -$998.55 -$815.26 
Backyard IP         
Change in US Consumer Surplus 
 
38.23 24.37 $26.46 $200.41 
Change in US Processor Surplus 
 
11.27 -76.22 -$44.88 $13.13 
Change in US Producer Surplus 
 
40.19 -4.27 -$1024.77 -$785.58 
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5.5.2.2.  Rapid Vaccine Availability versus Regular Vaccine Availability 
Table 47 and Table 48 provide summary statistics for rapid and regular vaccine 
availability respectively. Recall that rapid vaccine availability did not appear to be an 
expected loss minimizing strategy, so the question becomes whether or not it is a risk 
reducing strategy.  
Beginning with the standard deviation of the loss distribution for consumers, rapid 
vaccine availability reduces the absolute risk for infection points in small feedlots, large 
grazing operations and backyard operations but increases risk for large feedlot infection 
points. Similarly, for processors, rapid vaccine availability reduces absolute risk when 
infection points are small feedlots, large grazing operations and backyard operations but 
increases risk for large feedlot infection points. For producers, absolute risk is reduced 
under rapid vaccine availability for infection points in large grazing operations and 
backyard operations but not for infection points in feedlots.  
Examining the relative risk through the CV, consumers risk is reduced through rapid 
vaccine availability for infection points in small feedlots, large grazing operations and 
backyard operations but is increase for an infection point in a large feedlot. For 
processors, rapid vaccine availability reduces relative risk for infection points starting in 
large feedlots and backyard operations, but larger for infection points in small feedlots 
and large grazing operations. Finally, for producers, relative risk is reduced under rapid 
vaccine availability for large feedlot infection points but increased for infection points in 
small feedlots, large grazing operations, and backyard operations.  
Overall results are once again mixed, but seem to indicate that for the majority of 
potential infection points vaccine may have merit as a risk reducing strategy particularly 
when consumers gains are maximized or processors losses are minimized. For producer 
losses results are more mixed.  
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Table 47. Rapid Vaccine Availability Summary Statistics (Millions $2004) 
  Rapid Vaccine Availability 
Large Feedlot IP SD CV Max Min 
Change in US Consumer Surplus 
 
41.27 26.03 $26.46 $214.21 
Change in US Processor Surplus 
 
11.55 -86.36 -$44.88 $13.13 
Change in US Producer Surplus 
 
40.31 -4.26 -$998.55 -$815.26 
Small Feedlot IP     
Change in US Consumer Surplus 
 
40.35 26.09 $26.46 $200.41 
Change in US Processor Surplus 
 
10.79 -79.66 -$44.88 $13.13 
Change in US Producer Surplus 
 
41.99 -4.46 -$998.55 -$785.58 
Large Grazing IP      
Change in US Consumer Surplus 
 
38.04 23.70 $26.46 $214.21 
Change in US Processor Surplus 
 
13.74 -79.55 -$44.88 $13.13 
Change in US Producer Surplus 
 
39.76 -4.21 -$998.55 -$785.58 
Backyard IP      
Change in US Consumer Surplus 
 
39.27 25.33 $26.46 $200.41 
Change in US Processor Surplus 
 
12.22 -83.99 -$44.88 $13.13 
Change in US Producer Surplus 
 
41.03 -4.36 -$1,024.77 -$815.26 
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Table 48. Regular Vaccine Availability Summary Statistics (Millions $2004) 
  Regular Vaccine Availability 
Large Feedlot IP SD CV Max Min 
Change in US Consumer Surplus 
 
38.33 24.16 $26.46 $200.41 
Change in US Processor Surplus 
 
7.79 -65.89 -$15.20 $13.13 
Change in US Producer Surplus 
 
38.34 -4.05 -$998.55 -$815.26 
Small Feedlot IP     
Change in US Consumer Surplus 
 
41.02 26.84 $26.46 $200.41 
Change in US Processor Surplus 
 
12.97 -89.04 -$44.88 $13.13 
Change in US Producer Surplus 
 
41.97 -4.48 -$1,024.77 -$785.58 
Large Grazing IP      
Change in US Consumer Surplus 
 
44.98 29.02 $26.46 $214.21 
Change in US Processor Surplus 
 
12.35 -98.32 -$44.88 $13.13 
Change in US Producer Surplus 
 
43.45 -4.61 -$998.55 -$815.26 
Backyard IP      
Change in US Consumer Surplus 
 
44.16 28.83 $26.46 $200.41 
Change in US Processor Surplus 
 
12.02 -83.58 -$44.88 $13.13 
Change in US Producer Surplus 
 
46.03 -4.91 -$998.55 -$785.58 
 
182 
 
5.5.2.3.  Enhanced versus Regular Surveillance 
In comparing enhanced versus regular surveillance, economic loss results are shown in 
Table 49 and Table 50. Enhanced surveillance yields significantly higher absolute risk as 
measured by standard deviation across all infection points when examining consumer 
gains. For processors, enhanced surveillance yields higher absolute risk for infection 
points in feedlots, but lower absolute risk for infection points in large grazing operations 
and backyard operations. For producers, the standard deviation is consistently higher 
when enhanced surveillance is employed implying a higher level of absolute risk.  
Enhanced surveillance also yields a higher consumer gain CV for infection points in 
feedlots, but lower CV for infection points in large beef grazing operations and backyard 
operations. Processors' loss CV indicates a smaller level of relative risk under enhanced 
surveillance for feedlots, but a larger level of relative risk under enhanced surveillance 
for infection points starting in large grazing operations and backyard operations. Finally, 
producers follow the same pattern in which the CV indicates a smaller level of relative 
risk under enhanced surveillance for feedlots, but a larger level of relative risk under 
enhanced surveillance for infection points starting in large grazing operations and 
backyard operations.  
Taken together these results indicate that, overall, national losses would be reduced 
when enhanced surveillance is employed for feedlot infection points. This may not be 
unreasonable given that, although more animals are suspect when infections begin in 
feedlots, there may be fewer herds that are under surveillance when feedlots are 
infection points. The costs to surveillance are on a per herd basis. However, it is 
unknown at the time an outbreak occurs, typically, exactly what type of operation is the 
infection point so more detailed analysis is needed.  
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Table 49. Enhanced Surveillance Summary Statistics (Millions $2004) 
  Enhanced Surveillance 
Large Feedlot IP SD CV Max Min 
Change in US Consumer Surplus 
 41.97 26.48 $214.21 $26.46 
Change in US Processor Surplus 
 12.48 -89.80 $13.13 -$44.88 
Change in US Producer Surplus 
 40.91 -4.33 -$815.26 -$998.55 
Small Feedlot IP         
Change in US Consumer Surplus 
 42.85 27.79 $200.41 $26.46 
Change in US Processor Surplus 
 11.01 -82.94 $13.13 -$44.88 
Change in US Producer Surplus 
 44.26 -4.71 -$785.58 -$998.55 
Large Grazing IP          
Change in US Consumer Surplus 
 29.26 17.64 $200.41 $26.46 
Change in US Processor Surplus 
 5.50 -41.00 $13.13 -$15.20 
Change in US Producer Surplus 
 31.00 -3.25 -$815.26 -$998.55 
Backyard IP          
Change in US Consumer Surplus 
 29.26 17.64 $200.41 $26.46 
Change in US Processor Surplus 
 5.50 -41.00 $13.13 -$15.20 
Change in US Producer Surplus 
 31.00 -3.25 -$815.26 -$998.55 
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Table 50. Regular Surveillance Summary Statistics (Millions $2004) 
  Regular Surveillance 
Large Feedlot IP SD CV Max Min 
Change in US Consumer Surplus 
 23.78 14.06 $200.41 $84.21 
Change in US Processor Surplus 
 3.97 -28.16 $0.01 -$15.20 
Change in US Producer Surplus 
 27.37 -2.86 -$866.34 -$998.55 
Small Feedlot IP         
Change in US Consumer Surplus 
 33.98 21.18 $200.41 $26.46 
Change in US Processor Surplus 
 8.85 -67.68 $13.13 -$44.88 
Change in US Producer Surplus 34.85 -3.68 -$815.26 -$1024.77 
Large Grazing IP          
Change in US Consumer Surplus 
 42.27 27.10 $200.41 $26.46 
Change in US Processor Surplus 
 8.84 -78.67 $13.13 -$15.20 
Change in US Producer Surplus 
 41.07 -4.35 -$815.26 -$998.55 
Backyard IP          
Change in US Consumer Surplus 
 42.27 27.10 $200.41 $26.46 
Change in US Processor Surplus 
 8.84 -78.67 $13.13 -$15.20 
Change in US Producer Surplus 
 41.07 -4.35 -$815.26 -$998.55 
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5.5.3. Risk Aversion Analysis 
The risk aversion analysis was done since examining the mean levels of economic losses 
with no credence given to their embodied risk is an assumption that all decision makers 
are risk neutral—meaning they are indifferent to the chance of extreme outcomes and 
only care about the expected (or average) outcome. Also, the simple statistical measures 
of risk lead to inconclusive results.  
Results in this section will be presented by control strategy but will also be broken into 
two parts. The first part will be an examination of the CDFs for first or second degree 
stochastic dominance, and the second part will use SERF analysis to find the BRACs at 
which preference between alternative levels of control strategies switches. The lower 
bound risk aversion coefficient was set as risk neutral individuals (LRAC=0) and the 
upper bound was set using the standard deviation of the distribution of losses. The upper 
bound was approximately 1 for total US losses (where standard deviation ranged 
between 9 and 10) for each of the control strategies considered, so this was used for the 
upper risk aversion coefficient in the BRAC analysis in all three control strategies.  
5.5.3.1.  Early versus Late Detection 
In the analysis of standard deviation and coefficient of variation, the results for whether 
early detection is a risk reducing strategy are mixed. This section will apply more 
advanced analysis to determine whether early detection is a preferred strategy from a 
risk reduction standpoint. As shown in Figure 43, neither first nor second order 
stochastic dominance can be used to rank early and late detection strategies because the 
CDFs cross multiple times for every infection point; however, this is difficult to tell give 
the lines are sometimes too close to tell whether they are touching or not. So, the BRAC 
analysis is used to determine the RAC levels at which preferences switch back and forth 
between the two strategies.  
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Figure 43. CDFs for Early vs. Late Detection 
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Given the sensitivty of BRAC analysis to outlyers, a single iteration that resulted in an 
outlyer in every case was removed, resulting in a distribution based on 99 points. 
Examining all RACs lying between zero and 1, the preference switch point will depend 
on the infection point. Recall that early detection does not in general result in lower 
expected losses, but does appear to have the potential to reduce risk. The BRAC analysis 
shows that, in general, risk averse agents do not gain enough from early detection to 
more than offset the larger expected losses except in when infections begin in backyard 
operations. Backyard operations were found to have the potential for very large 
outbreaks in some iterations. This corresponds to the examination of the summary 
statistics shown earlier.The switch occurs at a smaller level of risk aversion for small 
feedlot incursions as opposed to large grazing incursions. To make these results more 
intuitive, the BRAC points can be translated into confidence intervals using the formula 
presented earlier. Results are as shown in Figure 44.  
The results shown for the Texas High Plains as they relate to detection are somewhat 
anomalous. It may be that the inclusion of greater trade impacts or a larger sample size 
would yield results more in line with the intuitive conclusion that, since fewer animals 
are slaughtered under early detection, it should be more preferable. Further examination 
of this issue would be an area of future research in the study of FMD in the Texas High 
Plains.  
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Figure 44. BRAC Points for Early vs. Late Detection 
 
5.5.3.2.  Rapid versus Regular Availability of Vaccine 
In the analysis of standard deviation and coefficient of variation, indicators pointed to a 
potential reduction of risk from rapid availability of vaccine; however, regular 
availability was preferred for risk neutral decision makers. Examining the CDFs for each 
of the four infection points under alternative vaccine availability presented in Figure 45, 
first and second stochastic dominance cannot be applied except potentially in the case of 
large grazing infection points.  
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Figure 45. CDFs for Rapid vs. Regular Vaccine Availability 
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As risk aversion increases, a switch to preference for rapid vaccine availability occurs 
for all infection points. Large feedlot and backyard infection point cases have the earliest 
switch at a RAC level at 0.07 and 0.06 respectively. Large grazing infection point cases 
have the latest switch at a little less than a RAC level of 0.883. Overall infection points, 
there is still a preference for rapid vaccine availability as risk aversion rises. To make the 
results more intuitive, Figure 46 illustrates the confidence intervals at which the 
preference for vaccine availability switches. These results indicate that rapid vaccine 
availability decreases the risk of extreme outcomes compared to regular vaccine 
availability. If the goal of rapid vaccine use is to reduce the overall impact of the disease, 
even at a higher average cost, then it appears to be attainable in the High Plains 
simulations.   
 
 
Figure 46. BRAC Points for Rapid vs. Regular Vaccine Availability 
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5.5.3.3.  Enhanced versus Regular Surveillance 
Enhanced surveillance had mixed results as a risk reducing control policy. Examining 
the CDFs for alternative surveillance in Figure 47, the CDFs much to close together to 
really tell using this method of one strategy dominates the other.  
For a large feedlot infection point, enhanced is always preferred to regular. This 
corresponds to the evidence provided in the risk summary statistic analysis and expected 
national loss analysis. For a large beef grazing operation infection point regular 
surveillance is always preferred to enhanced surveillance. Again this corresponds to 
previously presented evidence. Figure 48 illustrates the confidence intervals 
corresponding to BRAC points for enhanced versus regular surveillance.  These results 
may not be unreasonable intuitively. Large feedlot incursions may mean fewer herds are 
under surveillance, making the additional expense worthwhile. Large grazing operations 
are more scattered and may have fewer numbers per herd, making additional 
surveillance less effective but more costly comparatively. In a small feedlot or backyard 
infection point, regular is preferred for risk neutral and slightly risk averse individuals. 
As risk aversion rises the benefits of enhanced surveillance as a risk reducing control 
strategy cause a switch in preferences to occur for these infection points. However, 
looking across all infection points, regular surveillance is preferred. This may indicate 
that enhanced surveillance is not an overall risk reducing strategy.  
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Figure 47. CDFs for Enhanced vs. Regular Surveillance 
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Figure 48. BRAC Points for Alternative Surveillance 
 
5.6. Summary and Conclusions 
It can be concluded that the region studied is highly vulnerable to an animal disease 
outbreak but there are control options available that will reduce the losses associated 
with an outbreak and increase sectoral resiliency. Results suggest that some strategies 
may become preferable from the standpoint of reducing risk and thereby increasing 
resiliency. Furthermore, these may not be the same strategies that minimize the expected 
national loss from the disease outbreak.  
Early detection had the greatest impact epidemiologically, and still has merit as a 
strategy in increasing resiliency, which provides justification for examining systems and 
producer education promoting early detection. In large grazing and small feedlot 
infection point herds, as well as outbreaks starting in backyard operations the risk 
reducing benefits of early detection more than outweigh the higher expected national 
surplus losses. However, these results are anomolous and may be the result of small 
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sample size or not properly including trade. Thus, early detection may be a preferable 
strategy from a livestock industry resiliency standpoint, but results are inconclusive.  
Vaccine availability results suggested that, in general, improved vaccine availability 
during an incursion was not a cost effective mitigation option when seeking to minimize 
the average loss. Small feedlot, large beef and backyard operation index herds have a 
reduction in standard deviation from rapid vaccine availability. However, as risk 
aversion rises across all incursion points a switch in preference to rapid vaccine 
availability occurs despite the higher expected national surplus losses. Thus, having 
vaccine available faster does appear to be a resiliency increasing control strategy. 
Enhanced surveillance proved to reduce national welfare losses for outbreaks starting in 
large feedlots and backyard operations, but it only reduces standard deviation of national 
welfare losses in beef grazing operation index herds. Both large and small feedlots 
incursions lead to a preference for enhanced surveillance as risk aversion rises as well as 
backyard infection points, but for large beef infection point herds there is a preference 
for regular surveillance as risk aversion rises. This may indicate a strategy to reduce risk 
in areas with large feedlots. However, mixed results do not lead to a clear conclusion as 
to whether enhanced surveillance is a risk reducing strategy for the High Plains.  
This essay provides a jumping off point for a more detailed examination of the role of 
risk attitude in determining control strategy choice. Such analysis provides justification 
for examining other control strategies and portfolios of control strategies. Further 
research could include a more complete and detailed analysis for different detection 
levels, targeted and ring vaccination and in different types of regions from the 
concentrated beef feeding region in the High Plains. Agricultural policy design for FMD 
prevention and mitigation can utilize the analysis we currently have in making policy 
decisions for anticipation, response and recovery from a disease outbreak in 
concentrated feeding regions. 
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This work is not without limitations. First, the treatment of trade in the economic loss 
examination was not thorough. Rather the numbers presented here are local losses not 
including the impacts of international trade restrictions. Second, simply examining 
outbreak impacts on a national level may not be the proper criterion on which policy 
would be based. Rather, it may be the minimizing risk in the regional producer loss, for 
example,  on which policy decisions are based. Finally, the number of control strategies 
considered could be expanded to look at a more diversified response options portfolio 
and the sample size exposes results to sample size bias issues discussed in the 
methodology section.  
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6. ESSAY 5: MARKET RESPONSE- THE ROLE OF INFORMATION 
UNCERTAINTY IN EXACERBATING FUTURES MARKET RESPONSE TO 
UNCONFIRMED ANIMAL DISEASE 
6.1. Introduction 
Foreign animal diseases such as foot-and-mouth disease (FMD) pose a significant threat 
to the US economy. Current policy in the event of an FMD outbreak involves high levels 
of slaughter reducing aggregate meat and livestock supply, international export market 
closures and trade barriers, and other significant sources of local and national revenue 
losses15. The last two sources of damages to the economy stretch beyond and often 
exceed the direct disease mitigation costs and value of animals lost. For example, lost 
revenue from tourism was the largest loss category in the 2001 UK FMD outbreak (UK 
National Accounting Office, 2002).  
There is a considerable amount of uncertainty related to the threat of FMD since a 
confirmed incident has not occurred in the US since 1929. Uncertainty exists in the 
probability of disease occurrence, how fast it will spread, how quickly it will be 
contained and the magnitude of the impacts on demand and supply as well as the indirect 
costs relating to the disease outbreak. Given this uncertainty, the magnitude of damage 
to the economy is mostly unknown but is expected to be large. All of this uncertainty 
should be captured in the reaction of the livestock futures market that functions as a 
medium for setting price expectations at a given time in the future given information 
currently available (Leuthold, 1974).  
                                                 
15 It is possible that a there could be a shift in domestic demand for meat upon 
confirmation of an FMD outbreak, but a study from the 2001 UK event has shown the 
demand reaction to be small in magnitude and short in duration (Chopra and Bessler) 
and work done on meat recalls have shown that medium sized beef and pork recalls only 
have a marginally negative impact on futures prices where results are not robust across 
recall size and severity (Lusk and Schroeder). 
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Livestock futures markets are shown to react quickly to confirmations of Bovine 
Spongiform Encephalopathy (BSE) discoveries in the US (Tse and Hackerd; Jin, Power 
and Elbakidze) and also to have small negative reactions to meat safety recalls (Lusk and 
Schroeder). These are both situations in which real events occurring at the time were 
expected to influence livestock and meat demand in the future. However, the level of 
response that is expected from a rumor of animal disease that is unconfirmed has not 
been addressed in the literature. If the information provided to traders indicates strongly 
that an outbreak is likely, they may respond to that information in the same way they 
would an animal disease or meat safety information that is confirmed.  
The purpose of this study is to explore the implied volatility, persistency and rationality 
of futures market reactions to animal disease information uncertainty. This is achieved 
using data reflective of a widely publicized rumor of FMD based on a test performed at a 
Kansas sale barn in March 2002. This rumor turned out be false 48 hours later. It led to 
plummeting market prices of cattle futures and a loss in market value estimated at $50 
million (Cupp et al.). Furthermore, in an attempt to understand the nature of the price 
reaction to the shock, an examination of whether the market exhibits herding behavior 
and/or momentum trading is done. These behaviors could cause the reaction to be 
greater in magnitude or more persistent than would otherwise be expected.  Examining 
the livestock futures contracts' movement in reaction to a disease rumor also provides 
insight into the dynamics of how traders will respond to information related to animal 
disease in the future.  
The remainder of this essay is organized as follows. First, an overview of the relevant 
literature on information uncertainty in the futures market, herding and momentum 
trading as well as its application to the current problem is presented followed by an 
overview of the FMD rumor in question. Next, futures price data will be used to examine 
the volatility, persistency and rationality of response to the rumor. Finally, general 
summary and conclusions are discussed as well as ways this study will be expanded in 
the future.  
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6.2. Literature Review: Information Uncertainty, Herding and Momentum Trading 
Information uncertainty plays an important role in explaining futures market price and 
volume movements. Unscheduled announcements of news impacting markets lead to an 
increase in traders' uncertainty about future prices (Ederington and Lee). This in turn 
causes an increase in the implied volatility of the futures prices. However, the traders' 
reaction to news may not be irrational. It is a specific type of information uncertainty 
that leads to over or under-reaction by traders.   
Herding behavior has been given several definitions that primarily differ in whether 
agents involved move simultaneously or sequentially. Most authors have defined herding 
as the simultaneous trend of agents to move into and out of a market/asset rather than 
follow their own beliefs and information (Lakonishok, Shleifer and Vishny; Avery and 
Zemsky; Hwang and Salmon; Tse and Hackard; Baur; Walter and Weber).  Others have 
pointed out that the trades occur sequentially since traders cannot buy and sell at the 
exact same time; someone must move first. These authors define herding as agents 
following each other into and out of a market/asset over some period of time rather than 
following their own beliefs and information (Nofsinger and Sias; Sias; Agudo, Santo, 
and Vicente; Lin and Swanson). This study applies the latter definition of herding.  
Avery and Zemsky explore the role of information in herding behavior. There are three 
types of information uncertainty that impact the level and duration of a shock in the 
futures market: value uncertainty about how the asset value will change, event 
uncertainty about the existence of event, and composition uncertainty on accuracy of 
information received. In the case of the FMD rumor, the value uncertainty is the lack of 
nearby precedent. Since the last FMD case in the US dates back to 1929, there is no 
recent example to develop an expectation of the magnitude of futures market reaction in 
the US; although, the reaction can reasonably be expected to be negative. Event 
uncertainty pertains to whether the test would be negative for at least some parties 
involved. The composition uncertainty may exist due to media speculations and rumors 
about the event. If both the value and composition uncertainties exist, then herding 
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behavior may occur; however, when the composition uncertainty exists the herding 
behavior may lead to significant short term price distortions. This is because traders will 
have a "mistaken but rational belief that most traders possess very accurate information" 
(Avery and Zemsky).    
Herding behavior has a rich theoretical and empirical literature. While the former has 
provided considerable plausibility for the existence of herding, the evidence of herding is 
mixed. The theoretical literature on herding applicable to this problem focuses on a 
situation where traders' information is positively, cross-sectionally correlated (Froot, 
Scharfstein and Stein; Hirshleifer, Surahmanyam and Titman) and herding behavior is 
irrational (Lakonishok et al.; Walter and Weber). This will occur in the context of "event 
related" herding where traders tend to move together in order to offset extreme volatility 
or uncertainty about the market in the future based on some event (Lin and Swanson).   
Empirical work on herding has focused on specific stocks/securities/funds with mixed 
results. Herding behavior is empirically detected among foreign investors moving into 
and out of the U.S. markets (Lin and Swanson), investors in both Chinese A shares and 
Chinese B shares, especially among Chinese domestic investors (Tan et al.), investors in 
German mutual funds (Walter and Weber), Spanish equity funds (Agudo, Santo and 
Vicente, 2008) and Taiwan securities (Chen, Wang and Lin). Chang, Cheng and 
Khorana, who find herding in Taiwan and South Korea as well as a small amount in 
Japan, conclude that herding would be more likely in emerging markets as no evidence 
of herding was found in the US or Hong Kong equity markets. Experience also appears 
to factor into the tendency to herd, where more experienced fund managers have a lower 
tendency to herd (Menkhoff, Schmidt and Brozynski). Alternatively, Wermers finds 
little evidence of herding in mutual fund managers and Gleason. Mathur and Peterson 
find no evidence of herding among exchange traded funds. Herding during large scale 
extreme events like the Asian financial crisis has received no support from the literature 
(Baur).  
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This study will specifically define herding as the tendency of futures traders to buy (sell) 
futures contracts over some period of time based on the actions of other traders rather 
than on any private information about the disease shock. This has several implications, 
particularly that some traders will obtain information before others giving them an 
advantage. Several studies have concluded that it is obtaining information early, rather 
than the accuracy of that information, that yields higher returns for a trader (Froot, 
Scharfstein and Stein; Hirshleifer, Surahmanyam and Titman; Avery and Zemsky). 
Huberman and Regev find evidence of herding when positive information became 
widely available, even though that information was previously available through 
scholarly publications. They posit that traders acted on noise (e.g. the prevalent 
information among traders at the time like a rumor of animal disease) trader behavior 
rather than expert opinion information made available five months earlier.   
One would expect, once the information uncertainty is cleared up (meaning a negative 
test is reported) that mispricing should stop and prices should recover. In fact Tse and 
Hackard note that “once the market maker learns about event uncertainty and allows 
prices to adjust, herding disappears”. Hong and Stein note another market behavior 
called momentum trading that could help explain any continued drop after the news of 
the negative test was publicized.   
Following the assumptions of Hong and Stein, consider two types of traders: 
"newswatchers" that do not condition on current or past information in making their 
forecasts and "momentum traders" who rely on information from previous trades to set 
price forecasts. Both types of traders are boundedly rational--meaning they cannot 
observe all information perfectly and do not have unlimited computational capacity--and 
both make forecasts based on signals they privately observe on fundamentals. The 
difference is in the use of information and conditioning on past trades. Momentum 
trading means investors follow their own lagged trades (Sias). Hong and Stein conclude 
that newswatchers may under-react to new information, but will never overreact if they 
alone are in the market. However, when momentum traders enter the market they will try 
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to profit from newswatchers' under-reaction resulting in an eventual overreaction as 
more momentum traders try to take advantage of the opportunity. As a result, early 
momentum traders can make money but they impose a negative externality on later 
momentum traders who lose money.  
Momentum trading may occur simultaneously with herding behavior. For the purposes 
of this paper, this indicates a tendency of futures traders to buy (sell) futures contracts 
over some period of time based on the actions of other traders and lagged returns rather 
than on any private information about the disease shock. Although the Hong and Stein 
model is primarily theoretical, Sias and Tse and Hackard offer empirical applications of 
momentum trading in conjunction with herding analysis. Both find evidence of 
momentum trading and herding. Sias notes however that even when investors are 
momentum traders this does not necessarily explain a great deal of herding behavior. 
The work on futures markets' reaction to an incident of animal disease is sparse in the 
literature. U.S. live cattle futures prices were found to be negatively affected by BSE 
cases in the U.K. (Paiva) and by the 2003 U.S. BSE case (Schlenker and Villas-Boas; Jin 
et al.). However, all these studies are based on a confirmed case of animal disease. No 
studies have been done to determine whether strong rumors of animal disease will affect 
livestock futures markets and whether such rumors will trigger herding and momentum 
trading. Furthermore, no studies have been done specifically for FMD, which has certain 
characteristics quite different from BSE (e.g. FMD cannot be transmitted to humans). 
Huberman and Regev suggest that it is possible that traders in the livestock futures pits 
could trade based on rumor noise rather than waiting for an official announcement, 
which makes investigation on the reaction of futures markets to rumors of animal disease 
relevant and important. This study focuses in particular on one case of an FMD test in 
Holton, Kansas.   
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6.2.1. Rumor of FMD 
In 2004, there were 689 tests for vesicular diseases (which includes FMD) done in the 
US (USDA-APHIS, 2005). The reason so many tests are performed is that the physical 
manifestations of disease symptoms are very similar to other, more benign mouth 
problems caused by burrs and mold in feed. However, if news media reports a particular 
test widely it can be mistaken as a sign that FMD has been found in the country.   
There have been three US cases when tests were widely publicized and a reaction 
allegedly occurred in the livestock futures, including: a March 28, 2001 test group of six 
hogs at a slaughter facility in North Carolina;  a March 16, 2001 test group of cattle at a 
sale yard in Idaho; and a March 12, 2002 test group of nine cattle at a sale barn in 
Kansas.  However, for the first two cases the impacts of the test-related publicity on 
livestock futures were confounded by extraneous but relevant events. In particular, the 
United Kingdom FMD outbreak started on February 20, 2001 and lasted until September 
30, 2001. The Netherlands FMD outbreak occurred from March 21 to April 22, 2001. 
Around the same time there were outbreaks in France and Ireland as well. Even though 
market news reports claim livestock futures markets reacted to the tests in North 
Carolina ( DeCola; Cote and Thacker) and Idaho (Hedberg; Cote and Thacker), it may 
be very difficult to determine the true scope and length of the reaction given the other 
perturbations to the market from foreign events. This study focuses on the March, 2002 
Kansas case.  
On March 12, 2002 a veterinarian noticed and reported possible signs of FMD in a sale 
barn at Holton, Kansas. Upon further monitoring of the animals, the veterinarian felt 
confident this was likely not to be an FMD outbreak as evidenced by horses on the 
premise having similar symptoms (Cattle Buyers Weekly, 2002a). Tests for FMD on 
nine cattle were immediately carried out on the same day, while the other 16 cattle still 
housed at the sale barn were quarantined starting between 6:30 and 7:00 p.m. on March 
12th pending the results (Cattle Buyers Weekly, 2002a). Since the tests and quarantine 
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occurred after trading hours in Chicago it can be inferred that the rumor would not have 
affected trade on March 12th.  
Exactly how and when on March 13th the rumor reached traders is uncertain, based 
largely on speculation in the newspapers. Agweek reports that by the morning of March 
13th "an Iowa radio station was reporting the possibility of a foot-and-mouth outbreak in 
Kansas. Chicago traders heard the rumors and cattle markets nose-dived" (Hutchinson 
News). Another source speculates that the rumor was passed through word of mouth 
from a local cattle broker attending the sale to a broker working with traders in Chicago, 
and from there the trading floor (Corn). The general agreement of all news sources 
though is that some traders heard the rumor after trading hours on the 12th, but largely 
the  rumor was circulated in the live cattle pits early in the trading day on March 13th. 
Such publicity allegedly was the cause when live cattle April futures limited down 
dropping 1.12 cents to 74.50 cents a pound (Cote and Thacker) as traders swiftly 
responded to the information. The markets then recovered slightly by the end of the 
trading day. A Wall Street Journal article published on March 14 quoted floor trader Jim 
Rose with R.J. O'Brien and Associates as saying, "If the preliminary results are negative, 
we should have a sharp rally" (Cote and Thacker).  
Negative results for the tests were reported by the evening of March 13th. However, 
instead of “a sharp rally”, prices dropped once again on Thursday morning, March 14. 
Traders continued to sell resulting in live cattle futures falling the limit on the 14th, 
dropping 1.3 cents to a two month low of $73.20 cents per pound (Cote). By the end of 
the day, prices were trending slowly back up in response to the negative test result.  
It is possible that a trader or small group of traders manipulated the market to make a 
greater profit from the trade. Since prices in cattle futures are expected to plunge should 
a FMD outbreak occur, traders that with a short position could potentially have made 
quite a bit of money out of the rumor. The National Cattlemen's Beef Association 
(Bloomberg News) and the Kansas State Attorney General (Milburn) demanded an 
investigation on market manipulation. One was performed but failed to provide solid 
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evidence of manipulation (Cattle Buyers Weekly, 2002b). Futures Trading Commission 
chairman James Newsom made a public statement concerning the investigation on the 
events around March 13th, "We have found no deliberate activity of anyone to try and 
manipulate those markets. We didn't see any aggregated net positions that were of a big 
surprise to us" (Bloomberg News). Thus we are left with the idea that traders did not 
necessarily manipulate the situation knowingly, and so they must have felt their 
movement in the market was appropriate given the information available to them.  
6.3. Data  
To examine the market events occurring in association with the rumor, four meat 
commodities were included in the analysis: live cattle, feeder cattle, lean hogs and pork 
bellies. Live cattle are animals that have reached their mature slaughter weight and are 
about to enter the food chain. Feeder cattle are lighter weight cattle that will likely enter 
the feedlots, but are not yet ready to slaughter. It is expected that live cattle futures 
prices will be more sensitive to information as consumers and foreign markets would 
likely perceive them as being more threatening to the safety of the meat product. Since 
FMD is contagious to swine, two swine/pork futures contracts are also examined.  Lean 
hogs are swine that have reached their mature slaughter weight and are about to enter the 
food chain. Pork bellies are the only post-slaughter livestock futures contract considered 
here.  
Futures intra-day transaction data was obtained from the Chicago Mercantile Exchange 
(CME) on live cattle, feeder cattle, lean hogs and pork bellies for all futures contracts 
trading between February 28, 2002 and March 27, 2002. Observations are on the futures 
price at a given day and time for every contract traded in that month. In order to get a 
broader viewpoint on the incident, daily data was also collected from Datastream© 
through the Texas A&M Library Services. Daily data included settlement price, daily 
open, daily close, daily high and low as well as volume traded on futures contracts of the 
four livestock commodities for the period of January 1st, 1988 to December 31st, 20022. 
The daily dataset is spliced such that the information listed is for the nearest futures 
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contract; the transition from one futures contract to the next is made upon the current 
nearest contract reaching maturity.   
There are a few limitations that are data related preventing the most thorough analysis of 
this problem possible. First, intra-day volume data could not be obtained. This prevents 
an econometric measure of momentum trading from being established. Second, analysis 
done on the more extensive daily dataset does not contain the level of detail needed to 
determine whether herding and momentum trading exist normally in the market. This 
would require a more extensive intra-day trading dataset.  
6.4. Results 
This section is split into two parts -- a clinical analysis in the style of Tse and Hackard 
and an econometric expansion to more fully quantify the impacts of the rumor.  
6.4.1. Clinical Analysis 
Table 51 presents summary statistics for the daily data series divided into three time 
periods: pre-event from 1 October, 2001 to 27 February, 2002; event-window from 28 
February to 28 March, 2002; and post-event from 29 March to 31 December, 2002. 16 
                                                 
16 Although I have daily futures prices dated back to January 1st, 1988, I present the 
summary statistics by pre- and post-event periods as well as event window periods 
starting from October 1st, 2001 and ending on December 31, 2002. The reasons are the 
UK FMD outbreak lasted until September 30, 2001 (NAO, 2002) and Canada confirmed 
its first endemic BSE case on May 20, 2003. However, the preceding media speculation 
of the infected cow’s diagnosis started in January (Tse and Hackard 2006; Highplain 
Midwest Agriculture Journal). Thus, we truncate the daily data at both ends. 
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Table 51. Summary Statistics for Daily Data on the Nearest Futures Contract for Feeder 
Cattle, Live Cattle, Pork Bellies and Lean Hogs 
 Pre-event periods (N=108) Event-window periods (N=20) Post-even periods (N=199) 
 (10/1/2001-2/28/2002) (2/28/2002-3/27/2002) (3/28/2002-12/31/2002) 
 Mean std. Min. Max. Mean Std. Min. Max. Mean Std. Min. Max. 
 Feeder cattle 
Settlement  
price 84.18 1.90 78.15 88.08 80.46 1.47 78.33 82.48 79.05 3.23 71.23 85.45 
High price 84.54 1.90 78.95 88.50 81.06 1.36 78.73 82.88 79.47 3.12 72.73 85.60 
Low price 83.72 1.92 78.15 87.85 80.27 1.50 78.10 82.40 78.61 3.30 69.85 85.15 
Volume 2549 999 989 5803 3014 1102 750 5776 2206 969 78 6560 
 Live cattle 
Settlement  
price 69.85 3.42 61.75 76.38 73.01 2.25 69.70 75.88 68.15 5.38 59.40 79.63 
High price 70.18 3.37 62.30 76.53 73.70 2.13 70.08 76.08 68.49 5.25 60.35 79.90 
Low  69.35 3.53 61.75 75.95 72.75 2.24 69.55 75.68 67.68 5.38 59.33 79.15 
Volume 16483 5028 7870 32368 18717 7544 3620 33962 14911 4649 433 32952 
 Pork bellies 
Settlement 
 price 74.75 3.27 66.08 81.50 79.44 2.53 76.28 83.50 70.63 9.07 51.83 89.03 
High price 75.59 3.14 67.05 82.95 80.50 2.48 77.00 84.20 71.46 8.86 54.40 89.35 
Low price 73.70 3.23 64.93 80.60 78.77 2.38 75.75 82.40 69.40 8.96 51.83 88.50 
volume 714 242 324 1595 705 262 263 1281 548 264 31 1200 
 Lean hogs 
Settlement  
price 54.18 3.90 47.58 62.73 56.02 2.79 52.55 60.35 45.95 6.84 30.05 60.40 
High price 54.62 3.86 47.85 62.80 56.64 2.67 52.88 60.43 46.60 6.85 30.20 61.10 
Low price 53.59 3.97 46.70 61.85 55.73 2.78 52.30 59.70 45.34 6.88 29.40 60.10 
volume 7059 2407 2390 16290 8184 2900 849 11611 7761 2541 204 17121 
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The results show that the average settlement price was higher and the average daily 
trading volume was greater in the event periods than in the pre- and post-event periods 
for all four commodities except that feeder cattle contracts on average had a higher price 
in the pre-event periods compared with other periods. However, the movement of daily 
settlement prices may cover the true intra-day price movement if the market has a large 
reaction but recovers by the end of the trading day. Furthermore, livestock cycles, 
seasonality, and price trends may play roles in the price comparison between three 
periods. To better understand the price movement possibly related to the FMD rumor, 
we use both daily and minute data on futures contracts for the event window and expand 
the clinic analysis in finer details.   
Figure 49 and Figure 50 plots movement of prices, rate of returns, and volume of futures 
contracts on feeder cattle, live cattle, pork bellies, and lean hogs during the event-
window period (February 28 to March 27, 2002). The price volatility can be indicated by 
the daily high/ low price range given by the solid vertical lines and by the standard 
deviation of intra-day prices based on the minute data represented by dashed lines with 
triangles. The direction and level of price movements is indicated by the daily average 
prices based on the minute data and the rate of returns based on the daily settlement 
prices.  
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Figure 49. Price and Volume Movement of Feeder Cattle and Live Cattle Contracts 
During the Event Period (2/28 - 3/27/2002)17 
 
                                                 
17 For Figures 49-50, price information consists of daily high and low prices (vertical 
lines for each trade day); daily average price (asterisks); standard deviation of intra-day 
prices (triangles); daily rate of returns based on daily settlement prices (squares); and 
daily trading volumes (vertical bars). Vertical dotted lines represent events dates of 
March 12th where the rumor of FMD diseases started to spread and March 14th when the 
negative results went public. 
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Figure 50. Price and Volume Movement of Pork Bellies and Lean Hogs Contracts 
During the Event Period (2/28 - 3/27/2002) 
 
Lean hog futures contracts show the most volatility in prices, followed by pork bellies 
and live cattle, while feeder cattle contracts show the least. All four markets seem to 
move together during the period in which the rumor occurred; however, pork bellies 
seem to be less correlated than the other three commodities. In the feeder cattle and lean 
hog markets, returns fell post-rumor but recovered to previous levels by the end of the 
14th. Prices in these two markets continue to trend down after the rumor, although this 
could be reflective of the gradual decline in prices that typically occurs during mid to 
late March. The reaction in the live cattle market is more persistent, with returns not 
recovering to pre-rumor levels until the 18th of March. Pork bellies on the contrary see 
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increasing rates of returns during the 13th, but fell on the 14th and stayed low until the 
19th. This may reflect a lag in the reaction in the pork bellies market, which could be 
explained either as momentum trading, a spillover effect, or non-event related volatility. 
The comparison on daily trading volumes suggests that the rumor as well as the negative 
test result trigger greater transactions in all types of futures contracts, especially in the 
cattle futures markets.  
In all four markets a small spike in volume can be seen on March 13th and 14th. In 
addition, all of the live animal contracts also show a drop in rate of return and price on 
these two days. This corresponds with the ex post reports that the rumor started 
circulating early in the trading day on the 13th. These patterns indicate the presence of 
herding behavior given the information uncertainty of the rumor and in particular the 
presence of composition uncertainty (Avery and Zemsky). In feeder cattle and lean hog 
futures there is an indication that rates of return had started to fall prior to the rumor, 
which may be reflective of reports that feeder placements could be a potential 
explanation for the drop. An econometric analysis is conducted below to formally detect 
herding behavior. Momentum trading does not imply herding (Sias) but it may aggravate 
the effects of herding, so momentum trading is examined separately. 
Momentum trading is defined as the tendency of investors to use information from the 
last period to make trades in this period. In the context of this study, momentum trading 
would be identified where the return in period t depends on the information received in 
the previous period (t - 1) rather than the current one. No measures of momentum 
trading given in the literature can be used here since they depend on observing the 
number of traders in the market; rather, momentum trading is examined here through 
clinical analysis of daily data.  
The negative test results were returned on the evening of March 13th; recovery would be 
expected to start on March 14th. However from Figure 49, the only market to show 
recovery in the rates of return was the feeder cattle market.  Live cattle and lean hog 
futures' rate of return fell lower for those days. A continued drop in returns would reflect 
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the presence of momentum traders acting on the previous days' information and return 
trends rather than seeking the most current information; the negative test result 
announcement. Some live cattle and lean hog traders had not assimilated the new 
information, and were instead trying to take advantage of the previous days' trend. The 
traders who continue to drive the negative trend would then be momentum traders. Pork 
belly futures returns fell on the 14th as well, but they were not continuing a price decline 
rather starting a price decline. This may be more indicative of a spillover effect or 
natural volatility than momentum trading.  
The clinical analysis gives motivation to further quantify the presence of market 
volatility and some persistency in response to the rumor as well as to formally explore 
herding behavior triggered by the rumor using econometric analyses.  Such econometric 
analysis to a great extent will control for livestock cycles, seasonality, and price time 
trends allowing a better understanding of the price movements possibly related to the 
FMD rumor.   
6.4.2. Econometric Analyses  
The econometric analyses are split into two sections. The first explores the volatility and 
persistency of the reaction to the rumor using a vector error correction model (VECM). 
The second explores the evidence of herding behavior by adapting a herding measure 
used in prior studies to livestock futures trading. 
6.4.2.1.  Analysis of Persistency and Volatility of the Impacts using a VECM 
Financial time series data often exhibits non-stationarity. Commonly used are the 
(Augmented) Dickey-Fuller (DF) tests and Philips-Perron (PP) test, which examines the 
null hypothesis of a unit root against the alternative of a constant deterministic trend. An 
alternative is the Zviot and Andrews (ZA) unit root test, which allows for one possible 
structural shift in mean, trend, or both (Zivot and Andrews). If data is stationary in 
differences a VAR can be used to model the prices series. However, a VECM is more 
appropriate when the data also exhibits cointegration. The number of price series is 
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denoted by n and the time period by t. Based on the Johansen’s cointegrated vector 
autoregression (VAR) model with k lags (Johansen), the data generating process of Yt 
that is a n-by-1 vector of price series, can be modeled as a VECM with k-1 lags: 
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where ΔYt is a n-by-1 vector of futures commodity price differences, Yt-i is the vector of 
lagged own futures commodity prices, Π is the n-by-n conintegration rank matrix, Γ is a 
n-by-n matrix of parameters on the lagged price differences, Dl is a set of seasonal 
dummy variables, and e is a n-by-1 vector of pricing innovations (Lütkepohl and  
Kträtzig).  The seasonal dummy variable accounts for the yearly production cycle 
influence on futures prices.   
The parameter matrix Π can be further decomposed such that Π=αβ' where betas contain 
the cointegrating equation and alphas the speed of adjustment (Lütkepohl and  Kträtzig). 
So, Π Yt-1 = (αβ')Yt-1 =  α(β'Yt-1) where β'Yt-1 is an r x 1 vector of error correction terms 
and α's coefficients would determine the size of the effects of the r error correction terms 
in the four equations of the VECM (Magee). In other words, α show the short run 
response in β given a shock in the long run where there are r long run relationships in the 
series. The constant is captured in β but dummy variables have been moved outside of β.  
The VECM is estimated using generalized least squares.  
There are at least two ways to determine the optimal lag length (k) and the rank of the 
cointegration vector (r). The conventional approach is to use system-based likelihood 
ratio (LR) tests to sequentially determine them in two steps.  First, using information 
matrices to determine the lag length; and then use trace tests to determine the rank of 
cointegration vectors (Johansen). However, since the true model is rarely known this 
procedure may lead to model specification problems that ultimately involve trade-offs 
between model parsimony and fit (Wang and Bessler). Recently, "model selection" 
methods based on information criteria that simultaneously determine the optimal lag 
length and the cointergration rank have been proposed and implemented as an alternative 
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to the conventional two-step procedure (Phillips and McFarland; Aznar and Salvador; 
and Baltagi and Wang). The system based approach is popular due to its sound 
theoretical basis, computational simplicity, and superior performance relative to some 
other estimators (Brüggemann and Lütkepohl). However, there are at least three 
advantages of the model selection method. First, it jointly estimates the cointegration 
rank and the optimal lag length in a VAR (Phillips). Second, the model selection method 
relieves researchers from the arbitrary choice of an appropriate significance level in 
contrast with formal hypothesis testing used in system-based LR tests. Third, Chao and 
Phillips and Wang and Bessler provide simulation evidence to show the model selection 
methods based on information criterion give at least as good fit as system-based LR 
tests. We cross validate the results on the optimal lag length and the cointegration rank 
using both methods.  
As shown in Table 52, all three unit root tests (DF, PP and ZA tests) fail to reject the null 
hypothesis that the futures prices in levels contain a unit root at the 5% level of 
significance for feeder cattle, pork bellies and lean hogs. The same tests are then applied 
to the first order differences of each prices series, whereby the unit root hypothesis is 
reject at the 1% level of significance. Therefore, the evidence suggests that daily 
settlement prices of futures contracts of feeder cattle, pork bellies, and lean hogs contain 
a unit root (they are nonstationary) in levels but their first order differences are 
stationary. The only exception is live cattle, in which the level prices are stationary.  
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Table 52. Tests for Non-Stationary of Daily Settlement Prices of Futures Contracts18 
 Dicky Fuller test  Philip-Perron test Zivot Andrew test 
Level difference Level Difference level difference 
Feeder cattle -2.09 -59.49*** -2.07 -59.48*** -3.44 -24.78*** 
Live cattle -3.90*** -60.44*** -3.93*** -60.44*** -6.07*** -60.47*** 
Pork bellies -2.49 -58.62*** -2.59 -58.61*** -4.11 -25.10*** 
Lean hogs -3.00 -59.48*** -3.02** -59.46*** -3.91 -26.70*** 
 
 
Based on Table 53,  we conclude that the optimal lag length is one and cointegraton rank 
is two using the conventional two-step procedure. However, if the underlying VAR is of 
lag one, it suggests no lag in the corresponding VECM. The common practice is to 
impose a lag of two for the underlying VAR. Given the lag of two, the cointegration 
rank is two. Furthermore, the values of information criterion are fairly close between the 
lag length equals to 1, 2, 3, and 4. Based on the model section approach using Hannan 
and Quinn (HQ) information metric, the optimal lag length is one and the cointegration 
rank is three. However, those HQ information values are very close. Unfortunately, there 
is no consistence between these two approaches, but due to the advantages of the model 
selection approach, the final VECM is based on k = 2 and r = 3.  
                                                 
18 The asterisks, ** and ***, indicate 5% and 1% significance levels, respectively. The 
critical value is -2.86 at the 5% significance level and -3.43 at the 1% level for both 
Dickey Fuller tests and Pillip Perron tests; and -4.80 at the 5% significance level and -
5.43 at the 1% level for Zivot Andrews’ test allowing one structural break at the 
unknown date.  
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Table 53. Optimal Lag Length and Cointegration Rank 
Determine the optimal lag length of the underlying VAR (k) 
Lag length 
 
Schwarz 
information  
Criterion (SIC) 
Akaike 
information  
criterion (AIC) 
Hannan 
and Quinn 
(HQ)  
k = 0 15.80 15.80 15.80  
k = 1 -1.85 -1.88 -1.87  
k = 2 -1.83 -1.88 -1.86  
k = 3 -1.79 -1.87 -1.85  
k = 4 -1.77 -1.87 -1.84  
Determine the cointegration rank (r) using trace tests 
 r = 0 r = 1 r = 2 r = 3 
Trace stat. 
5% critical value 
101.96 
(61.21) 
52.06 
(40.49) 
20.75 
(23.46) 
5.89 
(6.40) 
Simultaneously determine the optimal lag length (k) and the conintegration rank 
(r) using model selection methods based on HQ information criteria19 
 r = 1 r = 2 r = 3  
k = 1 9.5061 9.5033 9.5027  
k = 2 9.5143 9.5115 9.5109  
k = 3 9.5297 9.5273 9.5266  
k = 4 9.5432 9.5409 9.5402  
 
After fitting an appropriate VECM, examination of deviations of the forecasted prices 
from the actual prices is performed. These deviations quantify the size and persistency of 
the FMD rumor impact on the futures markets. Figure 51 plots the actual (line with 
squares) and forecasted (line with asterisks) prices of futures contracts during the event-
window period.  
                                                 
19 A cointegration rank of r = 4 could also have been tested for the completeness using 
the HQ information criteria. However, since a rank of r = 3 is found this has not been 
done in this essay.  
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Figure 51. The Impacts of the FMD Rumor on Futures Prices of Feeder Cattle, Live 
Cattle, Pork Bellies and Lean Hogs20 
 
The difference between these two lines reflects the impact of the FMD rumor. Figure 51 
shows that feeder cattle, lean hogs and particularly live cattle actual futures prices move 
significantly outside of the 90% confidence interval of forecasted prices.  The movement 
out of the confidence interval on the 13th in the two cattle futures shows a quick 
response to the rumor in those commodities. Lean hogs did not track out of the 
confidence interval until the 15th. This could represent a lagged response to the rumor, 
potentially a spillover effect from the cattle futures markets 3. Pork bellies stay within 
                                                 
20 The shaded area represents the confidence interval of the forecasted settlement prices 
of futures contracts at the 10% significance level. The dashed lines with stars and 
squares indicate the forecasted and actual settlement prices.  
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the 90% confidence interval. This market has historically more price volatility than the 
other three.  
Figure 51 also illustrates the persistence of the shock as evidenced by prices continuing 
to remain below the 90% confidence interval. Actual prices do come close to moving 
back into the interval for feeder cattle and lean hogs but live cattle have persistently low 
prices until the end of March. Overall, the results suggest that the FMD rumor 
statistically reduced the futures price of feeder cattle, live cattle, and lean hogs on March 
13. The negative trend persisted on March 14th even though the negative test results 
came out. The incident may well have been a trigger for the downward price cycle 
earlier in the year than expected. However, the incident was not found to have a 
significant impact on prices of pork bellies contracts.  
6.4.2.2.  Analysis on Herding Behavior Resulting from the Rumor  
Econometric measures for herding have attempted to capture the patterns in the cross 
section of traders over time in order to examine whether they follow each other into 
trades (Sias). Several authors have proposed measures for quantifying herding behavior 
(Lakonishok, Shleifer and Vishny; Christie and Huang; Sias). The Lakonishok, Shleifer 
and Visney and Sias herding measures were designed to track how many investors 
bought or sold in a particular security.  
Ideally, we need to know how many traders were buying (selling) during the event 
window to investigate the possibility of herding and momentum trading. Such data is 
unavailable. However, the clinical analysis suggests that the daily trading volume did 
increase during the event window. Given the increased volume, a negative association 
between the dispersion of returns and the position in the distribution of extreme returns 
is used to infer herding behavior. Recall that herding implies reduced levels of return 
dispersions as traders move together in a particular direction during times of market 
stress. By looking at the tails of the distribution--reflecting the focus on periods of 
market stress--this measure of herding focuses on whether traders exhibit rational 
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behavior (higher dispersions) or herding behavior (lower dispersion). This follows the 
methodology for measuring herding proposed by Christie and Huang, which is 
concerned with whether or not individual returns can indicate herding during periods of 
market stress. Dispersion in this case is the average difference in the returns at a 
particular moment to the mean returns in the livestock futures market:  
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where rt is the observed return based on at the minute data within day t and the daily 
average return  is denoted by r . However, as Christie and Huang point out low 
dispersions by themselves do not guarantee the presence of herding. To examine whether 
herding has occurred, the extreme tail levels of dispersion are identified by using the 
following regression:  
t
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where the two dummy variables DtL and DtU  indicate whether the daily return lies in the 
lower or upper tails of the distribution. The constant α represents the average dispersion 
of the sample except for the area covered by the two indicators. The error term would 
capture any effects on the dispersion not related to the two dummy variables, which 
might include the effect of the season. For example, in March live cattle markets are 
expected to being their yearly downward trend in response to feedlot placements. The 
error term would capture this effect.  
If the signs of β1 and β2 are positive, then the returns movements are consistent with 
rational behavior; however, if they are negative it is consistent with irrational herding 
behavior (Christie and Huang). Intuitively, a negative value on the lower tail coefficient 
would indicate that during times of unusually low daily returns the dispersion of returns 
would decrease meaning traders are moving together. This would indicate they are 
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trading based on the common knowledge of the "herd" rather than on individual 
knowledge.  
We would not necessarily expect the values of β1 and β2 to be equal; in fact, Christie and 
Huang found that, across several different industries, the values of β1 were more uniform 
than β2 which had a larger distribution. Furthermore, in their examination of monthly 
data they found estimates of β2 to be three to six times greater than estimates of β1 
indicating asymmetry in the two coefficients is to be expected. The hypothesis that these 
two coefficients are equal is not tested here, but could be in future research for 
completeness.  
Since the same event, the rumor of foreign animal disease, may affect futures prices of 
four commodities, we use Zellner’s seeming unrelated regression approach to estimate a 
system of equations consisting of the regression equation for each commodity as 
specified in the equation for herding above. In the equation for each commodity, the 
dummy variables DtL and DtU  equals one if the daily rate of returns falls into the one or 
99 percentile in its distribution. The statistic of the Breusch-Pagan test of independence 
(11.43) exceeds the critical value of the chi-distribution with six degrees of freedom 
(10.64) at the 10% significance level (see the last row in table 4). The Breusch-Pagan 
test suggests that the SUR is appropriate since the variance of error terms exhibits 
heteroskedasicity. The results presented in Table 54 suggest that herding behavior exists 
when the rate of returns falls in the low tail of the distribution for feeder cattle, live 
cattle, and lean hogs futures but it is only statistically significant for live cattle and lean 
hogs at the 10% significance level.. Furthermore, asymmetric patterns of herding 
behavior are observed in livestock futures markets across different commodities as well 
as comparing between the rate of returns in the lower and upper tails.  
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Table 54. Zellner's Seemingly Unrelated Regression to Detect Herding Behavior During 
the Event Period21 
Zellner's seemly unrelated regression of four equations 
 feeder cattle live cattle pork bellies lean hogs
1 percentile of rate of returns -0.001 -0.008*** 0.003 -0.014* 
 (0.002) (0.002) (0.006) (0.007) 
99 percentile of rate of returns -0.001 0.001 0.004 -0.003 
 (0.002) (0.002) (0.004) (0.005) 
Constant 0.013*** 0.025*** 0.014*** 0.069*** 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.002) 
R-squared 0.03 0.01 0.08 0.10 
No. of OBSs 20 20 20 20 
Breusch-Pagan test of independence chi2(6)=11.44 p-value = 0.08 
 
6.5. Conclusions and Implications 
Both the confirmation and/or rumor of a foreign animal disease pose a significant threat 
to US agriculture. A rumor of FMD introduces non-trivial information uncertainty into 
the livestock futures market. This uncertainty can lead to changes in prices and price 
volatility, as well as trigger herding behavior and momentum trading. Although many 
tests for vesicular diseases are done in the US each year, tests done on March 12, 2002 in 
Holton, Kansas had an impact on futures prices in feeder cattle, live cattle and lean hog 
contracts on March 13th as well as March 14th, despite the fact that negative test results 
were announced before start of trade on March 14th. Prices did rebound near the end of 
the trading day, indicating the test results information had been assimilated. After the 
fact, an investigation was conducted that concluded no undue manipulation had occurred 
so an alternative explanation for the price impact is needed.  
                                                 
21 The asterisks  *, ** and *** indicate 10%, 5% and 1% significance levels, 
respectively. 
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This study examined the persistency and volatility of the futures price of livestock 
commodities impacted by FMD: feeder cattle, live cattle, pork bellies and lean hogs. 
Lean hog and pork belly contracts showed the most volatility, but little persistence. Live 
cattle and feeder cattle had lower levels of volatility, but while feeder cattle recovered 
within a week live cattle took much longer. This study proposes the existence of herding 
behavior and momentum trading on the part of livestock futures traders during this 
period contributed to the rumor price shock. Clinical analysis would seem to reveal 
herding behavior in feeder cattle, live cattle and lean hog livestock futures and 
momentum trading for live cattle and lean hog livestock futures. A more formal 
econometric analysis of herding behavior leads to evidence of herding behavior in live 
cattle and lean hogs.  
The occurrence of herding behavior and momentum trading could be reflective of the 
nature of FMD and the expected response should the test be positive. FMD does not 
contaminate meat products; they are still fit for human consumption. There are still the 
restrictions put in place by international trade but domestic consumption is still possible 
so the impacts in pork belly contracts is more likely to be small compared to live 
animals. Information uncertainty may have been greater for live animal contracts for 
several reasons. The current stamp out policy would lead to mass slaughter of live 
animals coming in either direct or indirect contact with a disease carrier. This means any 
live animal at the time of the positive FMD test could be placed under immediate 
quarantine, slaughtered and the carcass disposed of. Thus the evidence of herding and 
momentum trading in live cattle and lean hogs particularly--since they are the closest to 
slaughter and therefore have the greater value--may be a reasonable conclusion given 
information uncertainty related to the FMD rumor.  Although not significant in the 
econometric analysis, feeder cattle also showed clinical evidence of herding. As 
previously stated, momentum trading can lead to an over-reaction because of 
information uncertainty. The conjunction of herding behavior and momentum trading 
evidence for live cattle and lean hog futures could explain the large price and rate of 
returns drop observed during the event window and the persistency of the shock.  
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There are other possible explanations for a price decline in live cattle during this period: 
lower than expected cash live cattle trade, a slight drop in box beef values, speculation 
and feedlot placements. It could be argued that the rumor of FMD gave traders a reason 
to sell; however, even if the market was primed for a seasonal downturn the rumor 
appears to have caused the downturn to be steeper than expected or reasonable under 
ordinary circumstances. Herding and momentum trading provide plausible explanations 
for the over-reaction that occurred.  
This analysis is by no means comprehensive. It is intended to serve as a starting point for 
further expansion to explore information uncertainty, herding and momentum trading in 
the context of animal disease. Ideally, future work would identify whether there is 
herding behavior in livestock futures markets in general, as well as whether and how the 
animal disease outbreaks or the rumors of them enhance or attenuate herding behavior. 
The small data sample limited the ability to test for herding and momentum trading more 
generally; a further analysis based on a year of minute data rather than a month will help 
us better identify whether there is a tendency toward herding and momentum trading in 
livestock futures. Further analysis includes the examination of information spillover into 
related commodities like corn or soybeans contracts and the examination of other 
maturity months than the nearest one.      
223 
 
7. CONCLUSION 
Animal disease poses a significant threat to US livestock agriculture, this much is clear 
from the literature on outbreaks around the world. Foot-and-mouth disease poses a 
particular threat due to its status as a highly contagious, economic disease. Modeling the 
impacts of animal disease means more than just counting the number of head 
slaughtered; it also means determining how other parts of the agricultural sector are 
impacted by the disease and developing ways to assess impacts. This dissertation has 
contributed to the improvement of US preparedness for avoiding and/or dealing with 
animal disease outbreaks by:  
• Assessing the economic and epidemic consequences of select FMD related 
strategies and in the process 
o Developing a more generally useful deterministic modeling approach that 
integrates an economic sector model with an epidemic model so as to capture 
impacts more fully across the US agricultural sector by including the inter-
relationships among markets  
o Extending the framework into a risk setting to improve understanding of how 
risk and uncertainty impact FMD response policies and livestock markets 
again developing a methodology that can be used in other studies 
• Examining the way that false information releases can influence livestock futures 
markets  
Essay 1 sets the stage for the FMD analysis showing the danger presented by FMD 
through both its impact in other parts of the world and the potential damage it could 
cause in the US. Since trade restrictions are such a large part of the outbreak impact, hog 
sectors and beef sectors are at particular risk. Sheep and dairy sectors do not have a large 
international market presence; however, the domestic losses from the dairy sector's 
production of high value outputs would be significant. This essay also presents a 
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discussion of potential control strategies that can be used for the eradication of FMD. 
Several of these control strategies are evaluated in essays 2, 3, and 4.  
Essay 2 presents the integrated economic/epidemic modeling approach developed in the 
study.  It first reviews the literature on integrated economic/epidemic modeling and the 
economic justification for various modeling approaches, and then presents the modeling 
methodology developed for the assessments in essays 3 and 4. The integrated model 
utilizes a partial equilibrium economic approach, which allows assessment of impacts in 
vertically and horizontally linked markets, consumers and producers, and domestic and 
international markets within a single framework. This is a unique contribution among 
animal disease assessments since most have examined limited market setting without 
considering the entire agricultural sector. In particular they have generally modeled the 
livestock sector and select related sectors.  Essay 2 also does graphical economic 
analysis of expected outcomes guiding both the modeling scope and developing 
expectations for the nature of the results found later in the strategy evaluations. 
Essay 3 carries out a strategy assessment using the methodology developed in essay 2. 
Specifically, it is a case study of FMD strategy analysis in the context of the California 
central valley dairy industry. California is particularly susceptible to animal disease 
outbreaks due to the importance of agricultural production to the state's economy. 
California's value of agricultural products was valued at $33 billion in 2007. The study 
focuses particularly on simulating an outbreak in the dairy industry, a $6.9 billion sales 
industry in a state that produces 22% of the nation's milk supply. Control strategies 
considered are alternative detection and vaccination approaches.  
Results indicate that earlier detection is always a best response strategy in terms of 
reducing epidemic size, disease control cost, and national welfare loss.  They also show 
vaccination increases slaughter, as would be expected given US "vaccinate to die" 
policy. However, vaccination reduces the number of head placed under movement 
restrictions. Implications of this extend beyond the size of the outbreak. By keeping the 
quarantine zone as small as is reasonable, it lessens the welfare slaughter potential. 
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Vaccination does come at a higher economic national surplus loss and disease control 
cost. Examining the distribution of losses and accounting for risk attitude on the part of 
policy makers, I find that vaccination is a risk reducing strategy. This implies the 
undesirable tail of the distribution of losses is reduced such that there is less chance of an 
extremely bad outcome.  
Producers suffer the most from the outbreak, but simulation evidence suggests that 
producers in some non-infected regions gain from the outbreak. In dairy production 
regions outside of California, producers gain from the outbreak. However, for regions 
with hog production (an FMD susceptible species and therefore subject to trade 
restrictions) producers have losses due to international trade restrictions. These results 
can be traced back to the expected outcomes outlined in the economic theory section of 
essay 2.  
Essay 3 then turns to an examination of the cost of the potential outbreak and how that 
cost might vary depending on the quarantine zone policy put in place. Of the three 
policies considered (Lockdown, Milk Dumping and Business as Usual), the lockdown 
policy that those concerned only with minimizing disease spread risk would choose 
results in a significantly higher cost.  However, Milk Dumping results in a not 
unreasonable cost and would still reduce vectors for disease spread (milk, milk trucks, 
milk processing facilities, and personnel).  
Essay 4 reports on the extension of the approach into a risk context examining how risk 
attitudes impact control strategy decisions, in this case in the context of the High Plains 
of Texas. This essay extends an earlier study that the author was involved with to 
examine the ranking of control strategies under risk aversion. This is done by applying 
breakeven risk aversion coefficient methods to the distribution of losses from the 
integrated high plains model. Results suggest that of the three control strategies 
examined (detection, surveillance and vaccination), both early detection and rapid 
vaccination have merit as risk reducing strategies or equivalently as strategies that if 
used would increase the resiliency of the sector. Enhanced surveillance may be a 
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resiliency increasing activity under some outbreak situations, particularly when 
outbreaks begin in large feedlots.  
Finally essay 5 examines how market information and in this case false information 
affects demand and market response. Using a well publicized rumor of FMD in Kansas 
in 2002, an attempt was made at determining whether animal disease information would 
significantly and negatively impact livestock futures prices. Furthermore, would that 
impact be rational or the product of "noise" in the media and among other traders. 
Results suggest that the false information did have an impact in the futures market, and 
that traders did respond as if the information were true. There was evidence of herding 
behavior and indicators of momentum trading that indicate the live cattle and lean hog 
markets are particularly at risk.  
Overall this dissertation has shown that strategies can be used to enhance FMD 
preparedness. Outbreak simulations under strategies reveal likely large economic 
consequences, affecting the livestock sector as well as vertically integrated sectors 
(meat) and horizontally integrated sectors (feed grains), but producers in the infected 
region are significantly impacted as shown in essay 3. Furthermore, producers in other 
regions stand to gain from an outbreak.  
Although no quantitative work was done directly comparing a simple cost based or input 
output based analysis to the partial equilibrium structure used here, the results of essay 3 
and the theoretical discussion on economic modeling in essay 2 indicate that the 
underlying assumptions of partial equilibrium analyses would be most appropriate for 
FMD outbreaks. Risk and uncertainty cannot be assumed away in the economic 
modeling portion of integrated modeling; rather, economics has theory and tools 
available that allow us to include considerations in this area into the modeling we do as 
shown in essays 4 and 5.  
In terms of limitations, there is still much work that could be done for animal disease 
modeling. In particular the approach and analysis in essay 3 could be improved by 
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considering several factors. First, the international trade assumptions could be improved. 
The assumption is that the disease is confined to California but that all US opportunities 
to export were lost. However a zoning policy might be able to be employed to reduce 
international trade losses. In particular, the pork trade would not be as affected if zoning 
were put into place. The assumption that livestock and livestock product exports are 
reduced to autarky levels is a worst case scenario that would be more applicable to a 
multi-region outbreak rather than a regionalized outbreak.  
Second, the quarantine zone analysis is strictly economic with no feedback into the 
epidemic model. Ideally, if there is no movement of trucks into or out of the quarantine 
zone (lockdown or milk dumping) this reduction in disease spread vectors would be 
modeled through the epidemic model as well. It is for this reason that the previously 
described impacts through the ASM model were assessed using the business as usual 
cost calculations for the disease mitigation costs. At this time there is no feedback loop 
to account for the reduced disease spread from stopping movements of services.  
Third, only the short run aspects of the outbreak were examined. Essentially, the "year 
0" or the year of the outbreak were examined without looking the 5-10 years into the 
future to determine when or if the livestock sector would recover from the outbreak. This 
long run analysis would particularly be important given international trade impacts and 
the time it will take to regain market share after export restrictions are put in place by 
our current export partners.  
Like essay 3, a limitation of the analysis done in essay 4 is that international trade 
implications need to be better addressed in deriving the distribution of losses used in the 
risk analysis. The results were derived without taking into account extensive trade 
restrictions, which are a significant source of risk for US livestock agriculture. It is 
possible that rankings and BRAC levels may change given a significant threat of export 
market closures around the country.  
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Essay 5 has two significant limitations. First, data limitations prevent a more stringent 
measure of momentum trading from being used. Second, there are other possible 
explanations--based on market fundamentals-- that could explain a decreasing trend in 
livestock prices during that time; however, the decline was such that it is difficult to 
justify only from fundamentals.  
In terms of further work, what is clear is that the threat of animal disease--FMD in 
particular--is very real to the US agricultural sector and there is still much work to be 
done to assess vulnerability and outbreak related strategies would be over the short and 
long run. Further aspects not discussed in essay 3, but that could be examined in the 
future, are the implications this would have on tourism and commercial traffic important 
to the California economy. Furthermore, the costs of human suffering and lost wages 
from movement restriction policies could be explored.  
Also the results of essays 3 and 4 could be extended by explorations of the balance 
between ex ante investment and ex post response. In order to have rapid vaccine 
availability, the capability to replicate the vaccine in the US would have to be developed 
ex ante. This means laboratory equipment, trained personnel, and approved facilities 
strategically located around the country. Similarly, early detection would mean 
investment in diagnostics equipment and personnel in laboratories as well as the 
possibility of a random, mandatory testing procedure in vulnerable regions. Although 
these issues are not specifically modeled in this dissertation, the results presented here 
provide motivation for the further examination of balance issues.  
It is possible that essay 5 could be expanded in three ways to further explore the issues 
presented. First, where intraday data on price and volume are available, the tests for the 
presence of herding and momentum trading could be repeated to see if this is a 
characteristic of the live cattle and lean hog futures market. Second, this method could 
be applied to other instances where animal disease uncertainty impacted futures markets. 
A recent example, where data may be more available, is the H1N1 outbreak and 
subsequent implications for lean hog and pork belly markets despite the fact that no hogs 
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were sick and there was no danger of disease spread through pork consumption. Third, 
this model could readily be applied to a case where an animal disease is confirmed. An 
examination of livestock futures' responses to the rumor of an animal disease that was 
later confirmed, and a comparison to responses when the rumor was refuted, is helpful 
for policy implications and crisis management.  
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APPENDIX  
7.1. Programming Explanation 
Up to this point, essay 2 has attempted to provide intuition and justification for 
integrated economic/epidemic modeling approach taken. At this juncture, a more 
detailed explanation of the programming related to an integrated model is presented. 
Since the two models are very similar, only the DADS-ASM integrated model is 
presented.  
7.1.1. Define Scenarios  
The first step is in defining scenarios. The scenarios defined for the DADS-ASM study 
are discussed in detail in essay 3. Scenarios are specified using the set "altruns" and the 
subset "altrun" specified earlier.  
7.1.2. Integrate the DADS Model Output Results 
Since the DADS-ASM model runs the full set of epidemic iterations from the DADS 
model through the economic model, a mapping linking each scenario and its individual 
iteration number is made. Also included in this mapping is the more descriptive scenario 
name "fmdscenarios" and the name coming from the epidemic model dataset 
"newscenarioname".    
set mapscenario(altrun, iter, fmdscenarios, newscenarioname) 
At this juncture the Epidemic data set flowing from DADS is brought into ASM as well 
as the basic premises data from the DADS model. The premises data is used to transform 
the epidemic simulations output from animal population changes in terms of herds 
impacted to percentage of the population in the region impacted.  
parameter  EpiDataComplete(newscenarioname,iter,id,inputfield)  
$include DADS_epi_scenariosStoch 
parameter premisedata(id,inputfield) table of premise specific data from put file; 
$include DADS_premise_data 
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The next step is to perform some simple adjustments to transform premises level data 
into animal level data. This requires first a definition of the herd types in the DADS 
model, second a set of assumptions on the animal mix in each herd type, and third a 
breakdown of herd types into three general size categories. The reason for the third step 
is that FMD costs will vary by premises size, necessitating knowledge of which premises 
("id") falls into a particular size category.  
9.1.2.1.  Defining the DADS Model Herd Types 
The types of herds in the DADS model are defined as well as the numeric code assigned 
to a particular type description. The numeric code is all that occurs in the epidemic 
model results, so it is important to define the herd types. The herd types defined for the 
DADS-ASM integration are as follows:  
set farmtype the types of farms in the epi data 
  / SmBeef          small beef grazing operation 
    LgBeef          large beef grazing operation 
    SmDairy         small dairy farm 
    MdDairy         medium dairy farm 
    LgDairy         large dairy farm 
    SmDairyCalfr    small dairy calf raiser 
    LgDairyCalfr    large dairy calf raiser 
    SmSwine         small hog operation 
    LgSwine         large hog operation 
    Goat             goat producer   (meat and milk) 
    Sheep           sheep prouducer (meat and milk) 
    Backyard        an operation with less than 10 head 
    Saleyard  an animal sales facility 
/; 
 
parameter premisetype(farmtype) description of premises  
  /SmBeef         1 
   LgBeef          2 
   SmDairy        3 
   MdDairy        4 
   LgDairy         5 
   SmDairyCalfr   6 
   LgDairyCalfr   7 
   SmSwine        8 
   LgSwine        9  
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   Goat            10 
   Sheep           11 
   Backyard       12 
   Saleyard        13 
/;  
9.1.2.2. Calculating Herd Mix 
In order to take the appropriate proportion of death loss out of each budget, particularly 
for beef cattle budgets, broad herd types can be broken down into animal 
categorizations. This step was not as important for the DADS-ASM integration since 
there are only two beef operation types in the model. However, for the AusSpread-ASM 
integration there are not only beef cattle grazing operations but also feedlot operations. 
Still, in both models a breakdown of herds into individual animal types is used to 
calculate indemnity payments and foregone income. In the Texas High Plains, this 
information was collected via survey and gathering statistics work by Sherwell. For 
details, see Ward et al. (2007). Since similar work has not been done in California, it is 
assumed that the mix of animals in similar herd types will not vary greatly between the 
two regions. Table 55, Table 56, and Table 57 provide the breakdown of herds for beef 
cattle, dairy, swine, small ruminant and backyard operations.  
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Table 55. Animal Mix Assumptions in Beef and Dairy Herds (Sherwell) 
Herd 
Type 
600 
lb 
steer 
600 lb 
heifer 
800 
lb 
steer 
800 lb 
heifer 
1000 
lb 
steer 
1000 
lb 
heifer 
1200 
lb 
steer 
1200 
lb 
heifer 
1400 
lb 
steer 
1400 
lb 
heifer 
Milk 
Cow 
Sm Beef 0.17 0.17 0.11 0.11 0.21 0.21 0.01 0.01 0 0 0 
Lg Beef 0.17 0.17 0.11 0.11 0.21 0.21 0.01 0.01 0 0 0 
Sm Dairy 0 0.15 0 0.18 0 0.17 0 0 0 0 0.5 
Med 
Dairy 
0 0.15 0 0.18 0 0.17 0 0 0 0 0.5 
Lg  
Dairy 
0 0.15 0 0.18 0 0.17 0 0 0 0 0.5 
Sm Dairy 
Calf 
Raiser 
0.2 0.2 0.1 0.2 0.1 0.2 0 0 0 0 0 
Lg Dairy 
Calf 
Raiser 
0.2 0.2 0.1 0.2 0.1 0.2 0 0 0 0 0 
Backyard 0.24 0.24 0.1 0.1 0.3 0.1 0.1 0 0 0 0 
Saleyards 0.11 0.07 0.24 0.016 0.20 0.11 0.05 0.03 0.02 0.01 0 
 
Table 56. Animal Mix Assumptions in Hog Herds (Sherwell) 
Herd 
Type 
Sows Boars Piglet Feeder 
Pig 
Gilts Barrows
Sm 
Swine 
0.3 0.3 0.15 0.14 0.1 0.01 
Lg 
Swine 
0.3 0.3 0.15 0.14 0.1 0.01 
       
 
Table 57. Animal Mix Assumptions in Sheep Flocks (Sherwell) 
Herd 
Type 
Ewes Rams Male 
Lambs
Female 
Lambs 
Male 
Yearlings
Female 
Yearlings
Sheep 0.31 0.1 0.13 0.12 0.23 0.11 
Goats 0.31 0.1 0.13 0.12 0.23 0.11 
 
 
246 
 
9.1.2.3.  Including Premises by Size 
For an FMD outbreak, most costs are assumed to have two parts. The variable portion of 
cost is on a per head basis; however, there is often assumed to be a fixed portion of cost 
that will depend only on the general category of the size of the herd. Such a cost would 
be the cost of surveillance, in which a particular herd is visited by an animal health 
professional to check for symptoms of FMD. Another example would be the cost of 
appraising a herd for slaughter. As long as the fixed cost for a particular herd size is 
known as well as the average number of head for a herd of that size, these fixed costs 
can be transformed into a per animal cost. This simplifies adjusting the ASM budget. 
The herd sizes defined here are a small herd, a medium herd and a large herd size. The 
average number of head in these herds are 100, 450 and 800 respectively.  
A mapping is created to link each scenario ("newscenarioname") and iteration ("iter") 
with the premises impacted in that simulation ("id") and the farmtype and herd size.  The 
mapping named "link" sorts premises in the California study region into the small, 
medium and large categorizations.  
set link(newscenarioname,iter,id,farmtype,herdsize) map; 
loop(mapscenario(altrun, iter, fmdscenarios, newscenarioname), 
**SMALL 
link(newscenarioname,iter, id, farmtype, "smallherd")=no; 
loop( (id)$premisedata(id,"type"), 
   loop(farmtype$(premisedata(id,"type")= premisetype(farmtype)), 
       if(premisedata (id,"all_stock") lt herdsizedefinition("smallherd"), 
             link(newscenarioname,iter, id, farmtype, "smallherd")=yes;))); 
 
**MEDIUM 
link(newscenarioname,iter, id, farmtype, "medherd")=no; 
loop( ( id)$premisedata(id,"type"), 
   loop(farmtype$(premisedata(id,"type")= premisetype(farmtype)), 
       if((premisedata (id,"all_stock") le herdsizedefinition("medherd")) 
     and (premisedata (id,"all_stock") ge herdsizedefinition("smallherd")), 
             link(newscenarioname,iter, id, farmtype, "medherd")=yes;))); 
 
**LARGE 
link(newscenarioname,iter, id, farmtype, "largeherd")=no; 
loop( ( id)$premisedata(id,"type"), 
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   loop(farmtype$(premisedata(id,"type")= premisetype(farmtype)), 
       if((premisedata (id,"all_stock")gt herdsizedefinition("largeherd")), 
             link(newscenarioname,iter, id, farmtype, "largeherd")=yes;))); 
); 
7.1.3. Fix Animal Populations 
In order to simulate an episodic FMD outbreak, the first step is to fix the animal 
populations so we have short term fixed herd locations. We largely restrict this to the 
breeding herds. First, the set containing the animal categorizations "animal" must be 
split into those affected by FMD and those unaffected by FMD. The animal set elements 
that are locked are: "Sheep", "CowCalf", "Dairy", and "FeederPigProduction". As 
shown in Figure 21. ASM Beef Cattle Flow Chart to Figure 24 animals flow through the 
budgets. Animal death shocks and performance degradation shocks will be placed in this 
flow as appropriate to the herd type being slaughtered, vaccinated or quarantined.  
Note, animal production is also locked for non-impacted animals to prevent land from 
changing uses to produce more of this type of production in the short term. Again, this is 
necessary for the assumption of episodic disease to prevent the model from finding a 
new long term equilibrium. Table 58 provides the breakdown of FASOM animal 
categories into locked and non-locked sets.  
Table 58. ASM Spatially Locked Herd Types 
Spatially Locked ("allfixedanimal") Not Spatially Locked ("notfixedanimal") 
FMD Affected 
Sheep 
CowCalf 
Dairy 
Hog Farrow to Finish 
Feeder Pig Production 
Non-FMD Affected 
Horses and Mules 
Produce Turkey 
Broiler 
Egg 
FMD Affected 
Feedlot Beef Yearlings 
Feedlot Beef Calves 
Pig Finishing 
Steer Calf Stocker 
Heifer Calf Stocker 
Steer Yearling Stocker 
Heifer Yearling Stocker 
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After the sets of locked and non-locked animals have been defined, the production can 
be set such that the model is spatially locked down. This is done inside the scenario loop 
so that for each non-base scenario the production is locked. The base scenario is 
assumed to be a "business as usual", no outbreak scenario.  
First, the positive variable "AGLVSTBUDGETNSPR" that defines the levels of 
livestock budgets in the welfare maximization objective function of the program need to 
be given upper and lower bounds for non-spatially locked animal sets. Since all of the 
animal categorizations in this set are expected to reduce from the animal disease 
outbreak, but should be prevented from falling below zero the variable for this set of 
animals is bounded by zero below and the pre-outbreak level from above as shown in the 
two lines of programming below.  
AGLVSTBUDGETNSPR.lo(period,agreg,notfixedanimal,livetech,eftech) 
          $agregsperiod(period,agreg) 
           =0; 
 
AGLVSTBUDGETNSPR.up(period,agreg,notfixedanimal,livetech,eftech) 
          $agregsperiod(period,agreg) 
           =max 
(0.01,saveAGLVSTBUDGETlev(period,agreg,notfixedanimal,livetech,eftech)); 
 
In addition, the lower bound should be prevented from going above the defined upper 
bound. The following code prevents this from happening.  
loop((period,agreg,notfixedanimal,livetech,eftech), 
       if(AGLVSTBUDGETNSPR.up(period,agreg,notfixedanimal,livetech,eftech) 
         <AGLVSTBUDGETNSPR.lo(period,agreg,notfixedanimal,livetech,eftech), 
          if(AGLVSTBUDGETNSPR.up(period,agreg,notfixedanimal,livetech,eftech)<0, 
             
AGLVSTBUDGETNSPR.up(period,agreg,notfixedanimal,livetech,eftech)=0.0001); 
          if(AGLVSTBUDGETNSPR.lo(period,agreg,notfixedanimal,livetech,eftech)< 
             AGLVSTBUDGETNSPR.up(period,agreg,notfixedanimal,livetech,eftech), 
             AGLVSTBUDGETNSPR.lo(period,agreg,notfixedanimal,livetech,eftech)         
=max(AGLVSTBUDGETNSPR.up(period,agreg,notfixedanimal,livetech,eftech)*0.999
9,0)); 
         )); 
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For animals that are fixed spatially, the levels are fixed at the pre-outbreak levels, which 
is retained in the parameter saveAGLVSTBUDGETlev. Again this is done for each non-
base scenario.  
 
       AGLVSTBUDGETNSPR.fx(period,agreg,allfixedanimal,livetech,eftech) 
          $agregsperiod(period,agreg) 
           =saveAGLVSTBUDGETlev(period,agreg,allfixedanimal,livetech,eftech); 
 
loop((period,agreg,allfixedanimal,livetech,eftech), 
       if(AGLVSTBUDGETNSPR.up(period,agreg,allfixedanimal,livetech,eftech) 
         <AGLVSTBUDGETNSPR.lo(period,agreg,allfixedanimal,livetech,eftech), 
          if(AGLVSTBUDGETNSPR.up(period,agreg,allfixedanimal,livetech,eftech)<0, 
             
AGLVSTBUDGETNSPR.up(period,agreg,allfixedanimal,livetech,eftech)=0.0001); 
          if(AGLVSTBUDGETNSPR.lo(period,agreg,allfixedanimal,livetech,eftech)< 
             AGLVSTBUDGETNSPR.up(period,agreg,allfixedanimal,livetech,eftech), 
             AGLVSTBUDGETNSPR.lo(period,agreg,allfixedanimal,livetech,eftech) 
              
=max(AGLVSTBUDGETNSPR.up(period,agreg,allfixedanimal,livetech,eftech)*0.9999,
0)); ); 
 
 
       if(AGLVSTBUDGETNSPR.up(period,agreg,allfixedanimal,livetech,eftech) 
         <AGLVSTBUDGETNSPR.lo(period,agreg,allfixedanimal,livetech,eftech), 
          if(AGLVSTBUDGETNSPR.up(period,agreg,allfixedanimal,livetech,eftech)<0, 
             
AGLVSTBUDGETNSPR.up(period,agreg,allfixedanimal,livetech,eftech)=0.0001); 
          if(AGLVSTBUDGETNSPR.lo(period,agreg,allfixedanimal,livetech,eftech)< 
             AGLVSTBUDGETNSPR.up(period,agreg,allfixedanimal,livetech,eftech), 
             AGLVSTBUDGETNSPR.lo(period,agreg,allfixedanimal,livetech,eftech)=0); 
         )); 
 
loop((lockedanimals,fixanimal,natmixitem) 
       $(sameas(lockedanimals,natmixitem) 
       or unitlivestock(lockedanimals,natmixitem) 
       or unitlivestock(fixanimal,natmixitem)), 
    livmixgrouping(livemixg,natmixitem)=no); 
7.1.4. Defining Costs 
The control strategies built in that can be employed depending on the scenario are 
slaughter, surveillance, and vaccination with additional options for “vaccinate to live” 
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strategies and welfare slaughter. For each budget there is a section for additional direct 
costs of for “carcass disposal” and “disease management”. These costs are assumed to be 
zero until levels are assigned to them inside the scenario loop. The cost of herd appraisal, 
carcass disposal includes the cost of euthanasia, cleaning and disinfection, and carcass 
removal. The cost of disease management includes the cost of vaccination, indemnity 
payments for animals slaughtered, forgone income for the time the premises are 
depopulation until it can be repopulated, and surveillance of herds to check for signs of 
the disease.  
Also included in this cost number are the additional costs associated with restricting the 
movements of animals such as the additional costs to clean and disinfect trucks bringing 
feed in and milk out. If movement restrictions are very strict such that the movement of 
feed and other goods/services in and out of the zone is not possible, this would capture 
the additional cost of slaughter or lost value of milk and other products that spoil inside 
the movement restriction zone.  
• Surveillance costs were calculated according to herd size using fixed costs of 
being under surveillance and per visit costs of testing the herd.  
• Culling costs were calculated as a sum of euthanasia, carcass disposal, cleaning 
and disinfection and herd appraisal costs. These were multiplied by the estimate 
of herds slaughtered from the industry loss section above. 
• Vaccination costs were calculated based on per animal vaccination costs and 
fixed per herd vaccination costs according herd size.  
The specific cost categories calculated vary slightly between the integration of DADS-
ASM and the integration of AusSpread-ASM, so the details behind the calculations will 
be saved for essay 3. However, the goal is to reach a per animal cost calculation for each 
scenario based on the individual assumptions and simulated animal disease outbreak. 
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7.1.5. Regional Location 
Since the disease is assumed to be confined to a particular region, that region must be 
defined for the ASM model. This is a relatively simple process requiring only one line of 
code. This code for the outbreak assumed to occur in California is:  
set affectedregion(allreg) this is the region affected in this run  /"CaliforniaN"/;   
This subset of the full set of ASM sub-regions can then be used in place of allreg where 
appropriate to confine the disease shock to the region of interest. In the case of the Texas 
outbreak the "affected region" is "TxHiPlains".  
7.1.6. Epidemic Data Transformation 
As discussed earlier, the epidemic gives the status of each herd as to whether it is 
susceptible, sub-clinically infectious, infectious, removed/recovered, quarantined and/or 
vaccinated. The epidemic model does not stop moving forward in time from the initial 
infection until the disease is eradicated. The economic model moves in year time steps, 
so as long as the disease is eradicated within a year, the total epidemic results are 
integrated into the annual economic model. Therefore, the data that is moved into the 
economic model is the state of herds at the end of the epidemic model period. Since a 
"stamp out" policy is assumed as well as a "vaccinate to die" strategy when vaccination 
is used, the two states of herds in the model after the disease period is over is either 
susceptible or removed (dead). During the outbreak herds may have been subject to 
disease mitigation activities like vaccination and quarantine; this also must be 
transformed into a proportion of herds affected number. The ASM code performing the 
transformation from epidemic herd data to ASM regional percent changes is discussed as 
follows. First, the statuses possible in the epidemic data are defined as well as the 
numeric indicator in the "status" column of the data that is connected to that status. This 
number is used to sort data into the particular status groups. Mitigation activities are 
listed as a subset.  
set status the potential status of each herd in the affected region 
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/susceptible 
 dead 
 vaccinated 
 quarantine 
/; 
 
set herdcomponent(status) assign the value corresponding to each status 
/susceptible     0 
 dead            3 
 vaccinated      1 
 quarantine      1 
/; 
 
set mitigate (status) the disease mitigation strategies 
/ vaccinated 
  quarantine 
/; 
 
A simple mapping is created to indicate the linkage between the region of interest and 
the status of herds in that region.  
set percentlink(allreg,status) the link to calculate percent of herd lost 
/ "CaliforniaN" . susceptible 
  "CaliforniaN" . dead 
  "CaliforniaN" . vaccinated 
  "CaliforniaN" . quarantine 
/; 
The first step in calculating the percentage change in the region is to define the total 
population in that region. This is done to confirm that the epidemic model captures 
enough of the premises in that region to assure the percentages calculated can be applied. 
This number is compared against the USDA-NASS data for the region of interest. It is 
not unexpected that the number in the epidemic model may be slightly larger than the 
number reported in the NASS data since some premises cannot be reported due to 
confidentiality issues. The inventories are calculated for all premises types and for 
individual premises types.  
parameter totalinventory the total inventory of all susceptible animals in region; 
totalinventory=sum(id,premisedata(id,"all_stock")); 
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parameter animalinventory(animal,allreg) the total inventory by type of animal; 
 
         animalinventory("sheep","CaliforniaN") 
                =sum((id) 
                  $((premisedata(id,"Type") eq 10) 
                  or (premisedata(id,"Type") eq 11)), 
                  premisedata(id,"all_stock")) ; 
 
          animalinventory("cowcalf","CaliforniaN") 
                =sum((id) 
                   $((premisedata(id,"Type") eq 1) 
                   or (premisedata(id,"type") eq 2) 
                   or (premisedata(id,"Type") eq 12) 
                   or (premisedata(id,"Type") eq 13)), 
               premisedata(id,"all_stock")); 
 
          animalinventory("Dairy","CaliforniaN") 
                =sum((id) 
                  $((premisedata(id,"Type") eq 3) 
                  or (premisedata(id,"Type") eq 4) 
                  or (premisedata(id,"Type") eq 5) 
                  or (premisedata(id,"Type") eq 6) 
                   or (premisedata(id,"Type") eq 7)), 
                premisedata(id,"all_stock")); 
 
          animalinventory("Feederpigproduction","CaliforniaN") 
                =sum((id) 
                  $((premisedata(id,"Type") eq 8) 
                    or (Premisedata(id,"Type") eq 9)), 
                 premisedata(id,"all_stock")); 
 
Second, the number of animals that are dead or have received a particular control 
strategy treatment are sorted out of the epidemic data. The total number of animals 
slaughtered for disease control purposes are calculated as well as the breakdown of 
animal slaughtered for particular herd types. These are captured in the following 
parameters in the DADS-ASM integration. Note that due to the importance of dairy in 
California the premises quarantined and vaccinated are specifically broken out. Also, the 
numbers of head that are at risk for welfare slaughter are calculated.  
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parameter statusinventory(iter,affectedanimals,newscenarioname,allreg,herdcomponent)          
 numberslaughteredtotal(iter,newscenarioname,allreg,herdcomponent)          
 diseasecontrol(iter,newscenarioname,allreg,mitigate)  
 diseasecontroldairy(affectedanimals,newscenarioname,allreg,mitigate)          
 dairypremisesquarantined(newscenarioname,allreg,mitigate) 
 welfareligiblenCA(iter,newscenarioname,allreg); 
 
*effects on the herd (number of head)  
loop(mapscenario(altrun, iter, fmdscenarios, newscenarioname), 
         numberslaughteredtotal(iter,newscenarioname,"CaliforniaN","dead") 
              =sum(id$(EpiDataComplete(newscenarioname,iter,id,"status") eq 3), 
              premisedata(id,"all_stock")); 
 
         statusinventory(iter,"sheep",newscenarioname,"CaliforniaN","dead") 
               =(sum((percentlink("CaliforniaN","dead"),id) 
               $(premisedata(id,"all_stock") 
               and(EpiDataComplete(newscenarioname,iter,id,"status")eq 3) 
               and((premisedata(id,"type") eq 10) 
                   or (premisedata(id,"Type") eq 11))), 
              premisedata(id,"all_stock"))); 
 
         statusinventory(iter,"cowcalf",newscenarioname,"CaliforniaN","dead") 
               =(sum((percentlink("CaliforniaN","dead"),id) 
               $(premisedata(id,"all_stock") 
               and(EpiDataComplete(newscenarioname,iter, id,"status") eq 3) 
               and((premisedata(id,"type") eq 1) 
                  or (premisedata(id,"type") eq 2) 
                  or (premisedata(id,"type") eq 12) 
                  or (premisedata(id,"type") eq 13))), 
              premisedata(id,"all_stock"))); 
 
         statusinventory(iter,"dairy",newscenarioname,"CaliforniaN","dead") 
               =(sum((percentlink("CaliforniaN","dead"),id) 
               $(premisedata(id,"all_stock") 
               and(EpiDataComplete(newscenarioname,iter,id,"status")eq 3) 
               and((premisedata(id,"type") eq 3) 
                  or (premisedata(id,"type") eq 4) 
                  or (premisedata(id,"type") eq 5) 
                  or (premisedata(id,"type") eq 6) 
                  or (premisedata(id,"type") eq 7))), 
              premisedata(id,"all_stock"))); 
 
         statusinventory(iter, 
"feederpigproduction",newscenarioname,"CaliforniaN","dead") 
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              =(sum((percentlink("CaliforniaN","dead"),id) 
              $(premisedata(id,"all_stock") 
               and(EpiDataComplete(newscenarioname,iter,id,"status")eq 3) 
               and (premisedata(id,"type") eq 8) 
               or (premisedata(id,"type") eq 9)), 
              premisedata(id,"all_stock"))); 
 
         diseasecontrol(iter, newscenarioname,"CaliforniaN","vaccinated") 
              =(sum((percentlink("CaliforniaN","vaccinated"),id) 
              $(EpiDataComplete(newscenarioname,iter,id,"vaccinated") gt 0), 
              EpiDataComplete(newscenarioname,iter,id,"vaccinated"))); 
 
          diseasecontrol(iter, newscenarioname,"CaliforniaN","quarantine") 
              =(sum((percentlink("CaliforniaN","quarantine"),id) 
              $(premisedata(id,"all_stock") 
               and EpiDataComplete(newscenarioname,iter,id,"quarantine") 
               and (EpiDataComplete(newscenarioname,iter,id,"status") eq 0)), 
              premisedata(id,"all_stock"))); 
 
           diseasecontroldairy("dairy",newscenarioname,"CaliforniaN","quarantine") 
               =(sum((percentlink("CaliforniaN","quarantine"),id) 
               $(premisedata(id,"all_stock") 
               and(EpiDataComplete(newscenarioname,iter,id,"quarantine")) 
               and (EpiDataComplete(newscenarioname,iter,id,'status') eq 0) 
               and((premisedata(id,"type") eq 3) 
                  or (premisedata(id,"type") eq 4) 
                  or (premisedata(id,"type") eq 5) 
                  or (premisedata(id,"type") eq 6) 
                  or (premisedata(id,"type") eq 7))), 
              premisedata(id,"all_stock"))); 
 
            diseasecontroldairy("dairy",newscenarioname,"CaliforniaN","vaccinated") 
               =(sum((percentlink("CaliforniaN","vaccinated"),id) 
               $(premisedata(id,"all_stock") 
               and(EpiDataComplete(newscenarioname,iter,id,"vaccinated")) 
               and((premisedata(id,"type") eq 3) 
                  or (premisedata(id,"type") eq 4) 
                  or (premisedata(id,"type") eq 5) 
                  or (premisedata(id,"type") eq 6) 
                  or (premisedata(id,"type") eq 7))), 
              EpiDataComplete(newscenarioname,iter,id,"vaccinated"))); 
 
         dairypremisesquarantined(newscenarioname,"CaliforniaN","quarantine")= 
              sum(id 
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               $(premisedata(id,"all_stock") 
               and(EpiDataComplete(newscenarioname,iter,id,"quarantine")) 
               and (EpiDataComplete(newscenarioname,iter,id,'status') eq 0) 
               and((premisedata(id,"type") eq 3) 
                  or (premisedata(id,"type") eq 4) 
                  or (premisedata(id,"type") eq 5) 
                  or (premisedata(id,"type") eq 6) 
                  or (premisedata(id,"type") eq 7))), 
              1); 
 
          welfareligiblenCA(iter,newscenarioname,'CaliforniaN')=sum(id$ 
 (epidatacomplete(newscenarioname,iter,id,"days_qt") gt feeddays 
          and epidatacomplete(newscenarioname,iter,id,"status") eq 0 and 
 premisedata(id,'all_stock') gt 50),premisedata(id,'all_stock')); 
 
); 
 
Now the percentage slaughtered, vaccinated, quarantined or at risk for welfare slaughter 
in the regional animal populations can be calculated. These calculations are captured in 
several parameters where  
• "effectsonherd" parameter gives the percent slaughtered,  
• "effectsonherdDC" parameter gives the percent vaccinated or quarantined, and  
• "effectsonherdDCdairy" parameter breaks out vaccination and quarantine 
specifically for dairies in California.   
The scalar "factor1" is used to scale the inventory up or down if the epidemic model 
captures more or less geographic area than the region covered in the ASM definition. For 
example, if the epidemic model only included premises in an 8 county area, but the ASM 
model includes premises in a 18 county area, the NASS data could be used to calculate 
the "factor1" value to scale the total inventory up to account for this difference. In the 
DADS-ASM model this value was set to 1.  
parameter effectsonherd(newscenarioname,affectedanimals,allreg, herdcomponent)             
           effectsonherdDC(newscenarioname,allreg,herdcomponent)   
  effectsonherdDCdairy(affectedanimals,newscenarioname,allreg,mitigate) ; 
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*the percentage of the total herd population that falls into each herd component category 
loop(mapscenario(altrun, iter, fmdscenarios, newscenarioname), 
 
         effectsonherd(newscenarioname, affectedanimals,'CaliforniaN',herdcomponent) 
              $(animalinventory(affectedanimals,"CaliforniaN")) 
               =(statusinventory(iter,affectedanimals,newscenarioname,   
 "CaliforniaN",herdcomponent) 
               /(animalinventory(affectedanimals,"CaliforniaN")*factor1(affectedanimals)) 
              ); 
 
          effectsonherdDC(newscenarioname,"CaliforniaN","vaccinated") 
              $(diseasecontrol(iter, newscenarioname,"CaliforniaN","vaccinated") 
               and(totalinventory)) 
               =(diseasecontrol(iter, newscenarioname,"CaliforniaN","vaccinated") 
               /(totalinventory) 
              ); 
 
           effectsonherdDC(newscenarioname,"CaliforniaN","quarantine") 
              $(diseasecontrol(iter, newscenarioname,"CaliforniaN","quarantine") 
               and(totalinventory)) 
               =(diseasecontrol(iter, newscenarioname,"CaliforniaN","quarantine") 
               /(totalinventory) 
              ); 
 
         effectsonherdDCdairy("dairy",newscenarioname,"CaliforniaN","quarantine") 
           =(diseasecontroldairy("dairy",newscenarioname,"CaliforniaN","quarantine") 
               /(animalinventory("dairy","CaliforniaN")*factor1("dairy"))); 
 
        effectsonherdDCdairy("dairy",newscenarioname,"CaliforniaN","vaccinated") 
           =(diseasecontroldairy("dairy",newscenarioname,"CaliforniaN","vaccinated") 
               /(animalinventory("dairy","CaliforniaN")*factor1("dairy"))); 
 
    ); 
       
Finally, the percentage changes are linked to the region of interest.  
loop((newscenarioname,affectedanimals,allreg,herdcomponent)$ 
      effectsonherd(newscenarioname,affectedanimals,allreg,herdcomponent), 
      affectedregion(allreg)=yes;); 
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7.1.7. The Scenario Loop 
Once the cost per head of disease mitigation and carcass disposal and the percentage 
change in the regional population due to disease mitigation have been calculated for 
every scenario and stochastic replication case, the budgets in ASM are adjusted to 
impose the disease shock. The scenario loop begins by indicating that the loop will run 
over all alternative runs ("altrun") of the model using the mapping between the FMD 
scenario group and the alternative runs set. If the alternative run is the base run, then no 
animal disease shock is imposed and the model solves as it regularly would; however, 
when the alternative run is one in which an animal disease shock has been imposed the 
following adjustments are made.   
9.1.7.1.  Adjusting "Other Costs" in the ASM budgets 
Cost calculations get outbreak costs to a per animal basis. These costs are then used to 
inside the scenario loop to increase the "other costs" line item of the livestock budgets 
for the affected animals as follows.  
*Disease Management 
    livestockbud("CaliforniaN",affectedanimals,livetech,eftech,'diseasemanagement')                 
 $sum(primary 
$livestockbud("CaliforniaN",affectedanimals,livetech,eftech,primary),1) 
                            = losses(newscenarioname,"costdiseasemgmt"); 
 
*Cost of Slaughter 
  livestockbud("CaliforniaN",affectedanimals,livetech,eftech,'carcassdisposal')                            
 $(sum(primary 
$livestockbud("CaliforniaN",affectedanimals,livetech,eftech,primary),1)) 
                                 = losses(newscenarioname,"costcarcassdisposal") ; 
9.1.7.2.  Adjusting Animal Output in ASM Budgets 
The adjustment in the ASM budgets for each affected animal group are explained as 
follows. 
9.1.7.2.1.  Cow/Calf Budget 
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The animal output from the cow/calf budget is steer calves and heifer calves. These 
calves go into subsequent grazing operations. In the case of the DADS-ASM integration, 
only the cow/calf budget is adjusted rather than any of the stocker or feedlot budgets. 
This assumption is based on an examination of the beef cattle herd types typical of 
central and northern California where the outbreak happens. The output per cow in the 
affected region is reduced by the proportion of the animals killed that were in beef 
grazing operations.  
livestockbud("CaliforniaN","cowcalf",livetech,eftech,"HeifCalve") 
$(livestockbud("CaliforniaN","cowcalf",livetech,eftech,"HeifCalve") 
and effectsonherd(newscenarioname,"cowcalf","CaliforniaN",herdcomponent)) 
       =(livestockbud("CaliforniaN","cowcalf",livetech,eftech,"HeifCalve") 
           -(livestockbud("CaliforniaN","cowcalf",livetech,eftech,"HeifCalve")* 
               effectsonherd(newscenarioname,"cowcalf","CaliforniaN","dead")) 
         ); 
9.1.7.2.2.  Dairy Budget 
The output from the dairy budget is dairy calves and milk, both must be reduced to 
reflect the animal disease shock. The reduction in dairy calves later impacts the number 
of cattle available for slaughter. The reduction in milk production will affect the supply 
of processed milk products available.  
livestockbud("CaliforniaN","dairy",livetech,eftech,"DairyCalves") 
$(livestockbud("CaliforniaN","dairy",livetech,eftech,"DairyCalves") and 
effectsonherd(newscenarioname,"dairy","CaliforniaN",herdcomponent)) 
=(livestockbud("CaliforniaN","dairy",livetech,eftech,"DairyCalves") 
      -(livestockbud("CaliforniaN","dairy",livetech,eftech,"DairyCalves")* 
       (effectsonherd(newscenarioname,"dairy","CaliforniaN","dead")))) 
   ); 
 
*handle milk lost 
livestockbud("CaliforniaN","dairy",livetech,eftech,"milk") 
$(livestockbud("CaliforniaN","dairy",livetech,eftech,"milk") and 
effectsonherd(newscenarioname,"dairy","CaliforniaN",herdcomponent)) 
 =(livestockbud("CaliforniaN","dairy",livetech,eftech,"milk")* 
      (1-effectsonherd(newscenarioname,"dairy","CaliforniaN","dead")) 
    ); 
 
9.1.7.2.3.  Sheep Budget 
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Sheep and goats are both accounted for in the adjustment made to the sheep budget. 
There are two outputs from this budget, meat and wool. The reduction in meat is 
imposed by reducing the pounds of slaughter lambs and the wool is similarly reduced 
using the percent slaughtered calculation. Although sheep and goats are used for milk 
production as well, this is not accounted for in the ASM model.  
livestockbud("CaliforniaN","sheep",livetech,eftech,"LambSlaugh") 
$(livestockbud("CaliforniaN","sheep",livetech,eftech,"LambSlaugh") and 
effectsonherd(newscenarioname,"sheep","CaliforniaN",herdcomponent)) 
= (livestockbud ("CaliforniaN","sheep",livetech,eftech,"LambSlaugh") 
   -livestockbud ("CaliforniaN","sheep",livetech,eftech,"LambSlaugh") 
  *(effectsonherd(newscenarioname,"sheep","CaliforniaN","dead")) 
                          ); 
 
*handle wool loss 
livestockbud("CaliforniaN","sheep",livetech,eftech,"wool") 
$(livestockbud("CaliforniaN","sheep",livetech,eftech,"wool") and 
effectsonherd(newscenarioname,"sheep","CaliforniaN",herdcomponent)  
 =(livestockbud("CaliforniaN","sheep",livetech,eftech,"wool")* 
       (1-(effectsonherd(newscenarioname,"sheep","CaliforniaN","dead")) ) 
    ); 
 
9.1.7.2.4.  Hog Budget 
The final budget that must be adjusted is the hog budget. In this case, an assumption has 
been made that the majority of hog production in the impacted region of California is the 
production of feeder pigs that will then be finished elsewhere. This assumption is based 
on an examination of hog operations presented in the 2007 Ag Census Report.  
*no replacements taken out in hogs 
livestockbud("CaliforniaN","feederpigproduction",livetech,eftech,"feederpig") 
$(livestockbud("CaliforniaN","feederpigproduction",livetech,eftech,"feederpig") and 
effectsonherd(newscenarioname,"FeederPigProduction","CaliforniaN", herdcomponent)) 
=(livestockbud("CaliforniaN","feederpigproduction",livetech,eftech,"feederpig")    
-livestockbud("CaliforniaN","feederpigproduction",livetech,eftech,"feederpig") 
   *(effectsonherd(newscenarioname,"FeederPigProduction","CaliforniaN","dead")) 
   ); 
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9.1.7.3.  International Trade  
Thus far, only the supply side adjustment required to impose an animal disease shock 
has been discussed. Another component is the demand side adjustment that must be 
made in response to international trade restrictions on US non-pasteurized meat and 
dairy products as a result of FMD. These impacts have been shown to be quite large, 
particularly for countries that are leading exporters of meat products (Pritchett, Thilmany 
and Johnson). The imposition of trade restrictions has been simplified as a scalar 
reduction in US exports of affected products, where the scalar level is set as either no 
trade restrictions (0), a full trade block on those products (1), or a reduction in proportion 
to the production of the affected state (some number greater than zero but less than 1). 
This last option would reflect the use of zoning the disease to limit export restrictions to 
those products from the affected region (trade regionalization).   
Outside of the scenario loop, the affected products (pork, fed beef, non-fed beef, and 
lamb) are defined and the scalar is created. Then inside the scenario loop, the quantity of 
US exports is adjusted for these products.  
commodsupdem('US_exports','US',affectedproducts,'quantity') = 
         commodsupdem('US_exports','US',affectedproducts,'quantity')*zone_regions; 
9.1.7.4.  Solving the Model  
Finally the ASM is solved for the base scenario and each scenario and stochastic 
replication run in the epidemic model to reflect the animal disease shock. The resulting 
output is a distribution of national and regional economic impacts from the animal 
disease.  This distribution can then be used in additional economic analysis to ascertain 
the impact of the disease under the assumptions and control strategies examined.  
.  
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